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**Public Perceptions of ‘the Other’s’ Heritage:
Ottoman Heritage in Greece and Byzantine Heritage in Turkey**

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**By
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Publications

1. Tarhan, Hakan, Yeşim Tonga Uriarte and Maria Luisa Catoni.
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3. Tarhan, Hakan, Yeşim Tonga Uriarte. “Representation and Identity in a State Museum: Hagia Sophia, Istanbul,” at Interpret Europe Conference 2018, 23-25 March 2018, Kőszeg-Hungary.

Abstract

The relationship between cultural heritage and identity has long been acknowledged. Due to this relevance, utilizing past and its material remains for political purposes has been a common practice for the states; a phenomenon that has its roots in antiquity and is still actively used. Modern states have been active agents in this process by defining what constitutes their 'national identity' and 'national heritage'. This selection brings together the exclusion of the pasts and their remains that are 'dissonant' with the national historiography, thus resulting in the deliberate and non-deliberate destruction of 'the Other's' heritage. Due to their attachment to public memory, historical monuments are the most affected subjects of this process.

This study investigates the historical and contemporary effects of 'exclusion' of cultural heritage from the national narratives by focusing on the Ottoman heritage in Greece and the Byzantine heritage in Turkey. The research focuses on the two particular aspects of 'public': the state and the people. It critically analyses cultural heritage laws in Greece and Turkey and the states' contemporary cultural policies with regards to 'the Other's' heritage. People's perceptions of heritage are investigated through public opinion surveys conducted in two case studies from the two countries.

The research deals with a topical subject, 'heritage and identity', which is of high relevance to contemporary societies and the heritage literature. Its originality lies in its scope, 'the Other's' heritages in Greece and Turkey, and the novel results it produces.

In summary, the research shows that people's and states' perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage are interrelated and mostly governed by the states' policies. The inclusion of the Ottoman heritage in the cultural heritage management in Greece has positively influenced the people's perceptions. In Turkey, the 'otherness' of the Byzantine heritage is still felt by the people, but the potential benefits of their utilization enhance their protection by the public.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Background

Modern nations and nation-states, the contemporary socio-political context of the world we live in today, have its origins in the 18th century and are products of modernity.¹ They were not 'born,' 'reborn,' or 'awakened,' as they were once claimed to be,² but were invented by nationalisms.³ The era of nation-states began following the French Revolution of 1789, which led to the collapse of the empires and monarchies throughout the world and nation-states' formation.⁴ French revolutionaries harboured a politics-based nationalist ideology, defining national subjects based on citizenship, with no other inclusive or exclusive cultural elements attached to it.⁵ Soon after, with the emergence of cultural nationalism, the nation has started to be considered a group of people identified with a state and share a distinctive and common culture.⁶ The distinctiveness of a nation, its 'national identity,' was to be found in its history and cultural elements, which include "shared ancestry myths, common historical memories,

¹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3 [hereafter cited in text as Hobsbawm 1992]; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2001), 46 [hereafter cited in text as Smith 2001].

² Hobsbawm 1992, 3; Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, (Penguin Books Ltd, 1991), 71 [hereafter cited in text as Smith 1991].

³ Hobsbawm 1992, 9-10.

⁴ James Livesey, *Making Democracy in the French Revolution*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001).

⁵ Hobsbawm 1992, 18.

⁶ Margarita Díaz-Andreu, "Constructing Identities Through Culture: The Past in The Forging of Europe." In *Cultural Identity and Archaeology*, edited by Paul Graves-Brown, Sian Jones and Clive Gamble, (London: Routledge 1996), 53 [hereafter cited in text as Díaz-Andreu 1996].

unique cultural markers.”⁷ Therefore, investigating the ‘roots’ of their nation became a primary object of the nation-states.

This pursuit of discovering the nation’s ‘glorious past,’ which sometimes included ‘adaptation’ of the facts or even ‘invention’ of them in case of their absence, utilized many disciplines like history, archaeology, and folklore.⁸ The institutionalization and development of archaeology as a scientific discipline were profoundly influenced and shaped by nationalisms in the late 18th century.⁹ In the 19th century, it was already an important instrument used in nation-building.¹⁰ The data provided by archaeology was very suitable for the nation-states, as it could provide a historical connection and continuity with the nation and its ancestors. Furthermore, archaeological remains and monuments could serve as daily reminders of the nation’s ‘golden ages’ due to their material nature.¹¹ The establishment of public museums in the late 18th and 19th centuries was also connected with modern nation-states.¹² Public museums employed the role of housing ‘the national

⁷ Smith 1991, 70.

⁸ Smith 1991, 2001; Hobsbawm 1992; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991) [hereafter cited in text as Anderson 1991].

⁹ Margarita Díaz-Andreu and Timothy Champion, “Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe: An Introduction.” In *Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe*, edited by Margarita Díaz-Andreu and Timothy Champion, (London: University College London Press, 1996), 3 [hereafter cited in text as Díaz-Andreu and Champion 1996]. The relationship of archaeology and nationalism is a widely studied and documented phenomenon. On this topic, see, among others, John A. Atkinson, Iain Banks and Jerry O’Sullivan, eds., *Nationalism and Archaeology*, (Glasgow: Cruithne Press, 1996); Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett, eds., *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Philip L. Kohl, “Nationalism and Archaeology: On the Constructions of Nations and the Reconstructions of the Remote Past,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 27: 223–246 [hereafter cited in text as Kohl 1998].

¹⁰ Kohl 1998, 227.

¹¹ Díaz-Andreu and Champion 1996; Kohl 1998.

¹² Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics*, (London: Routledge, 1995) [hereafter cited in text as Bennett 1995]; Sharon Macdonald, “Museums, National, Postnational and Transcultural Identities,” *Museum and Society*, 1:1–16, 2003 [hereafter

heritage,' and their collections and exhibitions served as essential tools for educating the nation and promoting the 'national identity.' In conclusion, heritage was politicized and associated with national identity through these developments.

Identities are as much about 'exclusion', as they are about 'inclusion'.¹³ As was argued by Woodward (1997), identity is "most clearly defined by difference" and is "constructed in terms of oppositions."¹⁴ According to Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996), the concept of 'otherness' was embedded within Western thought since the Classical Ages.¹⁵ In the same manner, nation and national identities were also defined according to differences from 'others.'¹⁶ In terms of cultural heritage, this undoubtedly led to the appropriation of heritage that would fit in the national narrative and exclude those that do not.

Following the French Revolution and the European Enlightenment ideologies, the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830) from the Ottoman Empire, together with many other Balkan States, has started, and Greece was recognized as an independent nation-state with the London Protocol (1930).

The declining power of the Ottoman state, combined with the widespread movements for independence throughout the Balkans and the politics of power among the so-called Great Powers, led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the subsequent occupation of the Empire's

cited in text as Macdonald 2003]; Fiona McLean, "Museums and the Construction of National Identity: A Review", *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 3, n. 4: pp. 244-252, 1998 [hereafter cited in text as McLean 1998], "Museums and National Identity," *Museum and Society*, 3, n. 1:1-4, 2005 [hereafter cited in text as McLean 2005].

¹³ Marta Anico and Elsa Peralta, "Introduction", In *Heritage and Identity: Engagement And Demission in the Contemporary World*, edited by Marta Anico and Elsa Peralta, (London: Routledge 2009), 1. [Hereafter cited in text as Anico and Peralta 2009]

¹⁴ Kathryn Woodward, ed., *Identity and Difference*, (London: Sage, 1997), 2.

¹⁵ Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996, 48.

¹⁶ Macdonald 2003, 2.

capital (1918), and the partition of its lands by the Treaty of Sevres (1920), a nationalist resistance movement was born. Subsequently, the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923) was won, and the independent nation-state, the Republic of Turkey (1923), was established.

The construction of national identity is a fundamental part of modern states. Both Greece and Turkey underwent such processes of identity formation: Greece established its identity on two core axes, namely, the Classical Antiquity and the Byzantium / Orthodox Christianity, by disregarding its Ottoman past and creating a linear story discourse of uniting modern Greek people and the state with the Ancient Greek Civilization. On the other hand, the modern Turkish state employed the Turkish War of Independence and the legacy of the historic Turkic tribes whose roots were in Central Asia. In order to build the premise of continuity between the land and the nation, the Turkish State employed an intensive program of ‘shaping history’ to prove and promote the argument that Anatolia has always been the homeland of the Turkic people. The selective creation of national narratives and ‘national heritage’ eventually resulted in the denial, neglect, and to some extent, in the demolition of the ‘other’s’ heritage in both countries.

In the traditional Western discourse on nations and nationalism “nations are conceptualised as possessive individuals” and “having a distinctive heritage, memory, culture helps to instantiate and substantiate the nation (or other collective) as ‘living individual’”.¹⁷ However, in the contemporary world, as was pointed out by Graham and Howard (2008), “identity can no longer be framed primarily within the national context that has so defined it since the European

¹⁷ Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*, (Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press 1988), 41, as was quoted in Sharon Macdonald, *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 12. [Hereafter cited in text as Macdonald 2013].

Enlightenment of the eighteenth century".¹⁸ Therefore, it is no longer possible to presume a singular de facto national identity and national heritage, since even in a single society, multiple pasts, heritages and identities simultaneously exist.¹⁹

In the same manner, the definition of heritage, which was developed in the era of nation-states has also changed. As opposed to the traditional association of heritage with singular objects and their intrinsic (tangible and intangible) values, contemporary heritage discourse considers heritage as a process of meaning-making through active participation and engagement.²⁰ Therefore, instead of a top-down heritage discourse in the previous centuries which classifies, denotes and transmits 'what heritage is',²¹ in the contemporary society, heritage has multiple producers".²² They are "present-centered and are created, shaped and managed by, and in response to, the demands of the present".²³ Therefore, heritage in the contemporary world is in the constant state of alteration and recreation, and no singular heritage, defined by the official discourses and shared equally by all members of a society exist.

Within this framework, this research aims to investigate the relationships between official heritage discourses and people's perceptions of heritage. It does so by exploring contemporary public perceptions over the heritages that do not correspond with the national

¹⁸ Brian Graham and Peter Howard, "Heritage and Identity", In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity*, edited by Brian Graham and Peter Howard, (Aldershot: Ashgate 2008), 1. [Hereafter cited in text as Graham and Howard 2008]

¹⁹ Graham and Howard 2008, 1.

²⁰ Brian J. Graham, Gregory John Ashworth and John E. Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture, and Economy*, (London: Arnold, 2000) [Hereafter cited in text as Graham, Ashworth and Tunbridge 2000]; Brian J. Graham, "Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture?", *Urban Studies*, 39, 1003-17; Laurajane Smith, *Archaeological Theory and the Politics of Cultural Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2004).

²¹ Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, (New York: Routledge, 2006) [hereafter cited in text as Smith 2006].

²² Graham and Howard 2008, 1.

²³ Graham and Howard 2008, 3.

narratives ('the Other's' heritages), namely the Ottoman heritage in Greece and Byzantine heritage in Turkey. Furthermore, the research also tries to evaluate how these perceptions affect the tangible and intangible dimensions of these heritages.

1.2. The Aim and Scope of the Thesis

This research investigates public perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage by focusing on the Byzantine heritage in Turkey and the Ottoman heritage in Greece. The reasons behind this study are to understand (i) how the heritages of those who were once marginalised by the official discourse as '*the Other*' are being treated today and (ii) to what extent they have been incorporated into daily lives and personal identities of their contemporary communities.

In this study, the term 'public' encompasses the two notions Merriman (2004) expressed and refers both to 'the state' and 'the people.'²⁴ Accordingly, the term 'public perception' in this study indicates the states' treatment of 'the Other's' heritage in legal and practical terms and the people's feelings and attitudes towards these heritages.

In the context of this study, 'the state' represents the governments, and 'the states' perceptions' of 'the Other's' heritage include the recognition, preservation, and promotion of those heritage assets. In terms of the public as the people, this research concentrates on the local inhabitants of the towns which were selected as the case studies. 'The people's perceptions' are used to describe the values attached and interest shown to these monuments by the public, the people's feelings of ownership regarding these monuments and feelings of responsibility in protecting them, and the inclusion of these monuments in the collective and personal histories and identities of the people.

²⁴ Nick Merriman, *Public Archaeology*, (London: Routledge 2004), 1-2.

'Identity' is not a fixed concept with clear boundaries but is constantly shifting and recreated.²⁵ Likewise, the concepts of 'self' and 'the other' are very fluid and constantly changing, which makes it difficult, if not wholly impossible, to clearly define what constitutes 'us' and 'them' for a particular nation, at a specific time. Therefore, the national identities constructed during the formation of the nation-states are subject to change over time, which results in redefining what constitutes 'the nation' and 'the Other.' Accordingly, the pasts once excluded from national narratives and heritages long-neglected and faced destruction might gain recognition and acceptance. Building on that premise, this research aims to evaluate the contemporary perceptions towards these once-neglected Ottoman and Byzantine pasts and heritages and the contemporary effects of these perceptions on the material remains of heritage.

1.3. Methodology

Like many others within the field of heritage studies, this study includes within its area of inquiry various topics and fields related to other academic disciplines, such as history, politics, management, legislation, archaeology, and ethnography. Accordingly, the research methodology employed in this study combines different approaches.

1.3.1. Research Questions

In line with the aims and scope of the thesis, the main research questions are specified as follows:

- What is the public (the state and the people) perception towards the Ottoman heritage in Greece?
- What is the public (the state and the people) perception towards the Byzantine heritage in Turkey?

²⁵ Macdonald 2003, 6.

The secondary research questions are formulated separately for the *states' perceptions* and the *people's perceptions*.

Research questions for investigating *states' perceptions* are:

- What constituted 'the national' heritage and 'the Other's' heritage in the contexts of Greek and Turkish nation-states?
- To what extent do existing cultural heritage legislation include Byzantine / Ottoman heritage?
- To what extent is the Byzantine / Ottoman heritage involved in the states' cultural policies?
- How do the states' perceptions affect the preservation of 'the Other's' heritage?

Research questions for investigating *peoples' perceptions* are:

- How do the locals interact with the Byzantine / Ottoman heritage in their towns in their daily lives?
- What kind of values are attached to the Byzantine / Ottoman monuments in their towns by the locals?
- To what extent do the locals perceive the Byzantine / Ottoman heritage in their town as parts of their history and personal identity?
- How do the locals' perceptions affect the preservation of 'the Other's' heritage?

1.3.2. Research Design

This study is an example of exploratory research that employs an interdisciplinary approach and uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. The primary study subjects of this research are the states, namely Greece and Turkey, and the people, the local inhabitants. Accordingly, the research employs existing literature and secondary

data, and in addition, it introduces original data collected through public opinion surveys.

In terms of the state's perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage, the study focuses on laws and regulations on cultural heritage in Greece and Turkey. It investigates the evolution of the regulatory frameworks, the changes in the terminology, their inclusiveness of 'the Other's' heritage, and the levels of protection they provide. In addition, the practical actions of the states in the protection, promotion, and management of 'the Other's' heritage are investigated and exemplified.

To investigate people's perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage, the research uses public opinion surveys conducted with local inhabitants in the chosen case studies. As pointed out by Yin (2003), "the case study is used in many situations to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political and related phenomena"²⁶ as a tool to "understand complex social phenomena."²⁷ The public opinion surveys in this research aim to understand the locals' relationship with the selected monuments, various heritage values attached to these monuments by the locals, and to what extent they regard them as parts of their cities' history and identity as well as their personal histories and identities.

After carefully studying the existing literature and inventories of the relevant monuments in both countries, a shortlist of possible case studies was created.²⁸ The case studies to be studied were selected from this shortlist depending on the following criteria regarding 'the

²⁶ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, (Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publications, 2003), 1 [Hereafter cited in text as Yin 2003].

²⁷ Yin 2003, 2.

²⁸ The possible case studies from Greece included the cities Athens, Thessaloniki, Ioannina, Nafplio, Trikala, Kavala, Serres, Komotini and Didymoteicho. For Turkey, the possible case studies were İstanbul, İzmit (Bursa), Trabzon, Kırklareli and Cappadocia (Nevşehir).

Other's' monuments: (1) original and contemporary functions²⁹, (2) current physical state³⁰, (3) relationship with the contemporary townscape³¹, and (4) the communities involved³². Eventually, the case studies that were selected for this study were Trikala (Thessaly, Greece), Serres (Macedonia, Greece), İznik (Bursa, Turkey), and Trabzon (Turkey). The monuments to be studied in each case study are shown below, in Table 1.

Table 1: Selected Case Studies and Monuments

Trikala (Thessaly, Greece)	Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque & Mausoleum
	The Ottoman Baths
Serres (Macedonia, Greece)	Bedesten
	Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque

²⁹ After investigating the intensities of certain 'ethno-symbolic elements' (namely language, religion, and common roots) in the 'constructed' national identities in Greece and Turkey (see chapter 3 and chapter 5, respectively), religion was found to be the most influential factor in defining self and community identities, and accordingly, the 'otherness'. Furthermore, in the context of both Greece and Turkey, the contemporary debates related to utilization of these particular heritages mainly revolve around religious monuments of 'the Other's'. Therefore, for the context of this study, the existence and contemporary functions of religious Ottoman and Byzantine monuments were regarded as the primary criteria in choosing the case studies.

³⁰ Effort was made in order to include structurally intact monuments instead of monuments in ruinous physical states.

³¹ In the context of this study, historical monuments standing alone within modern neighbourhoods, surrounded by contemporary blocks of flats – 'alien monuments' – were selected instead of monuments located within 'old town' areas or historical neighbourhoods. Since the latter are mostly in harmony with their surroundings, they usually are not considered as 'outsider' by the contemporary viewer.

³² Namely, the existence of a modern neighbourhood around the monuments, which provides a daily contact with the monuments; and parties with special interest if any, such as the existence of a Muslim community living around a former Ottoman mosque in Greece, or an Orthodox Christian community living around a former Byzantine church in Turkey.

	Mehmed Bey Mosque
	Mustafa Bey Mosque
İznik (Bursa, Turkey)	Hagia Sophia Church
	Lake Basilica
	Koimesis Church
	Böcek Ayazma (Baptistery)
Trabzon (Turkey)	Hagia Sophia Church
	Saint Anna (Küçükayvasıl) Church
	Saint John (Kaledibi) Church
	Sümela (Virgin Mary) Monastery
	Panagia Theoskepastos (Kızlar) Monastery

1.3.2.1. Public Opinion Surveys

Gray (2003) argues that “through standardisation of the research techniques, different researchers conducting the same study would obtain consistent data, which could then be subjected to measurement, producing verifiable findings.”³³ To achieve the reliability of the findings, the public opinion surveys were conducted as a questionnaire and consisted of multiple-choice, Likert scale, and open-ended questions. Furthermore, through this strategy, the comparability of the results from different case studies were achieved.

The questionnaire was designed building on the already existing literature and the researcher’s previous fieldwork experience. Similar research aiming at understanding public perceptions towards archaeology and heritage were studied and benefited from in

³³ Ann Gray, *Research Practice for Cultural Studies: Ethnographic Methods and Lived Cultures*, (London: SAGE Publications, 2003), 71 [hereafter cited in text as Gray 2003].

preparing the questionnaires for this research.³⁴ In addition, public opinion surveys conducted by the researcher as a part of the Aspendos Archaeological Project³⁵, for the field seasons 2014 and 2016, were also consulted in designing the survey.

The questionnaires consisted of three main parts: demographics, public interest and attitude towards cultural heritage in general, and public interest and attitude towards 'the Other's' heritage.³⁶ To make the results from different case studies comparable with each other, most of the questions were kept the same, and only minor revisions were made to the questionnaire depending on the specifics of each case study.

The first part of the questionnaire aimed to gain insight on sample demographics, namely, age, gender, level of education, occupation and the amount of time spent (living or working) in the selected case study. The second part focused on evaluating the respondents' attitudes towards cultural heritage in general. In this part, the participants were asked to define what cultural heritage means to them, to evaluate their level of knowledge on cultural heritage, to express their opinions on 'to

³⁴ Two significant research with similar aims and methodology which were benefited from in preparing the public opinion survey questionnaires for this study were the doctoral thesis of Anastasia Sakellariadi (2011) [Anastasia Sakellariadi, "Archaeology for the People? Greek Archaeology and its Public: an Analysis of the Socio-Political and Economic Role of Archaeology in Greece" (PhD diss., UCL, 2011)], in which she investigates the relationship between archaeology and the Greek people through three different case studies; and the survey conducted by the Safeguarding Archaeological Assets of Turkey (SARAT) project which aimed at understanding the relationship between archaeology and society in Turkey, through a nationwide public opinion poll (İşilay Gürsu, Gül Pulhan and Lutgarde Vandeput, "'We Asked 3,601 People': A Nationwide Public Opinion Poll on Attitudes Towards Archaeology and Archaeological Assets in Turkey", *Public Archaeology*, 2020) [hereafter cited in text as Gürsu, Pulhan and Vandeput 2020].

³⁵ İşilay Gürsu, "The BIAA's Cultural Heritage Management Project", *Heritage Turkey*, (2014), 4: 37-39; Lutgarde Vandeput and İşilay Gürsu, "Monumental architecture, cultural heritage management and local perceptions of Aspendos", *Heritage Turkey*, 6, (2016): 35-37.

³⁶ See, Appendix A.

whom cultural heritage assets are valuable to' and their positions towards some pre-defined categories of heritage values.³⁷ In addition, their opinions on 'who owns cultural heritage assets' and 'who is responsible from protecting them' were asked, and the respondents' visitation habits were evaluated. The third part of the questionnaire aimed at evaluating the participants' perceptions towards the Ottoman/Byzantine heritage in their towns, and in more general terms, in their countries. The questions in this part of the survey were very similar to those in the second part, so that any possible changes in the respondents' attitudes towards these particular heritages could be evaluated. More specifically, the questions in this part tried to understand the respondents' feelings and positions towards the Ottoman/Byzantine heritage assets in their towns and countries, and their opinions on the protection and the utilization of these assets.

The surveys were conducted face to face with the respondents, who were picked using convenience sampling. The advantages of the face-to-face survey are achieving higher response rates and the ability to

³⁷ There is a rich literature on heritage values [see, among many others, Marta de la Torre, (ed.), *Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage*, (Los Angeles, CA: The Getty Conservation Institute, 2002); George S. Smith, Phyllis Mauch Messenger and Hilary A. Soderland, (eds.), *Heritage Values in Contemporary Society*, (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2016); Erica C. Avrami, Susan Macdonald, Randall Mason, and David Keith Myers, (eds.), *Values in Heritage Management: Emerging Approaches and Research Directions*, (Los Angeles, California : The Getty Conservation Institute, 2019)] and many scholars and cultural organizations have come up with classifications of heritage values (see, for example, Randall Mason, "Assessing Values in Conservation Planning: Methodological Issues and Choices", In Marta de la Torre, (ed.), *Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage*, (Los Angeles, CA: The Getty Conservation Institute, 2002), 5-30]. The categories of values used in this research follows the ones suggested in the Burra Charter (*The Burra Charter: The Australia ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance*, 2013), due to their inclusiveness, their conservation and management oriented nature, and their simplicity. In addition, considering the strong association of cultural heritage with tourism and the potential economic benefits related to it, which exists in both Greece and Turkey, the category 'economic-touristic value', following the categorization of the English Heritage (English Heritage, *Sustaining the Historic Environment: New Perspectives on the Future*. London: English Heritage, 1997) was added.

include more questions and the questionnaire.³⁸ Furthermore, it allows to reach out to a demographically wider sample.³⁹ The participants were selected randomly among the people sitting in central squares and cafes in popular neighbourhoods and working people, depending on their availability and willingness to participate.⁴⁰ For the public opinion surveys conducted in Serres and Trikala (Greece), due to the researcher's lack of fluency in the Modern Greek language, two native speakers assisted the researcher in the process. At the same time, this approach was also thought to be helpful to avoid any possible (positive or negative) reaction from the respondents, which might have affected the validity and reliability of the results.

On the other hand, a common criticism regarding qualitative data collection techniques where the research is in face-to-face contact with the respondent is the possibility of certain biases on the researcher's side or the respondent's side, which can affect the validity of the outcome.⁴¹ Since the researcher is a Turkish citizen investigating public perceptions toward the Ottoman monuments in Greece, the respondents might have answered the questions more positively, considering they are representing their state and nation in the

³⁸ W. Lawrence Neuman, *Basics of Social Research: Qualitative & Quantitative Approaches*, (Essex: Pearson Education 2014), 217 [hereafter cited in text as Neuman 2014].

³⁹ As was noted by Fouseki and Sakka (2013), even though using electronic mediums for distributing surveys provides higher response rates, it also risks reaching out to a sample which might not represent the whole population. In their study, for example, the respondents who responded the questionnaires distributed through Facebook and emails were mostly between 26 -45 years old with a high level of education. See, Kalliopi Fouseki and Nikki Sakka, "Valuing an Ancient Palaestra in the Centre of Athens: The Public, the Experts, and Aristotle", *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites*, Volume 15:1, (2013): 30-44 [Hereafter cited in text as Fouseki and Sakka 2013].

⁴⁰ A small number of the questionnaires, which would make around 15% of the total questionnaires conducted for this research, were handed over to the participants and were collected later on. The reason for that was the unavailability of the participants to conduct a face-to-face survey at the time even though they were eager to participate in the survey.

⁴¹ Gray 2003, 71-2; Neuman 20014, 217.

international context; or on the contrary, it might have aroused mistrust towards the researcher and considered provocative.⁴² Therefore, the assistance of Greek speakers, in the case of Serres, who was also a local inhabitant, certainly helped to overcome this bias. The public opinion survey in Trabzon (Turkey) was also completed with the assistance of a local citizen.⁴³ In this case, since Trabzon is highly regarded as a conservative community, the assistance of a woman researcher was thought to be necessary to overcome any possible bias and increase the presence of women respondents in the results.

In total, 443 responses were collected.⁴⁴ The data was analysed using the IBM SPSS Statistics 19 software, a widely-used computer program for statistical analysis. In addition to the descriptive statistics and cross-tabulation, further statistical analysis were conducted in order to evaluate if meaningful relationships exist between the participants' demographics (namely gender, age, level of education and the amount of time lived in the case study) and their responses to the questions. For this aim, certain questions were grouped under specific categories and the means were calculated for each category. (Table 2) The relationships of 'age' and 'years of inhabitation' with the responses to the questions were investigated by running a correlation analysis. The relationship between the participants' 'gender' and their responses were analysed through Independent T-Test, and the possible effects of

⁴² Needless to say, the same scenario could have easily taken place in the context of Turkey, if the researcher was of Greek citizen – or even a Turkish citizen of Greek origin – investigating local approaches towards the Byzantine heritage Turkey.

⁴³ The public opinion surveys in Trikala and Serres (Greece), and Trabzon (Turkey) were conducted with the assistance of Mrs. Katerina Tsinaslanidou, Mrs. Angeliki Gibirti and Mrs. Ayşen Tüysüz, respectively. The interviewers have been educated in the fields 'Ottoman History' (MA - graduate), 'English Literature' (BA – ongoing) and 'Architectural Conservation' (BA – graduate), respectively. Although they were not trained specifically for conducting ethnographic research, the structured nature of the questionnaire helped to ensure consistency in implementing the surveys.

⁴⁴ Number of respondents for each case study: 107 in Trikala, 130 in Serres, 83 in İznik, 123 in Trabzon.

the 'level of education' on participants' responses were investigated by conducting One-Way ANOVA test.

Table 2: Groupings of the Questions for SPSS Analysis

CHValues	• Cultural heritage has aesthetic value • Cultural heritage has historical value • Cultural heritage has scientific-educational value • Cultural heritage has economic-touristic value • Cultural heritage has political value
Ott/ByzValues	• I think that the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' add aesthetic value to 'Name of the Case Study'. • I think that the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' add historical value to 'Name of the Case Study'. • I think that the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' add scientific-educational value to 'Name of the Case Study'. • I think that the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' add economic-touristic value to 'Name of the Case Study'. • I think that the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' add political value to 'Name of the Case Study'.
Ott/ByzProtection	• Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' should be protected for the future generations. • I have a personal responsibility in the protection of the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study'. • Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in Greece/Turkey should be protected for the future generations. • I have a responsibility in the protection of the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in Greece/Turkey.
Ott/ByzIdentity	• Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' are part of 'Name of the Case Study's' history and culture. • Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case

Study' are part of my own history and culture.

- Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in Greece/Turkey are part of Greece/Turkey's history and culture.
- Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in Greece/Turkey are part of my own history and culture.

"Quantitative research is the primary tool to establish empirical relationships. However, it is less well-suited to explain the constituents or causal mechanism behind a statistical relationship."⁴⁵ Therefore, to "give meaning to quantitative findings,"⁴⁶ the statistical results of the survey data were evaluated in conjunction with answers to open-ended questions, personal observations, and insights gained from in-depth conversations with some local inhabitants. The answers to the open-ended questions were analysed separately and common themes among the answers identified.⁴⁷ Afterwards, the frequency of these themes were evaluated together with the quantitative data.⁴⁸

Using multiple-choice and Likert scale questions ensured to generate standardized and comparable data, whereas open-ended questions generated qualitative insight and assisted in interpreting the data generated with other types of questions.

1.4. Structure of the Dissertation

Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the history of nations and nation-states. After introducing some of the widely accepted discourses on the subject, it provides a working definition for this study. It is followed by defining characteristics of the

⁴⁵ Daniel Stockemer, *Quantitative Methods for the Social Sciences: A Practical Introduction with Examples in SPSS and Stata*, (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 9 [hereafter cited in text as Stockemer 2019].

⁴⁶ Stockemer 2019, 9.

⁴⁷ See Appendix B, Table 1, 2 and 3.

⁴⁸ For a similar approach, see, Mina Dragouni and Kalliopi Fouseki, "Drivers of community participation in heritage tourism planning: an empirical investigation", *Journal of Heritage Tourism*, 13:3, (2018): 237-256 [Hereafter cited in text as Dragouni and Fouseki 2018].

nation-states and national identity. Finally, it discusses how national identity and heritage are related; and how heritage is used for political purposes.

Chapter 3 focuses on Greece and the cultural heritage management practices in Greece, and aims to understand the state's perceptions towards 'the national heritage' and 'the Other's heritage.' Firstly, the chapter provides historical background on the administrative, economic and social aspects of life in Greek lands under the Ottoman empire, the emergence of the Greek War of Independence, and the foundation of the independent Greek state. Then, the chapter analyses how the Greek nation was constructed from the Greek ethnicity, how certain 'ethno-symbolic elements' were used in defining the Greek national identity, and consequently, how 'the Other' was defined. The third section of Chapter 3 examines the historical development of cultural heritage regulation in Greece and analyses the current law within the scope of the research questions stated above. In the last part of the chapter, the Greek state's perception of the Ottoman heritage is discussed through a critical investigation of the Greek cultural heritage legislation, its impacts, and the Greek state's practical efforts to protect the Ottoman heritage in Greece.

In Chapter 4, people's perceptions of the Ottoman heritage in Greece are investigated. The chapter is divided into two main parts focusing on the two selected case studies in Greece, Trikala and Serres. The chapter provides a brief history of these two cities, followed by representing the historical sites and monuments in these towns, including the selected Ottoman monuments. The results of the public opinion surveys are presented in three parts: (1) demographics of the respondents; (2) their knowledge on, interest in, and attitude towards cultural heritage in general; (3) their knowledge on, interest in, and attitude towards the Ottoman monuments in their towns, as well as the Ottoman monuments in Greece in general. The results of the two surveys are discussed with each other and the relevant literature. In the final section of the chapter, a general overview is presented.

Chapter 5 shares the same outline with Chapter 3. It focuses on Turkey and the cultural heritage management in Turkey, with particular focus given to understanding the state's perception towards the 'national heritage' and the heritage of 'the Other's'. Since the Republic of Turkey constitutes continuity with the Ottoman Empire in many political, administrative, and cultural aspects, the chapter starts with an overview of Turkish history in Anatolia and the Ottoman empire. The decline of the empire started in the 18th century was finalized with the successful Turkish War of Independence and the establishment of the Turkish nation-state. Intending to become a member of the league of modern states, the newly independent regime took on the task of constructing a nation and a state that fits the Western ideals and criteria. Accordingly, in the second part of the chapter, national identity construction and its relation to archaeology and heritage are discussed. The chapter then investigates the development of the legislative framework regarding the cultural heritage in Turkey, starting with the first laws regarding the antiquities in the 19th century Ottoman Empire, up until the establishment of the current law in the 21st century. It is followed by presenting the laws and regulations currently in effect. In the final part of the chapter, the official perceptions of Byzantine heritage in Turkey are critically examined, considering the heritage legislation and the practical cultural policies.

Chapter 6 focuses on the people's perceptions towards the Byzantine heritage in Turkey through the case studies of this study, İznik and Trabzon. After providing a brief history of the towns and their architectural remains, the chapter introduces the Byzantine monuments selected for this study's purposes. The third part of the chapter presents the results of the public opinion surveys in three parts, in accordance with Chapter 4, which include (1) demographics of the respondents; (2) their knowledge on, interest in, and attitude towards cultural heritage in general; (3) their knowledge on, interest in and attitude towards the Byzantine monuments in their towns, as well as the Byzantine monuments in Turkey in general. The results of both case studies are

further discussed in relation to the relevant literature in the following part. A general overview of the chapter is provided in the last section.

Chapter 7, Conclusion, starts with presenting the general findings of the research. The discussion part in this chapter includes a three-layered analysis. In the first layer, the analysis includes comparisons between the two case studies regarding the Ottoman heritage in Greece and the Byzantine heritage in Turkey, separately. In other words, the findings in Trikala and Serres are compared to each other, whereas the findings from in İznik and Trabzon are compared to each other. The second-level analysis discusses the states' perceptions of the 'the Other's' heritage, separately for Greece and Turkey. Finally, general comparison is made between the perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage in Greece and Turkey. In the next section, the contribution of the thesis is discussed. The chapter is concluded with a final section which includes the study limitations and future research directions.

Chapter 2: Nations, Nation-States, and Uses of Past

2.1. Introduction

Studies of 'nation' and 'nationalism' have a long history, and scholars from many different fields have investigated these subjects. This chapter briefly discusses the existing literature, presents some major paradigms, and provides working definitions. Afterwards, it explores modern states' characteristics and what factors differentiate these states from each other. To critically analyse the states' cultural policies, and more specifically, their perceptions towards 'Other's' heritage, it is crucial to understand how nations perceive themselves and the 'other', which can be achieved by analysing their national identities. Finally, the chapter discusses how modern states utilize the past and cultural heritage for their political agendas.

2.2 What is a Nation?

The nations and nation-states as we know today are the concepts of the late 18th and 19th centuries, and they are the products of modern developments such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and secular utilitarianism.⁴⁹ As was argued by Hobsbawm (1992), nations were created by nationalisms through transforming already existing cultures into nations or inventing them where they did not exist.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 2001. This 'modernist' view was objected by the 'primordialist' argument which put emphasis on the bonds based on factors such as language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory, and suggested that "nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral elements of human experience" (Smith 2001, 12), and the nations and nationalism have always existed in history. For a detailed discussion on the 'modernist' and 'primordialist' approaches to nations, see Smith 2001.

⁵⁰ Hobsbawm 1992.

According to Smith (2001), the term 'nation' is the "most problematic and contentious term in the field,"⁵¹ and, as Anderson would add, its explanation "remains a matter of long-standing dispute."⁵² Even though much of the literature on nations and nationalism tried to define a nation, no satisfactory criterion could be discovered.⁵³ Hugh Seton-Watson, who, according to Anderson, is the author of the most comprehensive work on nationalism,⁵⁴ states that he is "driven to the conclusion that no 'scientific definition' of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists."⁵⁵

In the literature, one can find definitions of the term nation ranging from "those that stress 'objective' factors, such as language, religion, and customs, territory and institutions, to those that emphasize purely 'subjective' factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments."⁵⁶ One of the most famous definitions relying on objective factors is that of Joseph Stalin, where he defined the nation as "a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture."⁵⁷ However, this objective approach has failed to generate a *de facto* definition of a nation since there could always be exceptions that did not fit these criteria yet are widely accepted as nations or that perfectly meet the criteria but are not recognized as nations.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the criteria used for these definitions – such as language, ethnicity, religion, territory, etc. – were considered vague and shifting.⁵⁹

⁵¹ Smith 2001, 10.

⁵² Anderson 1991, 3.

⁵³ Hobsbawm 1992.

⁵⁴ See Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (London : Methuen, 1977) [hereafter cited in text as Seton-Watson 1977].

⁵⁵ Seton-Watson 1977, quoted in Anderson 1991, 3.

⁵⁶ Smith 2001, 11.

⁵⁷ Joseph Stalin, quoted in Hobsbawm 1992, 5.

⁵⁸ Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 2001.

⁵⁹ Hobsbawm 1992.

The alternative approach was using subjective criteria. The emphasis on these alternative definitions was consciousness or personal choice as the criteria for nationhood. One such example was proposed by the Austro-Marxists, who believed that the "'nationality' could attach to persons, wherever they lived and whoever they lived with, at any rate if they choose to claim it."⁶⁰ Likewise, Renan (1882) connected nationhood to personal feelings and choices when he metaphorically defined the nation as a 'daily plebiscite', and Benedict Anderson (1991) defined the nation as 'an imagined political community.'⁶¹ These definitions were also criticized because the offered criteria (e.g., feelings, will, etc.) made it challenging to separate nations from other forms of groups, such as tribes, city-states, empires, which are also composed of similar subjective bonds.⁶² Furthermore, according to Hobsbawm (1992), these criteria could lead to extremes; for instance, if enough members of a small community want to become a nation, they would be able to.⁶³

Evidently, both the objective and subjective definitions had their inadequacies, and objections could be made to both; therefore, neither of them was satisfactory on their own, and no scholarly consensus could be reached on the definition of the nation.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, there was an agreement on two points; "a nation is not a state" and "it is not an ethnic community."⁶⁵

A nation was not regarded as a state because a 'state' is defined as "a set of autonomous institutions, differentiated from other institutions, possessing a legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given

⁶⁰ Hobsbawm 1992, 7.

⁶¹ Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?", text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?", trans. Ethan Rundell, (Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992); Anderson 1991, 6.

⁶² Smith 2001.

⁶³ Hobsbawm 1992.

⁶⁴ Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 2001.

⁶⁵ Smith 2001, 12.

territory", whereas the 'nation' represents a community "whose members share a homeland and a culture".⁶⁶ On the other hand, it is not considered an ethnic community since "the ethnic community usually has no political referent".⁶⁷ On the contrary, a nation "must occupy a homeland of its own, at least for a long period of time, in order to constitute itself as a nation; and to aspire to nationhood and be recognized as a nation, it also needs to evolve a public culture and desire some degree of self-determination".⁶⁸

According to Smith (2001), many modern nations emerged from an existing *ethnie*. The use of ethnic components such as collective memories, symbols, myths, and traditions was at the core of the nation-building processes.⁶⁹ The enduring ethnic ties and sentiments were used to define a nation's national identity and ensure a "continuity with the cultural past of the dominant *ethnie*."⁷⁰ Thus, he argues that to understand how a nation identifies itself and the differentiating characteristics from the others, it is necessary to analyse the ethno-symbolic components of a nation.

Taking into consideration the arguments explained above, Smith proposes the following definitions for *ethnie* and nation:

"The concept of *ethnie* is defined as 'a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites.

A nation is a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a

⁶⁶ Smith 2001, 12.

⁶⁷ Smith 2001, 12.

⁶⁸ Smith 2001, 12.

⁶⁹ Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 2001.

⁷⁰ Smith 2001, 118.

common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members".⁷¹

These definitions are considered suitable for this study's purposes as they clearly outline the common elements and differentiating factors between and within modern nations and ethnies.

2.3. The Nation and Its State

The primary meaning of 'nation' in the contexts of the American and French Revolutions was political, and it represented both the state and the people.⁷² This resulted in a tendency to equate state and people and popularise the concept 'nation-state'.⁷³ The nation-state, according to Smith (2001), is defined as:

"a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a measure of national unity and integration (but not of cultural homogeneity)"⁷⁴

In the context of this study, the term 'nation' refers only to 'people', whereas the term 'nation-state' is used for the modern form of state that was evolved after the American and French Revolutions

2.3.1. Characteristics of the Nation-States

The modern state reached its systematic form in the era after the French revolutions. By the 19th century, it became possible for other nations and nationalisms to follow a similar formula to form their own independent national states.⁷⁵ This nation format was based on:

⁷¹ Smith 2001, 13.

⁷² Hobsbawm 1992, 18.

⁷³ Smith 2001, 16.

⁷⁴ Smith 2001, 17.

⁷⁵ Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 2001.

1. “an historic territory or homeland, preferably one that was relatively compact;
2. a territorially unified, and socially cohesive, if not homogenous, population;
3. a unified economy with a single occupational system and mobility throughout the territory;
4. a single, shared and distinctive public culture, with preferably a unified history;
5. common rights and duties for all members, together with participation as citizens in a largely autonomous, and preferably independent and sovereign, national community.”⁷⁶

The ties with the ethnic bases and ethno-symbolic elements were significant for the modern states. The nation-states aimed to generate a great continuity with the nation and the dominant ethnic group's cultural past; and appeal to people's feelings and emotions through collective memories, symbols, values, and traditions. For this reason, Smith (2001) suggests that to “grasp the present self-understandings of nations or their peculiar beliefs about their own histories and destinies”, one needs to look at the ‘ethno-symbolic’ components.⁷⁷

The two case studies in this research, Greece and Turkey, are modern national-states formed following the national blueprint mentioned above. Therefore, to understand the factors that define and differentiate them, an analysis of their ethno-symbolic components is crucial, which can be achieved by investigating their national identities.

2.3.2. National Identity

Smith (1991) identifies two types of national identities: Western or ‘civic’ model and ethnic conception of the nation. The characteristics of

⁷⁶ Smith 2001, 116.

⁷⁷ Smith 2001, 118-9.

the 'civic' model are "historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology".⁷⁸ The ethnic model, which was developed mainly in Eastern Europe and Asia, challenged the dominance of the Western model and added new elements to it. The key difference was its emphasis on a community of common descent. On the contrary to the Western concept, in which an individual can choose freely which nation to belong to, in the ethnic model, individuals remain members of their communities of birth, even if they migrate and live in different territories.⁷⁹ However, in practice, there were no distinct separations between the two models, and modern nationalisms comprised elements of both types of identities, territorial and ethnic, in different amounts. Despite their differences, the territorial and the ethnic model have some shared assumptions on what differentiates a nation from other types of collective cultural identities. Looking at these commonalities, Smith (1991) lists the fundamental features of national identity as;

1. "an historic territory, or homeland
2. common myths and historical memories
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members"⁸⁰

"National identity and the nation are complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components — ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political".⁸¹ To analyze national identities, it is necessary to investigate these components and their relationship with each other. Through that, it would be possible to make a statement on

⁷⁸ Smith 1991, 11.

⁷⁹ Smith 1991, 11-2.

⁸⁰ Smith 1991, 14.

⁸¹ Smith 1991, 15.

what constitutes the national identity of a particular nation and nation-state.

2.4. The Nation and Its Heritage

What did 'past' mean for the nations and the nation-states in the 19th century? How did they make an understanding of its tangible and intangible remains, 'heritage', and of which uses they found in it? In order to answer these questions, it is thought to be necessary to look at the heritage discourse of the time briefly.

2.4.1. The Authorized Heritage Discourse

Laurajane Smith (2006) argues that a particular heritage discourse "emerged in the late-19th century Europe and has achieved dominance as a 'universalizing' discourse in the 21st century".⁸² This discourse, which she calls the 'Authorized Heritage Discourse' (AHD), is connected with the developments of nationalism and modernity of the 19th century, and it "simultaneously draws on and naturalizes certain narratives and cultural and social experiences – often linked to ideas of nation and nationhood".⁸³ Two main characteristics of this discourse are its emphasis on materiality and expert knowledge. Embedding the ideology of 19th century Europe, the AHD favours materiality and monumentality, which it regards as the "crucial markers of heritage and identity",⁸⁴ and considers heritage as innately valuable. Furthermore, it claims that these innate values can only be 'unlocked' by expert knowledge, so it privileges experts, such as archaeologists

⁸² Smith 2006, 17.

⁸³ Smith 2006, 4.

⁸⁴ Laurajane Smith and Emma Waterton, *Heritage, Communities and Archaeology*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 27 [hereafter cited in text as Smith and Waterton 2013].

and historians, and considers them as “legitimate spokespersons for and stewards of the past”.⁸⁵

As Smith (2006) explains, identifying such a discourse helps us understand how some conceptions of heritage were kept out of official heritage practices and their implications on the “expression of cultural and social identity”.⁸⁶ In analysing states’ heritage policies, the AHD is a useful concept since it helps to understand which heritages certain nation states legitimize and regard as ‘national heritage’ and which heritages they marginalize.

The focus of this research, Greece and Turkey, are both products of the Western modernity and nationalisms, and as will be discussed and exhibited in the following chapters, both states have followed the traditional blueprint of ‘nation-states’ and ‘nation-building’ in many aspects, including their approaches to cultural heritage. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, AHD is chosen as a standpoint to evaluate the states’ historical and contemporary approaches to heritage.

2.4.2. The National Heritage

The nation-state and ‘national heritage’ were fundamentally connected to each other.⁸⁷ As was stated by Graham, Ashworth and Tunbridge:

“The nation-state required national heritage to consolidate national identification, absorb or neutralize potentially competing heritages of social-cultural groups or regions, combat the claims of other nations upon its territory or people, while furthering claims upon nationals in territories elsewhere”. (Graham, Ashworth and Tunbridge, 2000, 183).

⁸⁵ Smith 2006, 29.

⁸⁶ Smith 2006, 42.

⁸⁷ Graham and Howard 2008, 7.

In line with the 19th nationalisms, within which the dominant heritage discourse (AHD) was born, heritage was used as a “resource for the representation of identities and a place for its performance”.⁸⁸ The selected remains of the past worked to generate feelings of “sense of place, a sense of self, of belonging and community”.⁸⁹ For the nation-states of the 19th century, whose primary purpose was to create a common identity, and through that, harmony within the nation, the tangible remains of the past were of crucial importance. Accordingly, one of the most decisive practices among nation-states was using the past, and cultural heritage as a tool of nation-building and homogeneity to create national discourses that glorify a shared and ‘owned’ national heritage whilst they disregard the heritage of ‘the other’.⁹⁰ The literature shows that cultural heritage plays an important role in nation-building, especially in the newly founded countries and countries with ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, creating social cohesion within the society and strengthening national identity.⁹¹

While deciding upon the ‘national heritage’, or what is ‘ours’, national identity played the most crucial role. As argued by Smith (1991), the nation's past could not be ‘any’ past; it had to be connected to the dominant ethnies, to their myths, legends, golden ages, and traditions.⁹² Therefore, the ‘national heritage’ was selected and legitimized with

⁸⁸ Anico and Peralta 2009, 1.

⁸⁹ Smith 2006, 30.

⁹⁰ Graham, Ashworth and Tunbridge 2000.

⁹¹ See, for example, Stuart Hall, “New Cultures for Old”, In *A Place in the World? Places, Cultures and Globalization*, edited by Doreen B. Massey and Pat Jess, (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1995); Martin Prötsler, “Museums and Globalization”, *The Sociological Review*, 43, (1995): 21-44; Monica Risnicoff de Gorgas, “Museums and the Crisis of Concurrent Identity Populations”, *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 5:1, (1999): 52-57; Elizabeth Croke, “Confronting a Troubled History: Which Past in Northern Ireland’s Museums?”, *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 7:2, (2001): 119-136; Alexander Herrera, “Heritage Tourism, Identity and Development in Peru”, *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 17, no. 2, (2013): 275–95.

⁹² Smith 1991.

regards to the national identity. Accordingly, the material and non-material remains that were not connected to the national identity were marginalized, and most of the time, faced denial, neglect and demolition.

The AHD treats heritage as “inherently good, safe and conflict-free”.⁹³ However, as was pointed out by Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996), classifying certain heritage as ‘someone’s’, inevitably makes it ‘not someone else’s’,⁹⁴ and any creation of heritage from the past disinherits someone completely or partially”.⁹⁵ Accordingly, any process of selecting and categorizing material and non-material remains of the past as ‘national-heritage’ marginalizes the ones that were not selected, which can be named the ‘dissonant heritage’.⁹⁶ In the context of the nation-states and this study, the ‘national heritage’ and the ‘dissonant heritage’ constitute ‘ours’ and ‘the Other’s’.

2.4.3. Uses of Heritage

Nation-states were using various tools to promote the distinctive characteristics of the nation, its glorious past and its distinctive heritage. Some of the most common ways of this communication were public education, museums and monuments.⁹⁷

Museums as institutions are developed from traditional practices of collecting, preserving and presenting objects, and they acquired their modern form during the late 18th and early 19th centuries.⁹⁸ Yet, with

⁹³ Smith and Waterton 2013, 30.

⁹⁴ John E. Tunbridge and Gregory John Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (Chichester: Wiley, 1996).

⁹⁵ Gregory John Ashworth, “Holocaust Tourism: The Experience of Krakow-Kazimierz”, *International Research in Geographical and Environmental Education*, 11 (4) (2002): 363-367; Graham and Howard 2008, 3.

⁹⁶ Graham and Howard 2008, 3.

⁹⁷ Smith 1991; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992.

⁹⁸ Bennett 1995.

the foundation of nation-states, the range and relevance of the museums' functions, both for the nation-states themselves and for communities and individuals, underwent a gradual process of expansion and amplification.⁹⁹ Since their modern establishment as institutions, museums have been significant in representing the nation's culture and performed the function of housing a national heritage, thus satisfying national ambitions through the construction of national identity.¹⁰⁰

This communication always implies processes of selection and manipulation. The physical environment the museum is established, the objects that are selected and the ways these objects are presented to the public represent the main tools of this communication. 'An object takes on a range of cultural meanings, partly due to how it has been represented in visual and verbal forms'.¹⁰¹ In addition to the selection of objects and the ways of representation, the museum building can also be a part of this communication.

Today, apart from their type and collections, museums vary highly in terms of the buildings they use. While some museums use modern structures built and designed specifically for housing exhibitions, some museums use historic buildings and monuments through adaptive reuse. The adaptive reuse of buildings and monuments, which had lost their meanings and function, is a long-lasting tradition that goes back to antiquity.¹⁰² Furthermore, in many cases, it constitutes a symbolic

⁹⁹ Linda Young, "Globalisation, Culture and Museums: A Review of Theory", *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 5 (1) (1999): 6–15.

¹⁰⁰ McLean 1998.

¹⁰¹ McLean 1998, 247.

¹⁰² The conversion of pagan temples into Christian churches and the patrician dwellings into monasteries with the orders of Pope Gregory the First in the 6th century; and the existence of dwellings, storehouses, workshops and merchants that occupied the arches of the Coliseum, of the Theatre of Marcellus in Rome and of the theatre in Pompeii in the 11th century are just some of these examples. For more on the topic, see, Françoise Choay, *The Invention of the Historic Monument*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

act.¹⁰³ Francoise Choay (2001) defines the term monument as “any artefact erected by a community of individuals to commemorate or to recall for future generations individuals, events, sacrifices, practices or beliefs.”¹⁰⁴ Therefore, monuments are directly related to memory and refer to a definite past that can promote “the preservation of the identity of an ethnic, religious, national, tribal or familial community”.¹⁰⁵ In this regard, as pointed out by Aloise Riegl (1903), a monument is a deliberate creation with the specific purpose of remembrance; besides, any historical object without an original memory function can also be intentionally transformed into a relic of memory, which he defines as the ‘historic monument’.¹⁰⁶

In conclusion, historic monuments serve as markers of identity and places of remembrance and forgetting. Their contemporary status, which includes the ways they are used or neglected and their physical condition, indicates their positions within the dominant heritage discourse in that country and their relation to the ‘national heritage’. Therefore, a contemporary understanding of the state’s perceptions can be achieved by evaluating those monuments’ contemporary functions, preservation, management and ownership. Furthermore, their place in the public memory provides insights into the people’s perceptions of specific heritages. Within this context, this study evaluates

2001) [hereafter cited in text as Choay 2001].

¹⁰³ A striking example of this symbolic act is the musealization of the Louvre, which used to be a royal palace housing the royal art collection. After the French Revolution that abolished the monarchy and established a republic, the new state used cultural heritage as a way of demonstrating its values and turned the Louvre palace and the private collection of the monarchy into a public museum in 1793.

¹⁰⁴ Choay 2001, 6.

¹⁰⁵ Choay 2001, 6.

¹⁰⁶ Alois Riegl, *Moderne Denkmalkultus: sein Wesen und seine Entstehung*, (Wien: K. K. Zentral-Kommission für Kunst- und Historische Denkmale: Braumüller, 1903). Translation first published as Alois Riegl, "The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin" trans. Kurt W. F. and Diane Ghirardo, in *Oppositions*, n. 25 (Fall 1982), 21-51 [hereafter cited in text as Riegl 1903]; Choay 2001.

contemporary public perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage through focusing on historical monuments.

2.5. Conclusion

The concept of 'nation' as we understand it today is a product of 19th century modernism and nationalism. The main characteristics of these modern nations are occupying a homeland, having a common history, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all its members.¹⁰⁷ Modern nation-states are the political representatives of nations. These states construct their national identities according to the characteristics of their dominant ethnies and communicate these values to their inhabitants and other nation-states as their distinctive features. Being the material and non-material remains of these pasts, cultural heritage constitute one of this communication's main channels. The contemporary uses of and attitudes towards cultural heritage provides valuable insights for understanding the states' and the people's perceptions.

¹⁰⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. (Cambridge: Polity, 2001, 2nd ed. 2010), 13.

Chapter 3: Modern Greece and Its Cultural Heritage

3.1. The Foundation of Modern Greece

Greece as an independent state has a history of almost two centuries, yet its 'national awakening' goes a bit further than that. Following the fall of the Byzantine Empire (1453), which was embedded within the Greek national history discourse in the second half of the 19th century, the lands that consist modern Greece were ruled by different peoples and states such as the Genoese, the Venetians, the Frankish, the Serbs, and the Ottomans.

3.1.1. Greece Under the Ottoman Rule

Ottoman conquests in Western Thrace started in the 14th century, and by the mid-15th century, mainland Greece was fully conquered by the Ottomans.¹⁰⁸ Thus, most of the lands that constitute modern Greece today have been under Ottoman rule, between approximately one and a half centuries to six centuries.

Administratively, the Ottoman Empire was divided into *eyalets*, which were the biggest administrative units and were ruled by a Pasha. The *eyalets* were then also subdivided into *sanjaks*. Among the lands comprising the Greek state today, the major part of mainland Greece was a part of the eyalet of Roumeli, and the Aegean region was a part of Eyalet of the Archipelago.¹⁰⁹ This division pretty much maintained

¹⁰⁸ The latest addition was the island of Crete, which was captured from the Republic of Venice in 1670. The Ionian Islands, on the other hand, have never went under the governance of the Ottomans.

¹⁰⁹ For the administration of today's Greek lands during the Ottoman rule, see, among many others, Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical*

administrative divisions under Roman and Byzantine rules.

In the political system of the Ottoman state, Sultan's subjects were divided according to their '*millet*'.¹¹⁰ Even though the meaning of the word '*millet*' is 'nation' in the modern-day Turkish language, within the *millet* system in the Ottoman era, *millets* were defined according to religion and not ethnicity. Therefore, the Greeks living under Ottoman rule were part of the Orthodox *millet*, which constituted all the Orthodox subjects of the empire, regardless of their ethnic background.¹¹¹ non-Muslim *millets* (Christians and Jews) were legally inferior to Muslims.¹¹² Legal and institutional equality between Muslims and non-Muslims was provided only in the 19th century, with the Tanzimat (1839).¹¹³

The Ottoman state's economy was highly based on agricultural production and tax revenues. Many of the Sultan's subjects were peasants and worked on the lands that were the Sultan's property. Accordingly, most of mainland Greece and its inhabitants were

Age 1300-1600, (London: Phoenix, 2000); Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social And Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Leiden: Brill, 2002) [hereafter cited in text as Karpat 2002]. For a brief overview, see also, Antonis Anastasopoulos, Elias Kolovos and Marinos Sariyannis, "The Ottoman Empire and the Greek Lands", In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 2008), 279-281 [hereafter cited in text as Anastasopoulos, Kolovos & Sariyannis 2008].

¹¹⁰ Karpat 2002, 611-646; Anastasopoulos, Kolovos & Sariyannis 2008.

¹¹¹ Karpat 2002, 611-646; Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

¹¹² Except for the formative period of the Ottoman state (from the 14th century until the mid-15th century), during which being a member of another faith other than Islam, did not constitute any drawbacks, as the Christian members of the state could also rise up to high ranks among the military and administrative elite. This situation continued until the second half of the fifteenth century when Islam became the dominant force within the Ottoman state affairs and being Muslim became a requirement to be in the ruling class, until the Tanzimat (1839). See, Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003) [Hereafter cited in text as Lowry 2003].

¹¹³ Anastasopoulos, Kolovos & Sariyannis 2008.

involved in agricultural production.¹¹⁴ Trade was developed mainly in the in-land trade routes and the coastal areas, especially in the islands.¹¹⁵ This situation eventually resulted in the development of a Greek mercantile class, which became a significant factor in the Greek Enlightenment and the Greek War of Independence to follow.¹¹⁶

In terms of the population within the Greek lands, considering the low level of record-keeping, especially within the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire, and the fact that the first census was made only at the end of the 19th century, it is not easy to calculate the actual population within the Greek lands.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, there wasn't a homogenous ethnic or religious population since it was a common practice to relocate Muslim families from Anatolia to the newly conquered lands.¹¹⁸ In addition, many Jews have also migrated to and settled in the empire in different eras.

In conclusion, economically, the inland areas of the Greek lands were primarily agricultural and inhabited by farmers. The main economic activity took place in the cities, the coastal regions, and the islands, and eventually, the cities emerged as cosmopolitan centres. The continuous transaction with the West through commerce also opened up the space for cultural and political interplays. Consequently, towards the end of

¹¹⁴ Halil İnalçık, "Greeks in Ottoman Economy and Finances, 1453-1500", In Halil İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, (İstanbul: Eren, 1998) [hereafter cited in text as İnalçık 1998b].

¹¹⁵ İnalçık 1998b; Anastasopoulos, Kolovos & Sariyannis 2008; Roderick Beaton, *Greece, Biography of a Modern Nation*, (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2019) [Hereafter cited in text as Beaton 2019].

¹¹⁶ Beaton 2019.

¹¹⁷ According to Anastasopoulos, Kolovos & Sariyannis (2008), the population of Greek lands before the War of Independence were about half a million people (35).

¹¹⁸ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda bir iskan ve Kolanizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler I", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 11, (1950): 524-69; "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda bir iskan ve Kolanizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler II", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 13, (1952): 56-78; "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda bir iskan ve Kolanizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler III", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 15, (1954): 209-237.

the 18th century, the Western ideas of Enlightenment and French Revolution made their way to Greek lands through these 'borderlands'.¹¹⁹

3.1.2. The Greek War of Independence

The Greek-speaking Orthodox mercantile class, whose members were located within the borders of the Ottoman Empire as well as other important centres in Europe, was instrumental in the outset of the Greek War of Independence.¹²⁰ The members of this 'Orthodox Commonwealth' (the collective community based on shared religion and language, which included Greeks but also Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, Moldovans, Ukrainians), were instrumental in the development of education and secular learning, as well as the increase in publications in Greek; all of which led to the 'Greek Enlightenment'.¹²¹ Through the so-called Greek-Enlightenment movement, the educated Greek-speaking people were introduced to Western ideas such as 'nation', which resulted in their 'self-discovery' as 'Greeks'.¹²² Consequently, with the effect of the French Revolution,¹²³ the ideas of 'national self-determination' and 'rights of citizens' began to circulate within the Greek-speaking Orthodox elite of the Ottoman

¹¹⁹ Beaton 2019.

¹²⁰ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 6-7 [hereafter cited in text as Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002]. See also Richard Clogg, *The Struggle For Greek Independence; Essays to Mark The 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (London: Macmillan, 1973); Dakin 1973; Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece: From Independence to The Present*, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Mark Mazower, *The Greek Revolution: 1821 and the Making of Modern Europe*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2021).

¹²¹ Beaton 2019, 20-21.

¹²² Beaton 2019, 23.

¹²³ For the effects of the French Revolution on Greece, see Paschalis Kitromilides, "Republican Aspirations in Southeastern Europe in The Age of the French Revolution", In Donald D. Horward, (ed.), *The Consortium n Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850, Proceedings (1980) Volume I*, (Athens, Georgia, 1980).

Empire.¹²⁴

The Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire started in March 1821 in the Peloponnese, around the same time as the uprising in the Danubian principalities of Romania.¹²⁵ Though the latter was suppressed by the Ottomans, the campaign in the Peloponnese was successful, and by the end of 1821, Peloponnese was in Greek control.¹²⁶

According to Beaton, two main factors affected the outcome of the Greek revolution; and neither could do without the other. These were the determination of Greeks on the field and the international aid the Greek diaspora could facilitate.¹²⁷ Beaton argues that the aid of the Philhellenes on the battlefield was minimal and did not make much difference on the Greek side. On the other hand, on the ideological and the economic level, their involvement in the Greek cause was undoubtedly much more beneficial. The Philhellenes living in the metropolitan cities in the west, such as London, Paris, Vienna, etc., were very effective in promoting the Greek cause and gaining support for Greek independence. The aid of the Philhellenes came in different forms: sometimes by sending soldiers to fight on the ground, but mainly by providing financial support through loans and fundraising campaigns.¹²⁸

Up until 1827, there were no direct official aids for the Greek War of Independence coming from the Western states. Only with the naval Battle of Navarino, the Great Powers decided to take a hands-on approach and openly supported the Greek independence. Following the defeat of the Ottoman-Egyptian naval army by the joint English-Russian-French army and the Russian army's advancement towards Constantinople in 1828, the Ottoman Empire was forced to accept the

¹²⁴ Beaton 2019, 53.

¹²⁵ Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, 12.

¹²⁶ Beaton 2019.

¹²⁷ Beaton 2019, 93.

¹²⁸ Beaton 2019.

autonomy of the Greek state with the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). The following year, the London Protocol of 3 February 1830 internationally recognized the independent Greek state.

3.1.3. The Modern Greek State

Greece was recognized as an independent state with the London Protocol signed between the 'Great Powers' - Great Britain, France, and Russia. With the Treaty of Constantinople (1832), signed between the 'Great Powers' and the Ottoman Empire, the borders of the Kingdom of Greece were decided to include the Peloponnese, continental Greece extending over the Arta-Volos line, and the Cycladic Islands. Thessaly was incorporated into Greece with a treaty in 1881. As a result of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), parts of Epirus, Macedonia, and the eastern Aegean Islands became a part of Greece. Crete was united with Greece in 1913. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) defined Greece's border with Turkey, and with the inclusion of the Dodecanese Islands in 1947, Greece's borders took their final form.

For the political system of the newly independent state, there was a joint agreement within Greece that the regime should have been a monarchy. The reason was, monarchy, especially a king from Europe, could have secured the political and financial support from the West and ensured the new state's independence. For the ordinary people, a 'king' and a 'monarch' were more familiar concepts than a 'republic' or 'representative government'.¹²⁹

Ioannis Kapodistrias was selected as the first head of the independent Greek state, and he served for four years (1827-1831) until his assassination. His successor, decided by the European Powers, was Otto, a Bavarian Prince, who brought together Bavarian advisers, an army, political backing of European Powers, and foreign loans.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, 41.

¹³⁰ Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, 49.

3.2. Inventing the Greek Nation

In the previous chapter, it is discussed that modern nations and national-states are products of modernism. As argued by Anderson, nations do not have clearly identifiable births in time.¹³¹ Nor, they emerge through a national awakening to self-consciousness but are invented by nationalisms.¹³² The nation is an 'imagined community' whose characteristics were designed and shaped by its founding fathers through a deliberate identity-building process.¹³³ So how did the 'founders' of the Greek state 'imagine' and 'construct' the Greek nation and its national identity?

As already mentioned, national identity consists of several different ethno-symbolic elements, which are in constant interplay, combined in different proportions, and unique in every case. For that reason, to analyse national identities, it is necessary to investigate these 'ethno-symbolic elements'. In the case of the Greek nation, language, religion, and shared past were used to unite the people around a shared national identity. Accordingly, the Greek national culture was regarded as the combination of 'fatherland, language and religion'.¹³⁴

3.2.1. Language

One of the most important of these ethno-symbolic elements was, without a doubt, language. Anderson emphasizes the political and ideological importance of the language in nationalisms in Europe. According to him, in European nationalisms, language was both a

¹³¹ Anderson 1991, 205.

¹³² Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 169.

¹³³ Anderson 1991.

¹³⁴ Antonis Liakos, "Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space", In Zacharia, K. (Eds.), *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 201-236 [hereafter cited in text as Liakos 2008].

unifying and a differentiating element.¹³⁵ As a medium of human interaction, language constitutes one of the fundamental building grounds of societies. It is a decisive criterion of self-identification and group identification and a determinant in defining ‘the other’. In terms of Greek ethnicity and nation, the Greek language, which had its roots in antiquity, and has been continuously used for centuries, was one of the fundamental characteristics. Thus, in the era of nationalisms, the Greek language functioned as a means for constructing a Greek national identity.¹³⁶

In practice, there were different approaches to the existence of a connection between the modern Greek language to the Ancient Greek language, considering that there were very few similarities between the language of the ancient Greeks and the Greek spoken in the 18th-19th century. Some experts had argued that these two languages were different, considering their syntax and vocabulary. In contrast, the others considered these differences an undeniable consequence of development and change within a thousand years.¹³⁷

Historically, the official language used in the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire was Latin until the 6th century. Over time, and with the separation of the non-Greek speaking territories from the empire, the Greek language became more widely used and became the empire's official language.¹³⁸ The Greek language was also the official language used by the Orthodox Church.

After the empire's collapse in the 15th century, the Greek language has continued to be spoken by ordinary people and used through religious

¹³⁵ Anderson defines the European nationalisms as ‘second-wave’ nationalisms. In contrast, in the ‘first-wave’ nationalisms that took place in the Americas, the language has never had such an importance. See Anderson 1991.

¹³⁶ Liakos 2008.

¹³⁷ Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, (5th edition), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 27 [hereafter cited in text as Millas 2020].

¹³⁸ Millas 2020, 32.

practices.¹³⁹ Furthermore, the Orthodox Christians under the Ottoman empire were allowed to get an education in the Greek language, which also assisted the language's survival. In the end, it also resulted in the appearance of a Greek aristocracy.¹⁴⁰

In conclusion, according to Millas, the modern Greek language has started to evolve through the Hellenistic language, and through the Middle Ages, it reached its current form.¹⁴¹ Even after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the Greek language has continued to be a living language, especially through religion and education, in addition to being the vernacular of many people. Therefore, for the Greek nation under Ottoman rule, the language constituted one of the main pillars that helped maintain a collective identity. Even though there were opposing sides on selecting the official language for the Greek nation [between the modern spoken version, the Demotic Greek (*Δημοτική Γλώσσα*) and a more 'purified' form, the Katharevousa (*Καθαρεύουσα*) that was closer to the Ancient Greek]¹⁴²; what is certain is that in creating the Greek state and the nation, one of the primary aims was to establish a standard and national language.¹⁴³

3.2.2. Religion

According to Millas, the history of the Byzantine empire is strictly connected with Orthodox Christianity since this faith and its Church had developed in the Byzantine era.¹⁴⁴ As mentioned above, Orthodox Christianity was also intertwined with the Greek language, as it was the official language of the Church. The rituals, hymns, and prayers

¹³⁹ Anderson 1991.

¹⁴⁰ Beaton 2019, 14.

¹⁴¹ Millas 2020, 32.

¹⁴² Millas 2020; Liakos 2008.

¹⁴³ Millas 2020, 32-3; Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987) [hereafter cited in text as Herzfeld 1981].

¹⁴⁴ Millas 2020, 34-35.

had all taken place using the Greek language.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, Orthodox Christianity is highly identified with the Greek language and the Byzantine Empire.

Within the rule of the Ottomans, non-Muslim subjects were free to practice their faith. The Greek-Orthodox Patriarchy was the authority over all the Orthodox Ottoman subjects of the empire.¹⁴⁶ Orthodox churches continued their operations without any intervention from the Sultan or the Ottoman administration. They were allowed to have students and give education in the Greek language.

So, like language, Orthodox Christianity acted as an essential factor in maintaining and determining self and group identities. During the Ottoman rule, the freedom to practice their religion allowed Greeks to maintain a shared ethnicity, which was influential in forming the Greek nation.¹⁴⁷ Even though the Greek nationalism at the beginning of the 19th century, a highly Western-influenced secular project, distanced itself from religion, throughout the 19th century, Orthodox Christianity came to be a major element in the Greek national identity.¹⁴⁸

3.2.3. The Common Roots

Along with a shared language and religion, a shared past is another important factor that binds individuals and facilitates a nation's emergence. As mentioned before, in the process of nation-building, a glorious past is deliberately selected and 'resurrected' – and it is

¹⁴⁵ Millas 2020, 34-35.

¹⁴⁶ Halil İnalçık, "The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Under the Ottomans", In Halil İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, (İstanbul: Eren, 1998) [hereafter cited in text as 1998a].

¹⁴⁷ Smith 1991, 63.

¹⁴⁸ On the relationship with Greek nationalism and Orthodox Christianity, see Umut Özkırmılı and Spyros A. Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (London : Hurst & Company, 2008); Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: "A Sacred Synthesis"*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013).

‘invented’ when it does not exist.¹⁴⁹ Greek intellectuals and historians took on this task to ‘furnish Greece with a national history worthy of a modern European state.’¹⁵⁰ There were two main arguments within the Greek historiography in relation to the nation’s and the state’s past. The first was the ‘*revivalism*’ narrative, arguing that Modern Greece was the ‘resurrection’ of Classical Greece, ‘subjugated by the Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines and the Turks’.¹⁵¹ The second argument was the ‘*continuity*’ narrative, which suggested the ‘survival’ of the ‘Hellenic spirit’ from the Classical past until the modern era, with the medieval phase serving as ‘the connecting link’: a continuity, whose traces could be observed in folklore.¹⁵²

The leaders of the Greek Enlightenment and subsequently the founding fathers of the state utilized the Classical Antiquity, the age of Athenian democracy, as the nation’s ‘common’, ‘shared’, ‘golden age’. The reasons for that were twofold. Firstly, all those people were either educated in or living in the West, where the ideals of democracy and the interest for the Classical past, Western Hellenism, have emerged and become prevalent. Secondly, it was considered a solid legitimizing factor for the independent Greek nation in the eyes of the Western states. To justify the existence of the Greek nation – like those other modern nations – and to gain European support for its independence, it was crucial to appeal to Western ideals.¹⁵³ According to Herzfeld, the ‘*revival*’ narrative, which he names the ‘*Hellenist model*’, was the dominant political and academic discourse in the first century after the Greek independence.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ Anderson 1991; Smith 1991; Hobsbawm 1992.

¹⁵⁰ Dimitris Plantzos, “Archaeology and Hellenic Identity, 1896-2004: The Frustrated Vision”, In Dimitris Damaskos and Dimitris Plantzos, (eds.), *A Singular Antiquity: Archaeology and Hellenic Identity In Twentieth-Century Greece*, (Athens: Benaki Museum, 2008), 17 [hereafter cited in text as Plantzos 2008].

¹⁵¹ Liakos 2008, 204.

¹⁵² Herzfeld 1981; Liakos 2008.

¹⁵³ Beaton 2019.

¹⁵⁴ Herzfeld 1981, 23.

Selecting the Classical past as the national history discourse of the newly independent nation and the state produced some problems, which became apparent, especially in the mid-19th century and afterwards.¹⁵⁵ Firstly, Ancient Greece and the Classical Age did not mean much for the ordinary Greek people, and, indeed, they did not associate themselves with people who lived a thousand years ago.¹⁵⁶ So, the ordinary people became an object for the ruling classes to educate and enlighten, which was done through mass media, schools, and museums.¹⁵⁷ Secondly, it created a contrast with the teachings of the Orthodox Church. After all, the Hellenes were pagan people and representing the modern Greek nation as the descendants of those heretics was a paradox.¹⁵⁸ Thirdly, it created another, maybe even bigger problem for modern Greek historiography: ancient Greek civilization was long gone.¹⁵⁹ The nations are supposed to have continuity in time, but there was a big gap between ancient Greece and the Modern Greece State.

The second half of the nineteenth century had been a period of great debates regarding the historical continuity of the Modern Greek state and the nation. Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891)¹⁶⁰, influenced by the ideas of Zambelios¹⁶¹, proposed the continuity of the 'Hellenic spirit' through ages by constructing a tripartite 'national-time' of the Greek nation, which suggested the 'survival' of the nation,

¹⁵⁵ Herzfeld 1981; Liakos 2008.

¹⁵⁶ Herzfeld 1981; Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) [hereafter cited in text as Hamilakis 2007].

¹⁵⁷ Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002; Hamilakis 2007.

¹⁵⁸ Millas 2020, 36; Herzfeld 1981, 6.

¹⁵⁹ Liakos 2008, 206.

¹⁶⁰ The influential work of Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, the *History of the Greek Nation* was published in various editions and revisions between 1860-1876, as was stated by Plantzos 2008, 17.

¹⁶¹ For Zambelios, see Herzfeld 1981, 39-47.

instead of its 'revival'.¹⁶² According to this argument, there were three main phases of Greek history: the classical age, the middle ages (Byzantine Empire) and the modern Greek nation. This discourse implemented the previously ignored Byzantine past into the Greek history narrative, which also helped to incorporate the Orthodox religion into the Greek national identity. In the end, the historiography suggested by Paparrigopoulos became the dominant discourse in Greece. As argued by many scholars like Hamilakis and Plantzos, this discourse has not changed much since the last century, and it is still very much alive in modern Greek national identity and the official discourse.¹⁶³

3.2.4. Of Greeks and 'the Others'

What defines self – or nation – is also related to what makes us different. In that sense, the 'other' is an instrumental and necessary component of any identity. What factors separated Greeks from other nations, and who were the 'others' for the Greeks?

At the beginning of the Greek Revolution, the ultimate 'other' for the Greek nation was the Ottomans, from which they wanted to gain their independence.¹⁶⁴ The uniting ethno-symbolic element in this struggle was religion, which also happened to be the primary separator with those they were fighting against.¹⁶⁵ Under the umbrella of the

¹⁶² Herzfeld 1981; Plantzos 2008.

¹⁶³ Hamilakis 2007; Plantzos 2008.

¹⁶⁴ The term 'Τουρκοκρατία' (Tourkokratia), the Turkish rule, has been used by the Greeks to refer to era of the Ottoman rule in Greece. As can be seen, in Greek perception, there were no differences between the terms 'Ottoman' and 'Turk'. (Millas 2020) Europeans as well used the term 'Turks' to refer to Muslims, whether they were Ottomans or not. On the other hand, the Ottoman ruling elite never identified themselves as 'Turks'. In their terminology, 'Turk' was used for the peasants and countrymen living in Anatolia. (Norman Itzkowitz, "The Problem of Perceptions", In L. Carl Brown, (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: the Ottoman imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

¹⁶⁵ As noted by Beaton, in the language of the era, regardless of their ethnicity, all

Orthodox-Christian community, who took an active part in the Greek War of Independence, also existed other ethnicities such as Albanians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, etc. Another essential element was the language, an effective tool used by the Greek state to 'Hellenise its multilingual lands'.¹⁶⁶

As the Balkan nationalisms grew and other members of the Orthodox Community also started to work towards their independence, religion, and language as determining factors of Greek identity were deemed not to be enough. Descent and cultural continuity were raised as elements of Greek identity, which eventually increased the importance of history, folklore, and archaeology.¹⁶⁷

3.2.5. Conclusion

According to Hobsbawm, some factors facilitate the appearance of the nations. These factors include the existence of a shared culture, an elite class, and the ability to conquer.¹⁶⁸ In the context of the Greek Enlightenment and the Greek War of Independence, these factors were all present.

In defining the Greek nation, ethno-symbolic elements such as language and religion were used in different combinations and proportions.¹⁶⁹ As identities are not fixed unchanging constructs and are constantly reshaped, so has the Greek national identity. Since its appearance, Greek nationalism has been shaping 'what constitutes a Greek' according to the context of the era. Accordingly, some ethnicities that were not previously regarded as 'others' became so through time.

On the other hand, the otherness of the Ottomans (also used as the

Muslims were described as 'Turks'. (Beaton 2019, 82)

¹⁶⁶ Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002.

¹⁶⁷ Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, Herzfeld 1981, Hamilakis 2007, Plantzos 2008.

¹⁶⁸ Hobsbawm 1992.

¹⁶⁹ Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002.

Muslims and the Turks) has stayed constant until today. The Greek War of Independence, after all, was fought against the Ottomans. Furthermore, since the foundation of the independent state, one of the biggest aims of the Greek state was to reclaim the historical Greek lands – the majority of which were under Ottoman/Turkish rule. This irredentist ideology of reuniting Greeks and their historical lands, known as the *Megali Idea*, resulted in the military campaign in Minor Asia, which was fought against the Turks. In conclusion, in Greek national discourse, Ottomans/Turks/Muslims – however named – meant the same and have always been considered the ‘other’.

3.3. The Greek National Heritage

Nationalism and the national imagining require tangible remains of the past to justify its historical narrative. Archaeology as a modern discipline has evolved to serve this need,¹⁷⁰ and accordingly, museums became places for communicating the national discourse.¹⁷¹ As explained in the previous chapter, the past selected and presented was associated with the national identity, whereas the other’s heritage was disregarded.

3.3.1. The Remnants of the Greek National Past

The previous section explained that, at the beginning of the 19th century, the newly independent Greek state associated itself and the Greek nation with ancient Greece and classical antiquity. Through that, the antiquity and ancient Greek heritage became the nation’s symbolic and cultural capital.¹⁷² Since the early years of the independent Greek state, archaeology became a discipline of great importance, and the first

¹⁷⁰ Hamilakis 2007.

¹⁷¹ Anderson 1991; Smith 1991; Hobsbawm 1992.

¹⁷² Yannis Hamilakis and Eleana Yalouri, “Antiquities as symbolic capital in modern Greek society”, *Antiquity*, Volume 70, Issue 267, (March 1996): 117-129.

archaeological institutions were established in this period.¹⁷³ The efforts were directed on uncovering the material remains of the ancient Greek past and ‘clearing’ them from the effects of the following centuries and civilizations.¹⁷⁴ A prime example of this process of ‘purification’ was the works on the Athenian Acropolis. Remains of the later periods such as the Frankish tower, Ottoman minaret and Venetian walls were destroyed to turn the Acropolis and the Parthenon into a pure representation of Ancient Greece’s golden era.¹⁷⁵ In this period, Byzantine-era heritage, such as historical churches, was also demolished in order to highlight the ancient past.¹⁷⁶

State museums, which were of great importance in presenting the national identity and educating the public, were also founded in this period. These museums were strictly archaeological and were aimed at presenting the glorious past of the Hellenes and justifying the historical continuity of the Greek nation through centuries. Towards the end of the 19th century, with the inclusion of the Byzantine era in the Greek national narrative, physical remains of the Orthodox-Christian past also gained increased recognition and care.

The dominant heritage discourse in Greece, which was shaped during the foundation of the modern state and has been altered towards the end of the 19th century, is still active today. According to this perception, as argued by scholars such as Hamilakis and Plantzos, the material remains of the past and especially of antiquity serve as the

¹⁷³ For the archaeological institutions in Greece, see Hamilakis 2007. For a brief overview of the archaeological heritage management practices in Greece, see Georgios Alexopoulos and Kalliopi Fouseki, “Introduction: Managing Archaeological Sites in Greece”, *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites*, Volume 15, No 1, (February 2013): 1-12 [Hereafter cited in text as Alexopolous and Fouseki 2013].

¹⁷⁴ Hamilakis 2007; Plantzos 2008.

¹⁷⁵ See, among many others, Hamilakis 2007; Plantzos 2008; Eleana Yalouri, *The Acropolis: Global Fame, Local Claim*, (Oxford: Berg, 2001); Daphne Voudouri, “Law and the Politics of the Past: Legal Protection of Cultural Heritage in Greece”, *International Journal of Cultural Property*, 17, 3 (2010):547-568 [hereafter cited in text as Voudouri 2010].

¹⁷⁶ Plantzos 2008.

centrepieces in constructing the national *topos* by connecting the imagined nation to the material space and linking the contemporary inhabitants of the land with those glorious ancestors.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, the material remains of these periods, namely Ancient Greece and Byzantine Empire, are regarded as ‘the national heritage’ and “what is ours”.

3.4. Legal Framework of Cultural Heritage Protection

This section aims to present the development of the legal framework of cultural heritage in Greece from its liberation until today. It investigates the historical development of the laws and regulations on cultural heritage and critically examines their inclusiveness and approaches to the cultural heritage of different civilizations/eras.

According to the Greek constitution, “the protection of the natural and cultural environment constitutes a duty of the State and a right of every person”.¹⁷⁸ The main legal instrument regarding the protection of cultural heritage is Law 3028/2002, “On the Protection of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in general”. In addition, within the Greek constitution, there are also some laws that regulate building activities near archaeological sites.¹⁷⁹

3.4.1. Historical Background of Legal Protection of Antiquities

The archaeological remains of Ancient Greece constituted a significant role in the formation of the Greek national identity and the sovereign Greek state,¹⁸⁰ and due to this significance, the state had implemented

¹⁷⁷ Hamilakis 2007; Plantzos 2008.

¹⁷⁸ Constitution of Greece, Government Gazette, 85/A/18-4-2001, Art. 24

¹⁷⁹ Council of Europe, Herein System, Greece, Cultural Heritage Policy, 2018. These laws are ‘General Building Regulation, Law 2508/1997’, ‘New Building Regulation, Law 4067/2012’, and ‘Control and Protection of Built Environment and other provisions, Law 4495/2017’. Accessed on 24/09/2021 via <https://www.coe.int/en/web/herein-system/greece>.

¹⁸⁰ Hamilakis 2007; Plantzos 2008; Daphne Voudouri, “Greek Legislation Concerning the

strict legislation regarding antiquities since its foundation.¹⁸¹ The development of the legal framework on cultural heritage originated in the Greek War of Independence, during which the revolutionary bodies issued official decrees to protect the antiquities and prohibit their exportation.¹⁸² With the same aim, the National Museum was founded in 1829¹⁸³, a year before the London Protocol of 1930, with which Greece gained its independence.¹⁸⁴

After the liberation of Greece, the first national legislation regarding the protection of antiquities was the Law of 10/22 May 1834, “On scientific and technological collections, on the discovery and conservation of antiquities and the use thereof”. The Law of 1834 was novel for its time since in many other nations, national legislation regarding antiquities was introduced only many years later.¹⁸⁵ The law regarded all antiquities found on Greek soil as “works of the ancestors of the Hellenic people” and thus “as national property of all Hellenes in general”.¹⁸⁶ The state was considered the owner of the antiquities found on or beneath public grounds, under seas, rivers or public streams, lakes or marshes. Yet, the law also allowed private ownership of antiquities under certain circumstances.¹⁸⁷ The law also defined the structure and responsibilities of the State Archaeological Service and of

International Movement of Antiquities and Its Ideological and Political Dimensions”, In Dimitris Damaskos and Dimitris Plantzos, (eds.), *A Singular Antiquity: Archaeology And Hellenic Identity In Twentieth-Century Greece*, (Athens: Benaki Museum, 2008) [hereafter cited in text as Voudouri 2008]; Voudouri 2010; Daphne Voudouri, “The Legal Protection of Antiquities in Greece and National Identity”, In Sofia Voutsaki and Paul Cartledge, (eds.), *Ancient monuments and modern identities: A critical history of archaeology in 19th and 20th century Greece*, (New York: Routledge, 2017) [hereafter cited in text as Voudouri 2017].

¹⁸¹ Voudouri 2008, 2010.

¹⁸² Voudouri 2008, 2010, 2017.

¹⁸³ The National Museum was founded in 1829, in Aegina, the first capital of Greece.

¹⁸⁴ Voudouri 2008, 2010, 2017.

¹⁸⁵ Voudouri 2008, 2010, 2017.

¹⁸⁶ Voudouri 2010, 549.

¹⁸⁷ Voudouri 2008, 2010.

the public museums planned to be opened in the future.¹⁸⁸

The Law of 1834 was written with the ideology that the relics of Ancient Greece were the symbols of the Greek national identity and the link between the modern Greek state and the developed European countries.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the law's main focus was the Ancient Greek civilization's material remains. However, architectural remains of the later periods were also referred to as the law protected "objects of art dating from the most ancient period of Christianity or the so-called Middle Ages".¹⁹⁰ Similarly, a decree issued by King Otto in 1837 called for the protection of the medieval remains in Athens "Byzantine, Venetian and Turkish," which according to Voudouri, was "a consideration that expressed a romantic taste for the picturesque".¹⁹¹ Nevertheless, almost all the efforts for protecting antiquities in the 19th century were focused on the remains of Greece's classical era, sometimes at the expense of the remains of later periods, in the name of 'purification'.

In 1899, with the implementation of the Law 2644/1899 "On Antiquities," a stricter approach on the ownership of antiquities was imposed.¹⁹² Contrary to the law of 1834, which allowed private ownership under certain conditions, Law 2644/1899 recognized the state as the sole owner of all antiquities in Greece, moveable and immovable, that were found on or beneath public or private land.¹⁹³

Law 2644 was written in line with the new nationalist discourse in Greece, which emerged towards the end of the 19th century. As explained in the previous section, this ideology was strongly influenced by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos' thesis of the 'unbroken

¹⁸⁸ Voudouri 2010, 2017.

¹⁸⁹ Voudouri 2010.

¹⁹⁰ Voudouri 2010, 551.

¹⁹¹ Voudouri 2010, 551.

¹⁹² Voudouri 2008, 2010, 2017.

¹⁹³ Voudouri 2008, 2010.

continuity of Hellenism' between the ancient Greek civilization and the modern Greek state and nation through the Byzantine (Christian – Orthodox) period.¹⁹⁴ In accordance with this new narrative, Law 2644 also included the objects dating to the Byzantine period (up until 1453) among the antiquities that belong to the state.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, in 1914, with the law 401, the Byzantine and Christian Museum was established, and objects of art and historical value from the medieval era gained protected status.¹⁹⁶ Churches, monuments, and historic buildings dating before 1830 also gained legal protection with a further provision made in 1920.¹⁹⁷ Cultural objects or monuments, which date to a time after 1830, gained protective status only in 1950, following Law 1469.¹⁹⁸

Throughout the 20th century, the primary legislation regarding the protection of antiquities (cultural heritage) in Greece was the Codified Law 5351/1932, written based on the principles of the law 1899 and its provisions.¹⁹⁹ Law 5351/1932's main innovation was allowing private ownership of movable antiquities for private persons, which allowed the existence of private collectors and antique dealers.²⁰⁰ This law remained in effect until 2002, when the new law, Law No. 3028/2002, was introduced.

3.4.2. The Current Law of Cultural Heritage Protection in Greece

The current law regarding the protection of cultural heritage in Greece is the Law 3028 of 2002, "On the protection of antiquities and cultural heritage in general." According to Voudouri (2010), this law's main innovation was establishing a general legal framework for Greece's

¹⁹⁴ Plantzos 2008.

¹⁹⁵ Voudouri 2008, 2010, 2017.

¹⁹⁶ Voudouri 2010, 2017.

¹⁹⁷ Voudouri 2010.

¹⁹⁸ Voudouri 2010.

¹⁹⁹ Voudouri 2008, 2017.

²⁰⁰ Voudouri 2008.

cultural heritage.

The law considers all the cultural objects, dating from ancient times to today, found within the Greek territory as the nation's cultural heritage. Cultural objects are categorized under four groups, monuments, archaeological sites, historical sites, and intangible cultural heritage, which are defined as:

Monuments: "Cultural objects which constitute material testimonies and belong to the cultural heritage of the country and which deserve special protection."

Archaeological sites: "Areas on land, or at sea or in lakes or rivers which contain or there is evidence that they contain, ancient monuments, or which have constituted or there is evidence that they have constituted monumental, urban or burial groups from ancient times up to 1830."

Historical sites: "Areas on land, or at sea or in lakes or rivers which have constituted, or there is evidence that they have constituted, the site of exceptional historical or mythical events, or areas which contain or there is evidence that they contain monuments dating after 1830, or combined works of man and nature dating after 1830, which constitute distinctive, homogeneous and topographically definable sites, and which deserve protection due to their folk, ethnological, social, technical, architectural, industrial or in general historical, artistic or scientific significance."

Intangible cultural heritage: "Expressions, practices, knowledge and information, such as myths, customs, oral traditions, dance, rituals, music, songs, skills or techniques which constitute testimonies of the traditional, folk and literary culture." (Law No. 3028/2002, Article 2)

Among these classifications, monuments also have four distinctions: ancient monuments or antiquities, recent monuments, immovable

monuments, and movable monuments.

Ancient monuments or antiquities: “All cultural objects dating back to prehistoric, ancient, Byzantine and post-Byzantine times up to 1830, subject to the provisions of article 20.

Archaeological monuments shall also include caves, paleontological remains, for which there is evidence that they are related to human existence.”

Recent monuments: “Cultural objects dating after 1830, which deserve protection due to their historical, artistic or scientific significance, in accordance with the distinctions of article 20.”

Immovable monuments: “Monuments which have been attached to, and remain on the ground or on the seabed or on the bed of lakes or rivers, as well as monuments which are found on the ground or on the seabed or on the bed of lakes or rivers and cannot be removed without damage to their value as testimonies. Immovable monuments shall also include installations, structures and the decorative and other elements, which form an integral part of the monuments, as well as their surroundings.”

Movable monuments: “Monuments which are not immovables.” (Law No. 3028/2002, Article 2)

3.4.2.1. Immovable Monuments

According to the Article 6 para. 1 of the law, immovable monuments are defined as;

- a) “Antiquities dating up to 1830;
- b) Recent cultural objects more than one hundred years old, which are classified as monuments due to their architectural, urban, social, ethnological, folk, technical, industrial or in general historical, artistic or scientific significance;

- c) Recent cultural objects less than one hundred years old, which are classified as monuments due to their architectural, urban, social, ethnological, folk, technical, industrial or in general historical, artistic or scientific significance.”

Immovable antiquities that date up to 1830 are automatically classified monuments and protected by law (Article 6). The antiquities built after 1830 (recent immovable monuments) need an administrative act to be classified as monuments and gain protected status.

The Greek state has the rights of ownership and possession over ancient immovable monuments (dates up to 1453) and immovable antiquities discovered during archaeological works (regardless of the period they were built). Other immovable monuments, which date after 1453, can have private ownership and possession in accordance with Law 3028/2002 (Article 7).

The State Archaeological Service is responsible for overseeing and preserving immovable antiquities (Article 9). In the case of private ownership, the owner or the possessor, or the holder, has an obligation to cooperate with the State Archaeological Service to guarantee the monument’s preservation and undertake necessary measures (Article 11).

3.4.2.2. Movable Monuments

According to Article 20 para. 1 of the law, movable monuments include;

- a) “Monuments dating up to 1453
- b) Monuments dating after 1453 and up to 1830 which constitute finds from excavations or other archaeological research, or have been removed from immovable monuments, as well as icons and other religious objects used for worship, dating from the same period
- c) Monuments dating after 1453 and up to 1830 which are not

subject to subparagraph (b) and are classified as monuments due to their social, technical, folk, ethnological, artistic, architectural, industrial or in general historical or scientific significance

- d) Recent cultural objects more than one hundred years old, which are classified as monuments due to their architectural, urban, social, ethnological, folk, technical, industrial or in general historical, artistic or scientific significance
- e) Recent cultural objects less than one hundred years old, which are classified as monuments due to their architectural, urban, social, ethnological, folk, technical, industrial or in general historical, artistic or scientific significance”

Movable monuments that were built before 1453 are automatically protected by the law. In addition, movables that date between 1453 and 1830 are also protected if they were found in archaeological works, or if they were removed from immovable monuments, or if they are religious objects. The remaining immovables (c, d, and e) need to have an administrative decision to be classified as monuments.

Movable monuments that date up to 1453 and movable monuments discovered during archaeological works (regardless of the period they were built) belong to the Greek state in terms of ownership and possession. Private ownership for imported antiquities dating up to 1453 is allowed under certain circumstances, and the law permits private ownership of movable antiquities dating after 1453.

The holder and the owner of movable antiquities are responsible for its safety and preservation, and they shall take the necessary measures for its conservation in communication with the archaeological service (Article 27).

3.4.2.3. General Overview

The new CH law is more advanced than its predecessors in several

aspects. Firstly, compared to the previous legislation, law 3028 is more inclusive as it provides a broader definition of cultural objects as “testimonies of the existence and the individual and collective creativity of humankind” (Article 2). In the same manner, intangible cultural heritage is introduced within the cultural heritage legislation for the first time.²⁰¹ Furthermore, the new law extended the previous law’s narrow aesthetic approach, and it allowed the classification of modern monuments (the ones built after 1830) under more general criteria such as architectural, urban, social, ethnological, folk, and technical significance.²⁰²

The territorial criterion introduced with the law also increases its inclusiveness as it provides legal protection status to different civilizations’ remains and considers them the country’s national heritage.²⁰³ At the same time, this innovation suggests that the Greek state has adopted a policy of accepting the remains of the other civilizations’ heritage on its lands as a part of its heritage.

According to Voudouri (2010, 2017), the new law breaks away from the archaeology-centric approach imbued within the previous legislation and treats the ancient and other monuments equally. However, at the same time, monuments’ classification criteria continue to use the chronological approach, which is very much related to the nationalist ideology of the 19th century. The two dates that affect the monuments’ extent of protection and ownership rights are 1453, the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans and the subsequent collapse of the Byzantine Empire, and 1830, the foundation of the sovereign Greek state. According to the law, monuments dating up to 1830 are automatically considered cultural objects and are legally protected; however, the protection of the monuments dating up to 1453 is

²⁰¹ Voudouri 2010.

²⁰² Voudouri 2010, 2017.

²⁰³ Voudouri 2010, 2017.

enhanced.²⁰⁴ According to the law, private ownership of the monuments built before 1453 is not allowed in any circumstances, and the state is considered the sole owner of these monuments. On the other hand, the law allows private ownership of the monuments built after 1453.

The Law 3028 of 2002 sets a general legal framework for protecting cultural heritage in Greece in compliance with international legislation.

3.4.3. International Legislation

As a member state of UNESCO since 1946 and the European Union since 1981, Greece is also bounded by international agreements and conventions regarding cultural heritage. The international conventions ratified by Greece are the following:

- “UNESCO
 - Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict (1954) and the two Protocols thereto (1954 and 1999). Law 1114/81, Official Gazette 6/A/08.01.1981 and Law 3317/05, Official Gazette 45/A/23.02.2005
 - Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970). Law 1103/80, Official Gazette 297/A/29.12.1980
 - Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972). Law 1126/81, Official Gazette 32/A/10.12.1981
 - Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003). Law 3521/2006, Official

²⁰⁴ Voudouri 2010, 2017.

Gazette 275/A/22.12.2006

- Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005). Law 3520/06, Official Gazette 274/A/22.12.2006
- COUNCIL OF EUROPE
 - European Cultural Convention (1954). Law 4194/61, Official Gazette 166/A/19.09.1961
 - Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe (1985). Law 2039/92, Official Gazette 61/A/13.04.1992
 - European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (1969, and revised, 1992). Law 1127/81, Official Gazette 32/A/10.02.1981 and Law 3378/05, Official Gazette 203/A/19.08.2005
 - European Landscape Convention (2000). Law 3827/10, Official Gazette 30/A/25.02.2010
- UNIDROIT
 - Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995). Law 3348/05, Official Gazette 144/A/23.06.2005” (Council of Europe, Herein System, 2018) ²⁰⁵

3.4.4. Discussion

Even before the foundation of the independent Greek state, the superiority of the West was internalised by the Greek revolutionaries, as it was the support of the so-called Great Powers that made the Greek

²⁰⁵ Council of Europe, Herein System, Greece, Cultural Heritage Policy, 2018. Accessed on 24/09/2021 via <https://www.coe.int/en/web/herein-system/greece>.

War of Independence both possible and effective.²⁰⁶ Therefore, it is no surprise that the rulers of the newly founded Greek state had the same mindset. Accordingly, the first cultural heritage legislation, the Law 1834 and 1839, was written with the acceptance of European superiority.²⁰⁷ In fact, both the first officials responsible for cultural heritage and the ones who had written the legislation were the Bavarian officials under King Otto.²⁰⁸ According to Hamilakis, the Greek national narrative was constructed in an ideological combination of colonialism and nationalism.²⁰⁹ Greek revolutionaries believed that they owed their independence to antiquity. Similarly, 'Western Hellenism' considered its roots within antiquity. Thus, for the Greek state, antiquity became both an asset as well as a burden, as they constantly felt 'the gazing eyes of the West upon them'.²¹⁰ Written within such context, the Western influence and appeal within first Greek cultural heritage legislation and the strong emphasis of the antiquities were no surprise. Considering the law 3028/2002, the emphasis on antiquities is still strong, and the artefacts from the Greek ancient past still enjoy a privileged status.²¹¹

The Greek legislation considers the state and organs the sole owner and the protector of cultural heritage assets. Like Italy and France, there is strict state control over cultural heritage. The custodianship of the state and the superior role attributed to the archaeologists and experts²¹² within the Greek legislation strongly reflects the Authorised Heritage Discourse, defined and argued by Smith.²¹³

The categorization of different cultural eras as the prehistory, the

²⁰⁶ Hamilakis 2007.

²⁰⁷ Voudouri 2008, 2010, 2017.

²⁰⁸ Hamilakis 2007.

²⁰⁹ Hamilakis 2007.

²¹⁰ Hamilakis 2007.

²¹¹ Voudouri 2008, 2010, 2017; Hamilakis 2007.

²¹² Hamilakis 2007.

²¹³ Smith 2006.

Antiquity, and the Byzantine/Post-Byzantine era suggests that the new cultural heritage legislation still embodies the national history narrative shaped at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.²¹⁴ Furthermore, the dates that affect cultural heritage assets' classification, protection and ownership levels are significantly symbolic. These dates, 1453 and 1830, mark the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans and the subsequent collapse of the Byzantine Empire, and the independence of the Greek state from the Ottoman empire. By providing different levels of protection to remains of these eras, the Greek legislation favours specific historical periods, namely and within this order, the Antiquity and the Byzantine era, over others, such as the Middle Ages, the Frankish, the Venetian and the Ottoman era. Therefore, even though the Ottoman heritage in Greece gained increased protection status within the Greek cultural heritage legislation with the Law 2038/2002, it is also seen that the Ottoman heritage in Greece is considered relatively inferior, as it is still not a part of the national narrative and national identity.

3.5. The Ottoman Heritage in Greece

3.5.1. The Architectural Legacy

The Ottoman conquests in Greece brought together the process of Islamification which was carried out through two interrelated practices: by altering demographics and topography of the newly conquered lands. Elements of Turkish-Islamic culture were introduced to the new cities by converting existing monuments or new building activities.

It is acknowledged that when it comes to a state like the Ottoman Empire administered by religious law and Islamic elements are highly intertwined with the social life; it is not always possible to make a clear separation of religious or secular architecture. Most of the time, the same buildings or building complexes embody both secular and

²¹⁴ Hamilakis 2007.

religious functions (as in the case of *medrese*, in which elementary education was provided, but there were also rooms preserved for religious activities). In the context of this study, the classification of the Ottoman monuments in Greece follows Brouskari's (2008) 'Ottoman Architecture in Greece', which divides the Ottoman monuments built on the Greek lands into two categories, religious architecture and secular architecture.²¹⁵ In this categorisation, the religious architectural monuments include *camis* (mosques), *tekkes* (monasteries), and *medreses* (theological schools, which also had a mosque within their complexes).²¹⁶ The secular architectural monuments include *bedestens* (covered market halls for luxury goods), *hamams* (bathhouses), *mektebs* (Koran school also giving education in reading, writing, arithmetic), *türbe* (tomb), *hans* and *kervansarays* (hostels), *imarets* (charitable institutions), *çeşme* (fountain), *hisar* (citadel) and *kule* (tower), *saat kulesi* (clock tower), bridge, aqueduct, administration buildings (such as barracks) and residential buildings.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 2008) [hereafter cited in text as Brouskari 2008]. Other important works on the Ottoman architectural remains in Greece include Semavi Eyice, "Yunanistan'da Türk Mimari Eserleri", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, Volume XI (1954): 157-182; Semavi Eyice "Yunanistan'da Türk Mimari Eserleri", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, Volume XII (1955): 205-230; Semavi Eyice, Atina'daki Türk Mimari Eserler, In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Volume 4 (1991): 76-79; Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı Mimari Eserleri*, Cilt IV, Book V, Yunanistan (İstanbul: İstanbul Fetih, 1982) [hereafter cited in text as Ayverdi 1982]; Nusret Çam, *Yunanistan'daki Türk Eserleri* (Turkish Monuments in Greece), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000); İsmail Bıçakçı, *Yunanistan'da Türk Mimari Eserleri*, (İstanbul: İSAR Vakfı, 2003). For more sources on the subject, see Heath W.

Lowry, *Ottoman Architecture in Greece: A Review Article with Addendum & Corrigendum*, (Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2009) [hereafter cited in text as Lowry 2009b].

²¹⁶ Souzana Choulia, "Religious Architecture in Ottoman Greece", In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 2008), 45-50.

²¹⁷ Paschalis Androudis, "Secular Ottoman Architecture in Greece", In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 2008), 51-65.

3.5.2. The Levels of Protection

Even though much of its Ottoman tangible heritage is lost in today's Greece, it is still possible to find a representative from all the mentioned architectural types.²¹⁸

During the Greek War of Independence, many Ottoman architectural monuments were (sometimes intentionally) damaged or destroyed. Due to that reason, especially in the Peloponnese – where the revolution started and the first independent Greek state was formed – there are not many existing Ottoman monuments today, especially religious architecture.²¹⁹ As explained in the previous section, in the era's perception, Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk meant the same thing, and the monuments that represented them were 'the other's' monuments. Thus, to truly 'cleanse the national land of the foreign occupation' and to 'unite the nation with its ancestral topos', the remains of the foreign eras had to be erased.²²⁰

The still surviving Ottoman monuments of religious architecture located in those areas are mostly those transformed into other buildings and have continued to be used with different functions. In the early years of the independent Greek state, these transformations primarily aimed at providing necessary infrastructures, such as

²¹⁸ See Brouskari 2008.

²¹⁹ As explained by Beaton [2019], when the Greek War of Independence was over, almost no Muslim inhabitants were left in the areas that the fought took place and Muslim monuments were either destroyed or transformed into other monuments. The most symbolic element of these transformations were the destructions of the Minarets. The inscriptions of the monuments that were written in Ottoman script were also damaged, which creates problems for the contemporary scholars, especially in terms of dating these monuments and determining their endowers. On the fate of the Ottoman sacred spaces after the Greek War of Independence and the foundation of the Greek state, see Heath W. Lowry, *In the Footsteps of the Ottomans: A Search for Sacred Spaces & Architectural Monuments in Northern Greece*, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2009) [hereafter cited in text as 2009a].

²²⁰ Hamilakis 2007, Plantzos 2008.

schools,²²¹ administrative buildings,²²² warehouses, hospitals. Some of these examples also include mosques that were transformed into churches, which according to Lowry, is a little-known phenomenon, and like the previous examples, mostly happened due to the lack of existing infrastructure.²²³ Two such examples include the Sultan Bayezid Mosque (1481-1512) in Drama and the Ibrahim Paşa Mosque (ca. 1525) in Kavala, both converted into churches of Agios Nikolaos, following the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey.²²⁴

On the other hand, deliberate destructions of the Ottoman monuments in Greece – religious architecture or not – were not always conducted with nationalistic or religious aims. Especially in the urban areas, many historical monuments were demolished to open up space for modern constructions. One such example is the Great Mosque (Cami-i Kebir) in Serres, a late 14th century mosque destroyed in 1937 to build a modern block of shops.²²⁵

The situation in terms of the secular Ottoman architecture has been better, as many of those monuments were kept being used with their original functions. The monuments of ‘neutral uses’ such as bridges, aqueducts, fortifications, etc., which did not have an identity-conferring status – as mosques or medreses did, for example –

²²¹ For example, “Trianon”, the 16th century Old Mosque, located in Syntagmatos Square in Nafplio. Giorgos Tsekis, “Trianon”, In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 2008).

²²² Vouleftiko Mosque in Nafplio, which was built in the late 18th – early 19th century, was used as the parliament building during the Greek War of Independence. After the foundation of the independent state and Nafplio became the capital, due to the shortage of buildings, this monument served various uses which includes prison, courthouse, school, hospital, barracks, dance hall, museum and a concert hall. See Anastasia Vassiliou, “Vouleftiko Mosque”, In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture, 2008).

²²³ Heath W. Lowry, *The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 1350-1550: The Conquest, Settlement & Infrastructural Development of Northern Greece*, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2008), 25 [hereafter cited in text as Lowry 2008].

²²⁴ Lowry 2008, 25.

²²⁵ Lowry 2008, 144-145.

maintained their original functions. The continuous use of these monuments increased their stability and ensured their survival.

On the other hand, regardless of their functions or attached identities, some monuments did not enjoy the same levels of protection. Most of those were the monuments located in remote locations and villages, which had a sharp decrease in their population due to wars and migrations. These monuments, due to disuse, fell into despair and sometimes were destroyed completely.

The Ottoman heritage in Greece also faced destruction in the Balkan Wars, as was the case almost everywhere throughout the Balkans. One example of such was the Great Fire of 1913 in Serres, which was started by the retreating Bulgarian army, resulting in the destruction of the many historical and contemporary structures in the city.

Another major event in the last century that affected the preservation of the Ottoman monuments in Greece was the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, following the Lausanne Treaty (1923). The high influx of migrants to Greece from Asia Minor put the Greek state, already facing financial problems, in a challenging situation. There was a considerable disparity between the numbers of people who left Greece and those who arrived; thus, accommodating them became a big problem. Under those circumstances, many of the disused Ottoman monuments in Greece provided housing and infrastructure for the new population. Furthermore, some monuments were also given by the Greek state to individuals, like private properties, in exchange for the immovable assets they had to leave behind in Asia Minor. As will be explained in the upcoming, this exercise also created particular problems for the preservation and the contemporary status of the Ottoman monuments in Greece – especially in terms of their management and public access.

According to Machiel Kiel, the prominent Dutch historian of Ottoman history and architecture in the Balkans, the overwhelming majority of

the Ottoman monuments that once existed in the Balkans are lost.²²⁶ On the other hand, Lowry considers this assumption pessimistic, especially in terms of the Ottoman monuments in Northern Greece. He suggests that “at best, we are in the opening stages of locating the rich ottoman architectural heritage” in the area.²²⁷

Considering the Greek state’s approach to the Ottoman monuments in Greece, especially within the last decades, we can see an increased recognition and efforts of preservation and utilization. One critical and significant step in this process was, without a doubt, the book titled ‘Ottoman Architecture in Greece’, published by the Hellenic Ministry of Culture, Directorate of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Antiquities. As stated in the prologue, the purpose of the book was “to present the wealth of Ottoman monuments that Greece possesses, and to inform the public about the important work in the fields of preservation and conservation which has been performed by the services of the Ministry of Culture.”²²⁸ In the opening pages of the book, written by Michalis Liapis, the Minister of Culture at the time, the existence of the Ottoman monuments in Greek landscape is stated to represent a “gesture of respect toward the ‘Other’.”²²⁹ Though without any doubt, this was a call for the Greek audience to respect the Ottoman heritage in Greece, it is also important to highlight that the Ottoman heritage in Greece was labelled, by one of the state’s highest representatives on culture, as the heritage of the ‘Other’.

At the time of this book’s publication, as stated by Lowry, a large percentage of the monuments included in the book, which were

²²⁶ Lowry 2008, 142.

²²⁷ Lowry 2008, 142.

²²⁸ Ioanna Koltsida-Makri, “Prologue”, In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture 2008), 16.

²²⁹ Michalis Liapis, “Ottoman Architecture in Greece”, In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture 2008), 15. Stress added by the author.

already restored, was not open to the public.²³⁰ Looking at the planned projects of restorations mentioned in the Ottoman Architecture in Greece (2007) and checking their contemporary status during this thesis, it was seen that as of 2018, many of the mentioned projects were finished, and the monuments were opened to the public with diverse functions. This clearly shows the Greek state's determination to preserve and promote the Ottoman heritage in Greece. Furthermore, some of these restorations, such as the Selcuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque in Serres, are considered among the highest quality of restorations conducted in the countries that were previously part of the Ottoman empire, including Turkey.²³¹

Yet, unexpected accidents sometimes also affect the wellbeing of Ottoman monuments in Greece – as can happen with any civilization's remains and in any other country.²³² On this point, an Ottoman monument of significant historical and artistic importance, Mehmed Çelebi Mosque (1420) in Didymoteichon, is worth mentioning. According to Lowry, this mosque is the earliest surviving mosque in Greece today. Its unique architectural features – especially its wooden dome – made it a unique testament of the 14th century Ottoman craftsmanship.²³³ Unfortunately, during the restoration works, a fire broke out, which spread to the entirety of the monument, and destroyed its unique wooden dome.

The state perception of the Ottoman heritage in Greece also manifests itself in different areas related to cultural management and education. One of them is the classification of the historical periods. Chronologically, the historical periods are separated as Stone Age, Bronze Age, Early Historical period, Archaic period, Classical period, Hellenistic period, Roman period, Byzantine period, Post-Byzantine

²³⁰ Lowry 2009b, 12.

²³¹ Lowry 2009a, 153-4.

²³² For example, the fire that broke out during the restoration works in the Notre-Dame de Paris, on 15 April 2019.

²³³ Lowry 2008, 21.

period, Modern Hellenic period and Contemporary period.²³⁴ The Middle Ages, which correspond to the Frankish, Venetian and Ottoman rule in Greek lands, are classified as ‘post-Byzantine’. This terminology works in two ways: it connects that historical era with the Greek national history, through naming it post-Byzantine, and separates it strictly from it by setting a boundary with the prefix ‘*post*’.

This chronological approach is also apparent in the collections and displays of state archaeological museums, and it serves a particular goal: exhibiting the national continuity through history.²³⁵ In addition, the majority of the state museums in Greece are archaeological museums, and there are only a couple of state museums dedicated to Byzantine art and history. On the other hand, the remains of the later periods are not displayed in the collections of state archaeological museums. An exception to this is the Ottoman monuments, which are open to the public and serve as museums or exhibition halls, where – in most cases, visitors can read about the history and architectural characteristics of that specific monument in the information boards.

A similar situation also exists in the archaeological departments of the state universities, where, in the majority of the cases, archaeology education is focused on and limited to three historical periods: pre-history, ancient Greece and medieval (Byzantine) era.²³⁶

3.5.3. The Legal Status

This study focuses on the material immovable monuments of the Ottoman era in Greece. Therefore, the status of the Ottoman monuments in Greece within the current cultural heritage legislation will be discussed according to their classification, rights of ownership, and management.

²³⁴ ODYSSEUS Portal – Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports.
<http://odysseus.culture.gr/>

²³⁵ Hamilakis 2007.

²³⁶ Hamilakis 2007.

3.5.3.1. Classification

The current Greek legislation is well inclusive in the classification of cultural heritage assets, as it considers all monuments built before 1830 (the foundation of the independent Greek state) as protected monuments. In that sense, many of the Ottoman-era monuments of Greece are automatically classified as cultural heritage assets. Yet, considering that the Greek state in 1830 was not covering all the area it constitutes today, and many parts of today's Northern Greece were still under Ottoman rule, the Ottoman monuments built in those areas after 1830 are not automatically protected. In order to be recognized as cultural property, an administrative act is required.

3.5.3.2. Ownership

In contrast with the classification issue, the law is not very inclusive in terms of ownership. According to the law, the state ownership of immovable monuments is automatically applied only to the monuments built before 1453. Therefore, considering that the significant part of what constitutes Greece today went under Ottoman rule after 1453, most of the still-standing Ottoman monuments in Greece are not automatically state-owned.

One of the underlying reasons for this is that the new cultural heritage law did not break away from the previous century's ideology and national history discourse, which divides the historical timeline into prehistory, the Antiquity, and the Byzantine/Post-Byzantine era.²³⁷ Thus, the Ottoman heritage is still 'dissonant' within the cultural heritage legislation.

The second reason is thought to be the fact that many of the Ottoman monuments in Greece were used to accommodate the refugees coming from Asia Minor, following the Greek War of Independence until the

²³⁷ Hamilakis 2007.

Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey. The Greek state also gave some of these monuments to Asia Minor refugees as personal properties in exchange for the ones they left behind.

3.5.3.3. Management-Public Access-Function

The possibility of private ownership of Ottoman-era heritage in Greece affects certain aspects of these monuments, especially their uses and preservation. If the monuments in question are classified monuments, any changes in the monument's use have to be authorized by the Ministry of Culture (Law 3028/2002, Article 10, Para. 4). If it is a monument not registered by the ministry, the state does not have a legal right to intervene in how the monument is to be managed. In that case, the owners of the monuments are free to use the monument with any function that suits their interests. For this reason, if the legal owners of Ottoman monuments decide to keep these monuments for their individual uses, public access and enjoyment cannot be ensured.

On the other hand, if the owners decide to use these monuments for commercial purposes, the state cannot intervene unless there is a possibility of structural damage to the physical integrity of the monument. In that case, providing that the necessary precautions are taken, the owner is free to choose whichever function suits their interest, be it a restaurant, a café, a hotel, or a nightclub. This, in the end, might create disputes or provoke some stakeholders, as in the example of the Hamza Bey Mosque in Thessaloniki. Even though it was declared a protected monument in 1926, it was sold to private owners in 1928. Afterwards, it was used for various purposes, such as a shopping centre and a cinema. When it served as a cinema named Alcazar, adult movies were also screened in the monument, which angered some of the Muslim inhabitants of Greece and some Turkish people who consider themselves the Ottomans' descendants.²³⁸ Some

²³⁸ Ghazali, A. S. 'Western reaction to Hagia Sophia exposes hypocrisy on 'religious tolerance'', *The Milli Gazete*, July 17, 2020, accessed September 24, 2021,

other relatively less disputed contemporary uses of the privately-owned Ottoman monuments in Greece include the Imaret in Kavala, which operates as a hotel²³⁹ and Yeni Hamam (Aigli) in Thessaloniki, used as a café, a music theatre, and a nightclub.²⁴⁰

3.5.3.4. *Preservation*

According to law 3028/2002 (Article 9, para.1), the responsibility of preserving immovable monuments is on the State Archaeological Service. If deemed necessary by the Archaeological Council to protect the monument's physical integrity, the state might restrict the use of the immovable monument, even if it belongs to an individual. The owner or the possessor of the monument has to take all the necessary measures advised and directed by the Archaeological Service (Article 11). According to the law, the state and its organs are the highest authority responsible for protecting and preserving immovable monuments. In the case of private ownership, the state can still intervene with the monument and has the legal power to implement its decision. On the other hand, if the monument in question is not automatically recognized as a cultural monument and not registered by an official decree, e.g., an unregistered Ottoman monument built after 1830, the owner or the possessor is free from the state intervention and authority.

<https://www.milligazette.com/news/8-international/33643-western-reaction-to-hagia-sophia-exposes-hypocrisy-on-religious-tolerance/>

²³⁹ The complex was built by Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt, owned by an individual, leased out to the Egyptian State and being used as a hotel & museum today. For more on Mehmed Ali Pasha of Kavala and his contributions to Kavala, see Heath W. Lowry and İsmail Erünsal, *Remembering One's Roots Mehmet Ali Paşa of Egypt's Links to the Macedonian Town of Kavala: Architectural Monuments, Inscriptions and Documents*, (Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2011).

²⁴⁰ Yeni Hamam is a late 16th century Ottoman bath located in central Thessaloniki which remained functional until 1912. It was taken under state control in 1919 and was sold to a private individual in 1937. *Thessaloniki4all*, 'Yeni Hamam', accessed September 24, 2021, <https://thessaloniki4all.gr/places/ottoman-monument/yeni-hamam>.

3.6. Conclusion

The effects of the Enlightenment and French Revolution reached Greek lands through the Greek-speaking Orthodox elite, who were in constant relationship with the West through their commercial businesses. This class became a prominent factor in the circulation of those Western ideas within the Greek-speaking inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent appearance of the Greek Enlightenment. The emergence of the Greek nation was the outcome of this process.

Certain elements facilitated the appearance of the Greek nation. Language and religion functioned as two elements that ensured a shared group identity through centuries that followed the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. A shared and glorious past was the third pillar bonding the individuals within the Greek nation. In the Greek War of Independence and the foundation of the independent Greek state, this glorious past was decided to be the classical age of Athenian democracy. Towards the end of the 19th century, the Byzantine past was also included in the Greek historical narrative, which demonstrated the existence and survival of the Greek nation through centuries that followed antiquity.

Accordingly, the material remains of those eras – antiquity and the Byzantine era – were regarded as ‘sacred’ remains of the nation and they connected the Greek national narrative with the ancestral land. In this process, in accordance with the AHD, material aspects of cultural heritage were deemed of the highest importance. The expert knowledge, archaeologists, were treated as the sole authority on these remains, whose role was to connect with those ‘sacred relics’ and the ordinary people. State archaeologists and archaeological institutions’ high status and authority still exist today without much change.

The selection of a common and ‘owned’ heritage, at the same time, meant the exclusion and alienation of the heritage of different eras. The material remains of the civilizations not included in the Greek national

narrative were trivialized both by the state and the people. Accordingly, the Ottoman past of Greece has been disregarded, and its material remains were considered dissonant. This approach brought the deliberate and non-deliberate destruction of the Ottoman heritage in Greece, both by the hands of the state and the people.

On the other hand, the situation has started to change towards the end of the 20th century, and Ottoman heritage in Greece started to gain increased recognition and respect. Especially within the last couple of decades, the Greek state, through its local and regional branches, as well as at the government level, is showing a positive attitude towards this once alienated heritage and working on preserving, promoting, and utilizing the material remains of the Ottoman heritage in Greece. Even though it is still not included within the national narrative, the state's positive perception of the Ottoman heritage suggests a policy of respect towards the 'other' and accordance with the international heritage discourse.

Chapter 4: Locals' Perceptions of Ottoman Heritage in Greece

4.1. Trikala

4.1.1. Its Past and Present

Trikala is a city located in the Thessaly region of Greece, and it is the capital of the Trikala regional unit. The area was inhabited since prehistoric times, and the modern town was built on the remains of the ancient city of Trikki, which was also mentioned in the works of Homer.²⁴¹ Throughout its medieval history, the city was raided many times by different peoples, such as the Goths, the Slavs, the Normans and the Catalans. The Ottoman Empire finally annexed it in 1393-1394.²⁴² The city remained under Ottoman rule until 1881, when Thessaly was incorporated in the Kingdom of Greece following the Convention of Constantinople.

²⁴¹ Ministry of Culture and Sports – Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala, *The Ottoman Osman Shah mosque (Koursoum Camii) at Trikala*, (Trikala 2018) [hereafter cited in text as Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala 2018].

²⁴² Machiel Kiel, “Tırhala”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 41 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2012), 114-116, [hereafter cited in text as Kiel 2012].



Figure 1: The Old Agora (taken from: <https://trikipress.gr/>)

During the Ottoman period, the city developed into a financial and cultural centre manifested in its military and civic buildings.²⁴³ According to a census from 1520-1530, Trikala was inhabited by 644 families, 343 Christian and 301 Muslim.²⁴⁴ The population reached 25,000 inhabitants in 1770, as noted by the Swedish traveller J. J. Bjornstahl, and at this point, the majority of the inhabitants were Muslims.²⁴⁵ A century later (1875-1877), before becoming a part of the Kingdom of Greece, Greek traveller Zotos Molossos noted that 13.000 inhabitants were living in the city, 8.000 Christians, 4.000 Muslims 1.000 Jewish.²⁴⁶

Today, according to the 2011 census, the population of the Trikala regional unit is 131,085, the population of the municipality is 81,355, whereas the urban area has 61,653 inhabitants. The majority of the city's inhabitants (58,921) are Greek citizens.

²⁴³ Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala 2018.

²⁴⁴ Kristallo Mantzana, "Trikala in the Ottoman Period", In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture 2008), 206-207 [hereafter cited in text as Mantzana 2008].

²⁴⁵ Mantzana 2008.

²⁴⁶ Mantzana 2008.

Due to its location in the Thessaly plain, which provides most of Greece's corn, maize and barley production, the primary employment and livelihood in the Trikala area is agriculture, followed by employment in the public sector and small private businesses.²⁴⁷ Apart from its central role in agricultural production, the city of Trikala is also referred to as the first "smart city" in Greece.²⁴⁸ The municipality of Trikala invests largely in information and communication technologies and sustainable, eco-friendly incentives such as fully automated electric buses,²⁴⁹ smart lighting systems, promoting the usage of electric vehicles and bicycles and providing free charging stations for electric vehicles and bicycle rentals for residents and tourists.

4.1.2. Historical Sites and Monuments

The modern city of Trikala bears the traces of its long and rich history with material remains of different civilizations.

²⁴⁷ Daniel M. Knight, *History, Time and Economic Crisis in Central Greece*, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

²⁴⁸ Geoffrey R. Pyatt, (2017, March 24), *The 'smart city' of Trikala and the future of Greece*. Kathimerini English Edition. Retrieved on September 22, 2020, from <https://www.ekathimerini.com/217138/article/ekathimerini/community/the-smart-city-of-trikala-and-the-future-of-greece>

²⁴⁹ Alexandra Kassimi, (2020, February 26), *Trikala to buy two automated electric buses*, Kathimerini English Edition. Retrieved on September 22, 2020, from <https://www.ekathimerini.com/249933/article/ekathimerini/news/trikala-to-buy-two-automated-electric-buses>



Figure 2: Trikala Citadel (taken from: <https://trikalacity.gr>)

One of the notable historical monuments is the Castle of Trikala, situated on the northeast side of the city, at the top of a hill, and holds a strategic position in the area. As recorded by Procopius, the 6th-century AD historian, the castle was built during the reign of the emperor Justinian I on the remains of a citadel of ancient Trikki.²⁵⁰ The castle took its final form during the Ottoman period, and a clock tower was built in the mid-17th century, one of the oldest known clocktowers in Greece under Ottoman rule.²⁵¹ The modern clock tower was built in 1936 to replace the original one destroyed by an earthquake.²⁵²

Below the castle hill is the old Varousi neighbourhood, which used to be a wealthy Christian district of Trikala. Even though it lost much of its traditional fabric and authenticity today, there are still some traditional houses and historical churches dating from the 16th to the 19th century.²⁵³

In the centre of the city, on Sarafis street, there is a small archaeological

²⁵⁰ Ministry of Culture and Sports - 19th Ephorate of Antiquities in Trikala, *Castle in Trikala*, (Trikala, 2014).

²⁵¹ Kristallo Mantzana, *Byzantine Castle in Trikala and old city of Varousi*, Retrieved September 22, 2020 from http://odysseus.culture.gr/h/2/eh251.jsp?obj_id=2005 [hereafter cited in text as Mantzana 2020a].

²⁵² Mantzana 2020a.

²⁵³ Mantzana 2020a.

site known as the Asklepion of Trikki. The ancient city of Trikki was strongly associated with Asklepios – to commemorate this, there is a statue of the god of medicine in one of the central squares of the modern city - and according to Strabo, the Asklepion of the city was among the oldest and the most prominent.²⁵⁴ The archaeological excavations uncovered remains of a late Hellenistic stoic building with floor mosaics, an early Roman bath and a small Byzantine church.²⁵⁵ The site is covered with fences, and permission from the Ephorate of Trikala is needed for a visit.



Figure 3: The Archaeological Site of Ancient Trikki ("Asklepieion")
(taken from:<https://trikalacity.gr>)

The city's Ottoman history is revealed best in the Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque and the Ottoman baths, which will be covered in the next section. Some of the other historical buildings worth mentioning are the School of Dorothea, which was built in 1875 and

²⁵⁴ Municipality of Trikala, *Ασκληπιείο της αρχαίας Τρίκκης* [Asclepieion of ancient Triki], Retrieved September 22, 2020 from <https://trikalacity.gr/building/asklippiio-tis-archeas-trikkis/> [hereafter cited in text as Municipality of Trikala 2020].

²⁵⁵ Municipality of Trikala 2020.

houses the Municipality Philharmonic today; the Matsopoulos Mill, an industrial museum and a cultural centre that was built in 1884; and the Ottoman Barracks of Trikala, which was built in the second half of the 19th century and today used as Law Courts. In addition to these, there are also some notable historical and cultural sites located in the Trikala region. The important prehistoric site Theopetra Cave, where researchers have found radiocarbon evidence of 50.000 years of human presence,²⁵⁶ is approximately 20 km away from the Trikala city centre; and the UNESCO World Heritage Site Meteora is located in Trikala regional unit and around 30kms away from the city.

4.1.3. Trikala's Ottoman Monuments

As a common practice in the Ottoman state administration, after taking control of Trikala in 1395, subjects of Muslim and Turkish origin from other parts of the empire were sent to settle in Trikala. Accordingly, in line with this aim of 'Ottomanizing' the newly conquered town, new civic buildings representing the Muslim and Turkish culture were constructed.

²⁵⁶ Facorellis, Yorgos, Nina Kyparissi-Apostolika, and Yannis Maniatis, "The Cave of Theopetra, Kalambaka: Radiocarbon Evidence for 50,000 Years of Human Presence." *Radiocarbon* 43, no. 2B (2001): 1029–48.




Figure 4: Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque & Litheos River (image source G. Papasouliotis)

In 1521, the Trikala population consisted of 322 Muslim families, 278 Christian and 181 Jewish; and at the time, the city had three mosques, seventeen mescids, three inns, one bedesten, one medrese and two hammams.²⁵⁷ According to Evliya Çelebi, the prominent Ottoman traveller who visited the city in 1668, there were eight mosques, six medreses, three hammams, five inns, and three imarets at the time,²⁵⁸ which shows that the city continued to flourish throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Trikala and its buildings witnessed major destructions during the 18th century due to fire (1749) and pillaging by an irregular army en route to Russia (1770) but were recovered afterwards.²⁵⁹

Before its inclusion in the Kingdom of Greece, Trikala had a population of 2000 Turkish residents,²⁶⁰ and as noted by a foreign traveller, Emil Isambert (1873), there were seven mosques, five tekkes, seven churches

²⁵⁷ Kiel 2012.

²⁵⁸ Kiel 2012.

²⁵⁹ Kiel 2012.

²⁶⁰ Kiel 2012.

and four chapels in the city.²⁶¹ However, in 1889, only thirty Turkish families were living in Trikala and correspondingly, the Ottoman architecture in Trikala lost its presence in time.²⁶² Today, among all the mosques mentioned by various travellers of the previous centuries, the only surviving one is the Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque, and the other existing Ottoman monuments consist of the remains of the Ottoman baths and the 19th century military barracks.

4.1.3.1. Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque & Mausoleum



Figure 5: Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque & Mausoleum

The Osman Shah Mosque is located in the city's centre, next to the Litheos river, which divides the city in half, and on Karditsis Street, one of the main streets connecting the downtown area to the outskirts and national roads. The mosque is situated in a very spacious square, which also houses the Ottoman baths, the Tsitsanis Museum, and the Church of Saints Constantine and Helen. Next to the mosque and the

²⁶¹ Mantzana 2008.

²⁶² Kiel 2012.

mausoleum is a primary school and a children's playground. Due to its central position in the city and on one of the main traffic routes, the monument is highly visible for residents and visitors alike. Furthermore, because of the other monuments, buildings and the neighbourhood surrounding it, and the function of the space as a recreational area, many residents interact with the monument daily.



Figure 6: Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque & Mausoleum [The Machiel Kiel Photographic Archive (NIT)]

The mosque and the mausoleum were built by the prominent Ottoman architect Sinan in the 16th century (before 1567-1568) as an endowment (vakif) of Osman Shah, the nephew of Suleyman the magnificent and the governor of the provinces Tırhala and Morea.²⁶³ Out of the 79 mosques built by Sinan in the Greek territory, Osman Shah mosque is the only surviving one today.²⁶⁴ The mosque and the mausoleum were a part of a complex that included a medrese, an imaret, an inn, a bath, a

²⁶³ Lowry 2008.

²⁶⁴ Kristallo Mantzana, *Οθωμανικό Τέμενος Οσμάν Σαχ (Κουρσούμ Τζαμί)* [Ottoman Mosque Osman Shah (Koursoum Mosque)]. Retrieved October 8, 2020 from http://odysseus.culture.gr/h/2/gh251.jsp?obj_id=5585

school, and a bridge.²⁶⁵ However, today, the only remaining ones among these buildings are the mosque, the mausoleum, and the foundations of the bath in the old prison complex.



Figure 7: Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque - Interior

Osman Shah mosque and its mausoleum belong to the Ministry of Culture and Sports jurisdiction. The authority responsible for their management is the Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala. The mosque went under restoration in 1996-1997,²⁶⁶ and was opened to the public as an exhibition hall and a centre for cultural events. The entrance to the mosque is free of charge. On the other hand, the mausoleum is not open for visitation and can only be viewed from the outside.

4.1.3.2. The Ottoman Baths

²⁶⁵ Kiel 2012.

²⁶⁶ Mantzana 2008.



Figure 8: The Ottoman Baths - Exterior View I

The Ottoman baths were a part of the building complex founded by Osman Shah and was built by Sinan in the 16th century.²⁶⁷ The monument was built as a twin bath that had separate entrances and sections for men and women to use simultaneously.

²⁶⁷ Ministry of Culture and Sports - Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala, *The Twin Ottoman Bath of Trikala*, (Trikala, 2015) [hereafter cited as Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala 2015].



Figure 9: The Ottoman Baths - Exterior View II

In the late 19th century, the monument underwent several architectural interventions and was transformed into a prison. New walls, doors, and windows were added during the process, while some existing ones were torn down and sealed. Among these changes, one of the most significant was the demolition of the domes.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁸ Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala 2015.



Figure 10: Aerial View - Former Trikala Prison (On the left) & Ottoman Baths (On the right) (taken from <https://trikalacity.gr>)

The building functioned as a prison between 1893 and 2006, when a new prison was built out of the city. While renovating the building to turn it into a cultural centre, the ground plan of the Ottoman bath was discovered, and further excavation and restorations took place to unveil the characteristic features of the building and increase its stability. The monument was opened to the public as a museum in 2016.



Figure 11: Ottoman Baths - Interior

The ground floor of the building serves as a museum of Ottoman baths, with a section dedicated to the building's past as a prison and a space for cultural events; whereas the second floor is the museum of Vassilis Tsitsanis, one of the leading Greek composers of modern Rebetiko and Laiko music, who was born in Trikala. The building belongs to the municipality, and the Ephorate of Antiquities of Trikala manages the museum of Ottoman baths. It enjoys the same visibility as the Osman Shah mosque does, as they are located in very close proximity. Admission to the museum is free of charge.

4.1.4. Results of the Public Opinion Survey

As previously mentioned in the methodology section, a public opinion survey was conducted to evaluate locals' perceptions towards the Ottoman monuments in their city. The survey was done through a questionnaire that consisted of multiple-choice questions, Likert scale questions and open-ended questions. The questionnaire was conducted face-to-face with citizens of Trikala with the help of a native speaker, Mrs Katerina Tsinaslanidou. Efforts have been made to make the

sample as representative as possible. The participants were selected randomly among the people sitting in central squares and cafes in popular neighbourhoods and working people, depending on their availability and willingness to participate. In total, 107 participants took part in this survey. The results of the questionnaire were analyzed using the SPSS computer software.

4.1.4.1. Demographics

The first part of the questionnaire consisted of profile questions.

In this survey, out of 107 participants, 58 (valid percent=54.7%) were female, and 48 (valid percent=45.3%) were male.²⁶⁹ The average age of the participants was forty-four ($\mu=44.42$; $\sigma=12.607$), with the youngest participant being nineteen years old and the oldest participant being eighty-four years old. According to the census of 2011, out of the 61,653 people living in Trikala, there was an almost equal distribution between women (frequency=31,118) and men (frequency=30,535); and many of the people were in the age groups 35-39 (frequency=4,773; valid percent=8%) and 40-44 (frequency=4,871; valid percent=8%). It was closely followed by the age group 30-34 (frequency=4,470; valid percent=7%) and 45-49 (frequency=4,447; valid percent=7%). Therefore, in terms of sex and age groups, our sample is thought to represent the population.

All the participants were living in Trikala, ranging from three years to eighty-four years, with an average of thirty-two years ($\mu=32.09$; $\sigma=18.248$). The majority of the participants (frequency=62; valid percent=57.9%) had a university degree, and twenty per cent of them had a master's degree or higher (frequency=22; valid percent=20.6%). On the other hand, according to the population census of 2011, the majority of the residents were graduated from Dimotiko (1st – 6th Grade) (valid percent=27%) and high school (valid percent=21%).

²⁶⁹ There was one missing value.

University graduates equal only eighteen per cent (valid percent=18.1%) of Trikala residents, and people with a master's degree or higher equals only one per cent (valid percent=0.9%) of the population.

In terms of occupation, most of the participants (frequency=95; valid percent=88.8%) were employed. Around seventeen per cent (frequency=18; valid percent=16.8%) of the participants have their own jobs, approximately fifty-three per cent (frequency=57; valid percent=53.3%) are working in the public sector, and about eighteen per cent (frequency=20; valid percent=18.7) working in the private sector.

The density of the university graduates and civil servants among the participants can be explained by the fact that most undereducated people were unwilling to join the survey, considering themselves ignorant about cultural heritage. In contrast, the private sector employees and self-employed people were usually unavailable and did not have much time to participate.

4.1.4.2. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Cultural Heritage

The second part of the questionnaire investigated public interest and attitude towards cultural heritage in general.

Firstly, the participants were asked to define what 'cultural heritage' means to them. Among the answers, the most commonly appearing aspects were tangible (frequency=55; valid percent=53.9%), such as «archaeological sites», «monuments», «buildings», «pieces of art». It was followed closely by intangible aspects (frequency=41; valid percent=40.2%), namely «language», «poetry», «customs», «folklore», «music», «dance», «intellectual achievements». The natural aspects (frequency=6; valid percent=5.9%) were the least common among the answers.

The participants mainly referred to cultural heritage as a representation of a nation's and place's identity as they defined the term as «the

continuity of our history», «history of our place», «history and culture of my country» «the particular characteristics that differentiate a society from other cultures», «monuments that belong to our tradition», «the history of our country», «whatever is related with the culture of an area». Many of them also stressed that cultural heritage is an inheritance from the previous generations that should be preserved and passed on to future generations.

After defining cultural heritage, the participants were asked their opinions on 'for whom the cultural heritage is valuable?' on a scale of 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree'. The totals of the responses 'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' were highest on 'to me' and 'to tourists' with 93.1%, followed by 91.5% 'to humanity', 91.1% 'to states' and %80.4 'to local people'. (See Table 3)

Table 3: Trikala - Cultural heritage is valuable to ...

Cultural heritage is valuable	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
To me	-	-	6.9%	29.7%	63.4%
To the local people	1%	5.9%	12.7%	29.4%	51%
To states	-	3%	5.9%	32.7%	58.4%
To tourists	-	2%	5%	30.7%	62.4%
To the humanity	-	0.9%	7.5%	23.6%	67.9%

Following this question, the participants were asked their opinion on some values attributed to cultural heritage in general. Among these values, the most agreed upon by the participants was 'historical value' (valid percent=100%), followed by 'scientific-educational value' (valid percent=98%) and 'economic touristic value' (valid percent=98%) and 'aesthetic value' (valid percent=93.9%). When it came to 'political value', only 59.6% of the participants agreed that cultural heritage has 'political value', whereas 29.3% was neutral and 11.1% disagreed with

it (See Table 4).

Table 4: Trikala - I think that cultural heritage has ... value.

I think that cultural heritage has value.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	-	2%	4%	41.4%	52.5%
Historical value	-	-	-	17.8%	82.2%
Scientific – educational value	1%	-	1%	28%	70%
Economic - touristic value	-	1%	1%	31.7%	66.3%
Political value	5.1%	6.1%	29.3%	20.2%	39.4%

The majority of the participants (frequency=61; valid percent=54.5%) stated that cultural heritage assets belong to everybody, regardless of their origin or citizenship, whereas according to the rest, they belong to the citizens (frequency=31; valid percent=27.7%) and states (frequency=20; valid percent=17.8%) of where they are located in. When asked about the responsibility in protecting cultural heritage assets, around half of the participants (frequency=71; valid percent=49.65) responded that it is everybody's responsibility, and the other half thinks it is the responsibility of regional and national authorities (frequency=69; valid percent=48.25) and international authorities (frequency=3; valid percent=2.1%).

In terms of the level of knowledge regarding cultural heritage in general and visitation patterns; around sixty per cent of the participants think they are fairly-well knowledgeable (frequency=49; valid percent=47.6%) or extremely-well knowledgeable (frequency=15; valid percent=14.6%); and eighty per cent of our participants visit archaeological sites, monuments, and museums at least once a year (weekly-valid percent=4.7%; monthly-valid per cent =1.9%; several times a year-valid per cent =59.8%; once a year-valid per cent =14%)

4.1.4.3. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Ottoman Heritage in Trikala

In the following part of the questionnaire, the participants were asked questions regarding the Ottoman monuments of Trikala, namely the Osman Shah Mosque and the Ottoman baths.

Almost eighty per cent of the participants (valid percent=79%) stated that they visited the mosque and more than half of those (valid percent=59.1%) were repeated visitors. For the Ottoman baths, the percentage of visitation among the participants was around fifty-seven per cent (valid percent=57.5%), and sixty per cent of the participants (valid percent=60%) visited the monument more than once. The difference between the number of participants who visited the mosque and the baths are believed to be because the ottoman baths were opened to the public very recently. Many of the locals know the building as a prison, and since the exterior of the building does not bear the architectural characteristics of a traditional Ottoman bath, some people are not aware that there are the remains of an ottoman bath on the ground floor of the building.

In terms of the reasons to visit, the most common reasons were 'personal interest' (valid percent=33% for the Osman Shah mosque; valid percent=48,3% for the Ottoman baths) and 'visiting exhibitions/workshops/events' (valid percent=40% for the Osman Shah mosque; valid percent=22.4% for the Ottoman baths) and 'educational visits' (valid percent=19% for the Osman Shah mosque; valid percent=15.5% for the Ottoman baths).

When asked about their knowledge of the Ottoman monuments in Trikala, slightly more than half of the participants (valid percent=52%) said they are 'somewhat' knowledgeable or less than that. Compared with the answers to the question on the level of knowledge about cultural heritage in general (valid percent=62.2% for 'fairly well' or 'extremely well knowledgeable'), we can see that there is a certain decrease in the level of knowledge when it comes to the Ottoman

monuments in the city. On the other hand, the majority of the participants (valid percent= 84.5%) stated that they would like to learn more about the Ottoman monuments in Trikala, which can be interpreted as a positive attitude.

Another positive aspect is that ninety per cent of the participants (valid percent= 90.6%) think the Ottoman monuments in Trikala are valuable for the city and its citizens. The highest value given to these monuments by the participants is the historical value (valid percent=92.2%), and it is followed by economic – touristic value (valid percent=84.9%), aesthetic value (valid percent=83.5%) and scientific-educational value (valid percent=82.6%) (See Table 5).

Table 5: Trikala - I think that the Ottoman monuments in Trikala add ... value to Trikala

I think that the Ottoman monuments in Trikala add value to Trikala.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	2.1%	1%	13.4%	41.2%	42.3%
Historical value	2%	1%	4.9%	40.2%	52%
Scientific – educational value	3.1%	2%	12.2%	36.7%	45.9
Economic - touristic value	3%	4%	8.1%	38.4%	46.5%
Political value	12.4%	8.2%	26.8%	28.9%	23.7%

However, when the values given to Ottoman monuments in Trikala were compared to those given to cultural heritage in general, we can see that the positive responses have decreased (See Table 4).

In terms of protecting the Ottoman monuments in Trikala, most of the participants (valid percent=65.6%) think the primary responsibility should belong to regional and national authorities. In contrast, the participants who said ‘everybody should be responsible’ are only half of that (valid percent=30.5%). Similar results were found when the

question was asked for all the Ottoman monuments in Greece (valid percent=70.1% for ‘regional and national authorities’; valid percent=24.6% for ‘everybody’). However, when asked ‘who is responsible for the protection of the cultural heritage assets in general’, the responses were equal between ‘everybody’ (valid percent=49.6%) and ‘the authorities’(valid percent=48.2%). Here it can be seen that, although in general, the participants think they have a responsibility in protecting cultural heritage assets as much as the authorities do, when explicitly asked about the protection of the Ottomans monuments, at least half of the participants think the primary responsibility is on the authorities. This point is evident when the results of the upcoming questions are analyzed. Although more than ninety per cent of the participants (valid percent=92.1%) think the Ottoman monuments in Trikala should be preserved for future generations, only seventy-five per cent of them (valid percent=75.5%) think they have a personal responsibility in that. Similar results were also found for the protections of the Ottoman monuments in Greece (See Table 6 & 7).

Table 6: Trikala - Ottoman monuments in Trikala I

Ottoman monuments in Trikala	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	1%	-	6.9%	22.5%	69.6%
I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	2%	2.9%	19.6%	29.4%	46.1%

Table 7: Trikala - Ottoman monuments in Greece I

Ottoman monuments in Greece	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	1%	-	8.9%	27.7%	62.4%
I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	2%	3%	25.7%	27.7%	41.6%

Finally, the participants were asked if they consider the Ottoman monuments in Trikala to be a part of the city's and their own history and culture. Almost ninety-five per cent of the participants (valid percent=94.2%) agreed that these monuments are part of Trikala's history and culture. However, the locals' personal identifications with the monuments were lower and equalled seventy-seven per cent (valid percent=77%). In terms of the Ottoman monuments in Greece, eighty-seven per cent of the participants (valid percent=87.4%) said Ottoman monuments are part of Greece's history and culture; and eighty per cent of them (valid percent=80%) agree that they are also a part of their own history and culture (See Table 8 & 9).

Table 8: Trikala - Ottoman monuments in Trikala II

Ottoman monuments in Trikala	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments are part of Trikala's history and culture.	1%	-	4.9%	27.2%	67%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	3%	5%	15%	27%	50%

Table 9: Trikala - Ottoman monuments in Greece II

Ottoman monuments in Greece	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments are part of Greece's history and culture.	1.9%	1.9%	8.7%	34%	53.4%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	4%	2%	14%	34%	46%

4.1.4.4 Statistical Relationships Between Participants' Demographics and Their Responses

Firstly, to evaluate if there is a relationship between the participants' gender and their answers to the questionnaire, an Independent T Test analysis was conducted. The results show that there is not a meaningful statistical difference between the answers given by male and female participants (CHValues: $t = 0.229$, $p = 0.820$; OttValues: $t = -1.492$, $p = 0.139$; OttProtection: $t = -0.169$, $p = 0.866$; OttIdentity $t = -0.924$,

p= 0.358). (Table 10) As was seen by the t values, even though the male and female participants have very similar appreciation of cultural heritage assets in general (t= 0.229), female participants have higher the appreciation of the Ottoman heritage assets in their towns (t= -1.492) and their personal and local / national attachment to the Ottoman monuments in Trikala and Greece are higher than those of the male participants (t= -0.960). In terms of the protection of Ottoman monuments in Trikala and in Greece, both male and female participants have similar agreement (t= -0.169). (See Table 10)

Table 10: Trikala - SPSS Output I

Independent Samples Test									
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances				t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper
CHValues	Equal variances assumed	1,163	,283	,229	104	,820	,02141	,09358	-,16417 ,20699
	Equal variances not assumed			,225	93,188	,822	,02141	,09495	-,16714 ,20995
OttValues	Equal variances assumed	3,080	,082	-1,492	100	,139	-,23357	,15654	-,54414 ,07700
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,424	72,671	,159	-,23357	,16405	-,56054 ,09340
OttProtection	Equal variances assumed	2,212	,140	-,169	101	,866	-,02452	,14493	-,31203 ,26299
	Equal variances not assumed			-,163	78,487	,871	-,02452	,15041	-,32394 ,27490
OttIdentity	Equal variances assumed	4,354	,039	-,960	101	,339	-,15109	,15731	-,46315 ,16097
	Equal variances not assumed			-,924	77,148	,358	-,15109	,16343	-,47652 ,17433

Secondly, to investigate the relationships between the participants' age and their responses, and, the amount of time participants' spent in Trikala and their responses, correlation analysis were conducted. The results show that, there are no significant correlations between the 'age' and the results given to the questionnaire (Age-CHValues: r=0.094, p=0.358; Age-OttValues: r= 0.085, p= 0.413; Age-OttProtection: r= 0.164, p= 0.112; Age-OttIdentity: r= 0.152, p= 0.143). In the same manner, no significant correlations were detected between the 'years of inhabitanace' and the participants' responses (Inhabitanace-CHValues: r=0.168, p=0.100; Inhabitanace-OttValues: r= -0.45, p= 0.665; Inhabitanace-OttProtection: r= 0.062, p=0.552; Inhabitanace-OttIdentity: r= 0.105, p=0.315). (See Table 11)

On the other hand, the results show that there is a significant correlation between the values given to cultural heritage assets in general and the values given to Ottoman monuments in Trikala (CHValues-OttValues: $r = 0,356$, $p = 0.000$; CHValues-OttProtection: $r = 0.230$, $p = 0.019$; CHValues-OttIdentity: $r = 0.255$, $p = 0.009$). (See Table 11) Therefore, it is shown that the participants do not have negative perception towards the Ottoman heritage in Trikala and in Greece, and as their appreciation of cultural heritage assets in general increase, so do their appreciation of Ottoman heritage assets.

Table 11: Trikala – SPSS Output II

		Correlations					
		Age	For how many years?	CHValues	OttValues	OttProtection	OttIdentity
Age	Pearson Correlation	1	,632**	,094	,085	,164	,152
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,358	,413	,112	,143
	N	98	92	98	94	95	95
For how many years?	Pearson Correlation	,632**	1	,168	-,045	,062	,105
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,100	,665	,552	,315
	N	92	97	97	94	94	94
CHValues	Pearson Correlation	,094	,168	1	,356**	,230*	,255**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,358	,100		,000	,019	,009
	N	98	97	107	103	104	104
OttValues	Pearson Correlation	,085	-,045	,356**	1	,633**	,691**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,413	,665	,000		,000	,000
	N	94	94	103	103	102	103
OttProtection	Pearson Correlation	,164	,062	,230*	,633**	1	,788**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,112	,552	,019	,000		,000
	N	95	94	104	102	104	103
OttIdentity	Pearson Correlation	,152	,105	,255**	,691**	,788**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,143	,315	,009	,000	,000	
	N	95	94	104	103	103	104

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Lastly, One-Way ANOVA analysis was used for investigating if there is a meaningful difference between the participants responses to the questionnaire depending on their levels of education. As can be seen below, the analysis revealed that the participants' appreciation of and attitudes towards cultural heritage assets in general and the Ottoman heritage assets in Trikala and Greece do not change according to their

levels of education (CHValues: $F = 0.874$, $p = 0.501$; OttValues: $F = 0.724$, $p = 0.607$; OttProtection $F = 0.519$, $p = 0.761$; OttIdentity: $F = 0.558$, $p = 0.732$). (See Table 12)

Table 12: Trikala – SPSS Output III

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
CHValues	Between Groups	1,002	5	,200	,874	,501
	Within Groups	23,172	101	,229		
	Total	24,174	106			
OttValues	Between Groups	2,275	5	,455	,724	,607
	Within Groups	60,979	97	,629		
	Total	63,254	102			
OttProtection	Between Groups	1,399	5	,280	,519	,761
	Within Groups	52,850	98	,539		
	Total	54,249	103			
OttIdentity	Between Groups	1,790	5	,358	,558	,732
	Within Groups	62,890	98	,642		
	Total	64,680	103			

4.2. Serres

4.2.1. Its Past and Present

Serres is a city located in the Macedonia region of Greece, and it is the capital of the Serres regional unit. The city has been continuously inhabited since Antiquity²⁷⁰ and the earliest findings in the acropolis hill date to the Late Archaic period.²⁷¹ The city became an important military and administrative centre from the Middle Byzantine period (843-1204) onwards, and in the 15th century, it was one of the most important Byzantine Macedonia.²⁷² Due to this importance and its strategic location, the city became a target for many, and it was invaded at different times by Franks, Bulgarians, and Serbians.²⁷³ The city was conquered by the Ottoman army commanded by Evrenos²⁷⁴ and Halil Hayreddin Çandarlı in 1383. It remained under Ottoman rule until 1912, when the Bulgarian army captured it during the First Balkan War. A year later, in 1913, Serres was conquered by the Greek army and became a part of the Kingdom of Greece.

During the Ottoman period, Serres continually increased its importance. The city became the capital of the sanjak,²⁷⁵ and the new rulers started endowing new public buildings and charitable

²⁷⁰ Stavroula Dadaki, "Serres in the Ottoman Period", In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture 2008) [hereafter cited in text as Dadaki 2008a].

²⁷¹ Petros Samsaris, "An Outline of the History of the City of Serres Until Its Liberation", In *Serres: Past and Present*, (Serres: D.E.P.K.A. Serron, 2006) [hereafter cited in text as Samsaris 2006].

²⁷² Dadaki, 2008a.

²⁷³ Samsaris, 2006.

²⁷⁴ For more on Evrenos Bey and his role in the expansion of the Ottoman state in the Balkans see: Heath W. Lowry, *Fourteenth Century Ottoman Realities: In Search of Hâcı-Gâzî Evrenos*, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2012); Lowry 2008; Heath W. Lowry and İsmail Erünsal, *The Evrenos dynasty of Yenice-i Vardar: Notes & documents*, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2010).

²⁷⁵ Samsaris, 2006.

institutions to the city, among which is the still-standing Bedesten in the centre of Serres. Turkish nomads and farmers from Anatolia were settled in the city and the surrounding agricultural area, accelerating its flourishing and Islamification.²⁷⁶ Soon, the town became a thriving centre of commerce and an important agricultural production area. Travellers in the 18th and 19th centuries pointed out the importance of Serres as a commercial centre. By the end of the 19th century, the city also became an important place for education.²⁷⁷



Figure 12: Bedesten [The Machiel Kiel Photographic Archive (NIT)]

Serres was the third populous town of Macedonia between the 15th and

²⁷⁶ Machiel Kiel, "Observations on the History of Northern Greece during the Turkish Role: Historical and Architectural Description of the Turkish Monuments of Komotini and Serres, their Place in the Development of Ottoman Turkish Architecture, and their Present Condition", *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 12, (1971): 415-444 [hereafter cited in text as Kiel 1971].

²⁷⁷ Dadaki 2008a.

19th centuries.²⁷⁸ Evliya Çelebi, who visited Serres in the mid-17th century, noted 10 Christian and 30 Muslim neighbourhoods.²⁷⁹ In the early 16th century, there was also a Jewish community settled in Serres.²⁸⁰ According to travellers in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Christian population was the major actor involved in commerce.²⁸¹ The population of Serres was around 30.000 in the early 19th century, with the Turkish population constituting half of the inhabitants.²⁸²

Serres and the surrounding area have been subjected to many conflicts and battles, especially after the 19th century. The Greek War of Independence, the Balkan Wars, and the subsequent World Wars caused immigrations and refugee movements, thus affecting Serres' population. The Muslim population of Serres was constantly leaving the area between 1905-1913, and in the meantime, Greeks were arriving from Thrace, Bulgaria, Asia Minor and such.²⁸³ The exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey (1923) changed the demographics of Serres drastically as the Muslim inhabitants in the area were sent to Turkey, and Greek refugees from Asia Minor settled in. According to the 1920 census (before the exchange of populations), the city's population was around fifteen thousand, while eight years later, the population rose to twenty-six thousand²⁸⁴. The population of Serres also seen a decrease due to WWII and the Greek Civil War but has continuously increased afterwards.²⁸⁵

Today, according to the 2011 census, the population of Serres regional unit is 176,430, the population of the municipality is 76,817, whereas

²⁷⁸ Dadaki 2008a.

²⁷⁹ Dadaki 2008a.

²⁸⁰ Dadaki 2008a; Samsaris 2006.

²⁸¹ Dadaki 2008a

²⁸² Samsaris 2006.

²⁸³ Dimitra Tsismetzi-Maragaki, "The City of Serres", In *Serres: Past and Present*, (Serres: D.E.P.K.A., 2006) [hereafter cited in text as SerronTsismetzi-Maragaki 2006].

²⁸⁴ Tsismetzi-Maragaki 2006.

²⁸⁵ Tsismetzi-Maragaki 2006.

the urban area has 58,287 inhabitants. The majority of the city's inhabitants (57,223) are Greek citizens. Employment in Serres is heavily on the service sector, followed by light industry, which is mainly associated with the agricultural production within the district.²⁸⁶

4.2.2. Historical Sites and Monuments

Unfortunately, there are not a lot of monuments of the earlier historical periods still standing in Serres today. Due to continuous occupations and destructions throughout its history, the architectural legacy of Serres was significantly diminished.²⁸⁷ Below are some of the important historical sites and monuments located in Serres and its surrounding area.

The Byzantine castle on the acropolis hill was rebuilt in 1208 after the Bulgarian army destroyed the castle and the city walls. The city walls were partly demolished during the Ottoman period²⁸⁸, and the centre moved outside the city centre. The castle area was inhabited until 1617; however, Evliya Çelebi, when visiting the town in the mid-17th-century, noted that the castle was in ruins.²⁸⁹ Today, the only remaining tower of the fortress is the Orestes' Tower, which was built in 1350.²⁹⁰

The (reconstructed) 14th-century church of Agios Nikolaos is also

²⁸⁶ Tsismetzi-Maragaki 2006.

²⁸⁷ A major recent event that affected the wellbeing of the architectural heritage in Serres was the fire of 1913, which was started by the retreating Bulgarian army and resulted in the destruction of many historical and contemporary buildings in Serres. In the end, around 4,000 houses out of 6,000 were burnt down (Tsismetzi-Maragaki, 2006), the city's commercial district was completely destroyed (Lila Theodoridou-Sotiriou, "The City's Architecture", In *Serres: Past and Present*, (Serres: D.E.P.K.A., 2006) and eighteen out of the twenty-one churches in Serres were demolished (Tsismetzi-Maragaki, 2006).

²⁸⁸ Dadaki, 2008a.

²⁸⁹ Haralampos Vouroutzidis, "Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Monuments In The City", In *Serres: Past and Present*, (Serres: D.E.P.K.A., 2006) [hereafter cited in text as Vouroutzidis 2006].

²⁹⁰ Vouroutzidis, 2006. The inscription found on the tower states "Orestes for Stephanos his King", which is thought to be a reference to Stephanos Dousan, the King of Serbia.

located on the acropolis hill, within the area historically circled by the city walls.²⁹¹ Another historically and religiously significant monument located in the city centre is the Church of Agios Theodoros, which is thought to be built around the 6th century. It was destroyed a couple of times in its long history and was finally rebuilt between 1938-1959.

The still standing notable Ottoman monuments in Serres, some of which will be discussed in detail below, are the Bedesten, Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque, Mehmed Bey Mosque, Mustafa Bey Mosque, 15th century aqueduct, 19th century fountain and tomb of İsmail Bey, the Government Building and the city's train station.²⁹²

There are also some important historical sites and monuments in the Serres prefecture. The monastery of Timios Prodmos, located 9km. east of the city of Serres, is one of them. It was built in 1270 AD, and many Patriarchs rest here.

Located 55 km away from Serres city centre, Amphipolis is an important archaeological site. Many travellers mentioned the site in the 19th century, but the excavation works started only after World War II. In 2012 a tomb was discovered inside the Kasta tumulus, near Amphipolis, and it was first entered in 2014. The tomb was speculated to belong to Alexander the Great or one of his family members, and thus it gained enormous attention both within Greece and internationally.²⁹³ Since then, the site, especially the tomb itself, has

²⁹¹ The church of Agios Nikolaos was built in 1339 and was also mentioned by Evliya Çelebi. However, the church standing today is not the original construction but a reconstruction which was built between 1935-1948 (Vouroutzidis, 2006).

²⁹² Lowry 2008, 141-142. In addition to these monuments, Lowry recounts the remains of four Ottoman-era hamams and some other late 19th century Ottoman monuments, which are the Municipal Hospital (1895) – used as a High School today –, the 'First Primary School' – used as the 'Eighth Primary School –, The Ottoman Boy's High School (İ'dadiye Mektebi) – used as the 'Eleventh Primary School–, and several private residences.

²⁹³ The case of Amphipolis is a perfect example of political uses and abuses of archaeology and cultural heritage in contemporary Greece. See, Dimitris Plantzos, "Amphipolitics: Archaeological Performance And Governmentality In Greece Under The Crisis", In. Dimitris Tziouvas, (ed.), *Greece in Crisis: The Cultural Politics of Austerity*,

been very famous and has received comprehensive coverage by the media. The works are still ongoing, and the tomb is expected to receive visitors from early 2022.²⁹⁴

Another point of interest worth mentioning in the prefecture is the Rupel Fortress, an important WW II Resistance monument. Still being used as a fortress, a part of the monument is open to visitors as a museum and a memorial.

4.2.3. Serres' Ottoman Monuments

An important city in Northern Greece during the Ottoman rule, Serres was adorned with many architectural elements of the Ottoman culture. Yet, as is also the case with many other former Ottoman cities throughout the Balkans, most of these monuments could not escape the destruction from the hands of wars, natural disasters and time.²⁹⁵ Nevertheless, compared with many other Greek cities under the Ottoman rule, it is safe to say that Serres has been luckier in preserving its Ottoman heritage. Some of the Ottoman monuments still standing in Serres are well known for decades, whereas some were more recently discovered and identified.²⁹⁶

As for this case study, the monuments selected for the public opinion survey are the Bedesten, Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque, Mehmet Bey Mosque, and Mustafa Bey Mosque.

(London : I.B. Tauris, 2017); Kalliopi Fouseki and Mina Dragouni, "Heritage spectacles: the case of Amphipolis excavations during the Greek economic crisis", *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 23:8, (2017): 742-758.

²⁹⁴ Duncan Howitt-Marshall, (2021, July 9), "Restoration Earthworks Continue at the Amphipolis Tomb", *Greece Is*, Accessed September 7, 2021, <https://www.greece-is.com/news/restoration-earthworks-continue-amphipolis-tomb/> .

²⁹⁵ Machiel Kiel, "Ottoman Building Activity Along the Via Egnatia", In Elizabeth Zachariadou, (ed.), *The Via Egnatia Under Ottoman Rule, 1380-1699*, (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1996); Kiel, 1971.

²⁹⁶ Kiel 1971; Ayverdi 1982; *Serres: Past and Present*, (Serres: D.E.P.K.A., 2006); Lowry 2008.

4.2.3.1. Bedesten



Figure 13: Bedesten - Serres Archaeological Museum - Exterior

Bedesten, the old market house for luxury goods, is standing in the main square of Serres, the Eleftherias (Liberty) Square. The monument was built in the late 15th century (ca. 1485) by İbrahim Paşa, the grandson of Halil Hayreddin Çandarlı, who conquered Serres together with Evrenos Bey²⁹⁷. Bedesten was built outside the old city walls²⁹⁸, in the commercial part of the city, next to the Great Mosque (Cami-i Kebir), a.k.a. Eski Cami (Old Mosque), and a public bath, which were both endowed by Halil Hayreddin Çandarlı.²⁹⁹ It served a significant role in the city's economic life as it provided a space for the trade and protection of textiles and leather goods, major commercial products of Serres.³⁰⁰ Adjacent to the Bedesten, there were also many other smaller shops.³⁰¹ These shops, which were burnt down and rebuilt in different

²⁹⁷ Kiel 1971; Lowry 2008, 2009a, Heath W. Lowry, *The Selçuk Sultan Cami'i in Serez (Serres) & its Place in Early Ottoman Architecture*, (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University Press, 2013) [hereafter cited in text as Lowry 2013].

²⁹⁸ Aimilia Stefanidou, "Bedesten", In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture 2008) [hereafter cited in text as Stefanidou 2008].

²⁹⁹ Lowry 2008, 144.

³⁰⁰ Lowry 2008, 2009a.

³⁰¹ Kiel 1971; Stefanidou 2008.

periods, were finally demolished for applying the Serres town plan of 1920, and the Bedesten was left standing alone in the square.³⁰² Sampanopoulou noted that the demolition of the Bedesten was prevented with the efforts of A. Orlandos³⁰³, a professor of Byzantine Archaeology, who eventually restored the monument in the 1930s.³⁰⁴



Figure 4: Bedesten - Serres Archaeological Museum - Interior

In 1970, the Bedesten was transformed into the Serres Archaeological Museum to store and display the findings from archaeological works in and around Serres.³⁰⁵ Today, the monument still serves the same function. It is open to the public, and the entrance is free of charge.

³⁰² Stefanidou 2008.

³⁰³ S. V. Sampanopoulou, "The Ottoman Monuments", In *Serres: Past and Present*, (Serres: D.E.P.K.A. Serron, 2006) [hereafter cited in text as Sampanopoulou 2006].

³⁰⁴ Lowry 2008.

³⁰⁵ Magdalene Valla, "Archaeological Museum", In *Serres: Past and Present*, (Serres: D.E.P.K.A. Serron, 2006).

4.2.3.2. *Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque*



Figure 15: Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque - Exterior

Selçuk Sultan Mosque, more commonly known as 'Zincirli' (chained) Mosque, is located in a central and densely populated district in Serres, on the intersection of Anatolikis Thrakis (Ανατολικής Θράκης), Andrianoupoleos (Ανδριανουπόλεως) and Voirlwn (Βουρλών) streets.

The building was constructed in the late 15th century as an endowment by Selçuk Sultan, the daughter of Sultan Bayezid II and the wife of Mehmet Bey, who endowed another complex to Serres³⁰⁶. The mosque had a medrese (theological school) and an imaret (soup kitchen) in its courtyard, which were in use until 1913.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁶ Lowry 2008, 2013.

³⁰⁷ Lowry 2013.



Figure 16: Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque [The Machiel Kiel Photographic Archive (NIT)]

During Kiel's visits to Serres (1966-1971), Selçuk Sultan Mosque was used as a storeroom of the Public Works of Serres Municipality.³⁰⁸ The monument's ownership was transferred to the Ministry of Culture in 1968, following the ministerial decision 15813/19-12-61; however, it continued to be used by Serres Municipality with the same function until 1980.³⁰⁹ The monument went under restoration between 1995-2000 by the 12th Ephorate of Byzantine Antiquities, co-funded by the Greek State (25%) and the European Community (75%).³¹⁰ Another extensive restoration project took place on the ground floor of the monument

³⁰⁸ Kiel 1971.

³⁰⁹ Argyris Bakirtzis and Lila Sambanopoulou, "Zincirli mosque of the city of Serres and its conservation interventions (1995-2000)", In Aimilia Stephanidou and Aimos, Society for the Study of the Medieval Architecture in the Balkans and its Preservation, *Η συντήρηση και η αποκατάσταση των οθωμανικών μνημείων στην Ελλάδα*, (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2009) [hereafter cited in text as Bakirtzis and Sambanopoulou 2009].

³¹⁰ Bakirtzis and Sambanopoulou 2009.

between 2010-2012³¹¹ , and afterwards, the monument was opened to the public.



Figure 17: Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque - Interior

According to Lowry, the restoration works in Selçuk Sultan Mosque were among the best restoration projects in Greece and all other former-Ottoman territories.³¹² Not surprisingly, between the three mosques still standing in today's Serres, Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque has the highest state of preservation. Today, the monument is being used as a museum and a space for cultural events and temporary exhibitions, and the entrance is free of charge. It is circled with fences and has an ample green open space (garden), increasing its visibility.

³¹¹ Konstantinos Menzel, (2014, January 14), "Zincirli Mosque Serres: The Forgotten Monument", *Greek Reporter*, Accessed from: <https://greekreporter.com/2014/01/14/zincirli-mosque-serres-the-forgotten-monument/> on July 14, 2021.

³¹² Lowry 2009a.

4.2.3.3. Mehmed Bey Mosque



Figure 18: Mehmed Bey Mosque

Mehmed Bey Mosque, also locally referred to as Hagia Sophia due to its architectural features³¹³, is located on the southeastern edge of Serres, next to a small river and the Serres-Drama intercity road.

The mosque was built in 1492 as an endowment of Mehmed Bey, the husband of Selçuk Sultan. It was a part of a complex that included a soup kitchen; however, today, the mosque is the only remaining monument.³¹⁴ Mehmed Bey Mosque, its garden, and its surrounding area were used as a *mesiregah* (excursion spot) as mentioned by Evliya

³¹³ Stavroula Dadaki, "Mehmet Bey Mosque (or "Agia Sophia")", In Ersi Brouskari, (ed.), *Ottoman Architecture in Greece*, (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Culture 2008) [hereafter cited in text as Dadaki 2008b].

³¹⁴ Lowry 2008.

Çelebi.³¹⁵ In the 19th century (1814-1815), a funerary complex of İsmail Bey, a chief notable of Serres, was built to its northern side.³¹⁶



Figure 19: Mehmed Bey Mosque [The Machiel Kiel Photographic Archive (NIT)]

It is not sure when Mehmed Bey Mosque stopped functioning as a mosque.³¹⁷ In the 1960s, the building suffered extensive damage due to floods of the nearby stream.³¹⁸ Years of desolation also caused severe damage to the integrity of the monument, and during Kiel's second visit to Serres in 1970, he found half of the gallery and the dome collapsed.³¹⁹ In the 1980s, the monument was declared a protected monument, and minor maintenance and preservation works took

³¹⁵ Lowry 2009a.

³¹⁶ Lowry 2008. According to Lowry, İsmail Bey was an important official from Serres, and the city regained its former importance in commerce under his governance. This complex includes an ornamental wall with a fountain and a tomb behind that.

³¹⁷ Dadaki 2008b.

³¹⁸ Lowry 2009.

³¹⁹ Kiel 1971.

place.³²⁰ From 1995 onwards, more works aiming at increasing its stability took place.³²¹



Figure 20: İsmail Bey Funerary Complex and Mehmed Bey Mosque

Today Mehmed Bey Mosque is fenced around and closed to the public. On the other hand, due to its location on the side of Serres's one of the main roads, it is easily noticeable by anyone entering and exiting the town.

³²⁰ Lowry 2009.

³²¹ Dadaki 2008b.

4.2.3.4. *Mustafa Bey Mosque*



Figure 21: Mustafa Bey Mosque - Exterior

Mustafa Bey mosque is located in the western edge of Serres, on Kapetan Mitrousi (Καπετάν Μητρούση) street, and the right-hand side of the Serres – Thessaloniki intercity road.

The monument was first built as a mescid (the small praying hall where no Friday prayers occur) in the 15th century, and it was expanded into a mosque in 1519 as an endowment by certain a Mustafa Bey.³²²

³²² Lowry 2008.




Figure 22: Mustafa Bey Mosque [The Machiel Kiel Photographic Archive (NIT)]

The building was being used as a carpentry workshop during Kiel's visits to Serres (1966-1971)³²³, and it remained so until the early 2000s.³²⁴ Some minor changes were made to the structure during this period, such as widening the walls and windows. In 2009, it was listed as a protected monument.³²⁵

Today Mustafa Bey Mosque is fenced around and closed to the public. Even though it is located almost adjacent to one of the city's main roads, the monument cannot be seen from the road due to other buildings constructed in between.

4.2.4. Results of the Public Opinion Survey

As previously mentioned in the methodology section, a public opinion survey was conducted to evaluate locals' perceptions of their city's

³²³ Kiel 1971.

³²⁴ Lowry 2008

³²⁵ Lowry 2013.

Ottoman monuments. The survey was done through a questionnaire, which consisted of multiple-choice questions, Likert scale questions, and open-ended questions. The questionnaire was conducted face-to-face with citizens of Trikala with the help of a native speaker, Mrs Angeliki Gibiriti. Efforts have been made to make the sample as representative as possible. The participants were selected randomly among the people sitting in central squares and cafes in popular neighbourhoods and working people, depending on their availability and willingness to participate.

Furthermore, to increase the number of the sample, snowball sampling was also used. In that scenario, personal contacts were asked to direct the researchers to some possible respondents – regardless of any selected demographics data – that live in Serres, e.g., colleagues or family members. In total, 131 participants took part in this survey. The results of the questionnaire were analysed using the SPSS computer software.

4.2.4.1. Demographics

In this survey, out of 130 participants, 75 were female (valid percent=57.7%), and 55 were male (valid percent=42.3%). The average age of the participants was forty-three ($\mu =43$; $\sigma=13.18$), with the youngest participant being eighteen years old and the oldest participant being seventy-seven years old. According to the 2011 census, Serres municipality's population is 58,287, which consists of 30,244 females (valid percent=51.88) and 28,043 males (valid percent=48.12%). Considering the age groups, the majority of the population is between the ages 40-44 (valid percent=7.7%), followed closely by the age groups 45-49 (valid percent=7.3%), 50-54 (valid percent=7.3%) and 20-24 (valid percent=7.1%). Regarding the participants' gender, the sample slightly differs from the population distribution, but in terms of the age groups, it is very much in line with the population.

All the participants were living in Serres, ranging from one year to sixty-two years, with an average of twenty-nine years ($\mu = 28.9$; $\sigma = 15.2$). Most of the participants were highly educated in terms of education, as sixty per cent of them had a university degree (valid percent=60.8%), and twenty-three per cent had a master's degree or higher (valid percent=23.1%). Twelve per cent of the participants were high school graduates (valid percent=12.3%), and the remaining were Gymnasio (valid percent=2.3%), and Dimotiko (valid percent=0.8%) graduates. The participants with no formal education were only one per cent (valid percent=0.8%) of the total sample. On the other hand, according to the 2011 census, the university and equivalent school graduates equal only to nineteen per cent of the population (valid percent=18.8%), and the majority of the population is High School graduates (valid percent=24.9%) and Dimotiko graduates (valid percent=23.2%). People with master's degrees or higher equal only one per cent of the population (valid percent=1.36%).

In the sample of this study, the majority of the participants were public employees (valid percent=53.5%). Private sector employees (valid percent=14%) and self-employed people (valid percent=12.4%) were equally distributed, followed by unemployed people (valid percent=9.3%), students (7%) and retired people (valid percent=3.9%).

Comparing the demographics of the sample with the population of Serres, it is seen that the percentage of female participants in the survey is slightly higher than the population average. On the other hand, the age dispersion in our sample is in cohesion with the age groups of the population. The significant disparity between the sample and the population appears when the participants' level of education is compared with the Serres population. The participants of this survey are much more educated than the general population, as was also the case with the public opinion surveys conducted in Trikala. This situation stems from the fact that, in both case studies, more educated people were more willing and interested in joining the survey. Likewise, the density of the public employees in the sample, as

opposed to the private sector employees, was due to their availability to participate.

Overall, even though the sample demographics do not correspond perfectly to the population demographics, the high number of responses to the questionnaire is believed to increase the representativeness and compensate for the deficiency mentioned. In addition, the participants of the two case studies in Greece (Trikala and Serres) are very similar in terms of demographics, which increases the compatibility of the two surveys' results and provides the opportunity to conduct more insightful analysis.

4.2.4.2. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Cultural Heritage

Following the questions on personal information, the participants were asked what 'cultural heritage' means to them. The most common aspects among the replies were 'intangible' aspects (valid percent=53%) of cultural heritage, which included elements like 'traditions', 'customs', 'history' and 'music'. The tangible aspects of cultural heritage, such as 'monuments', 'historical buildings', 'museums' and 'archaeological sites', appeared in forty-five per cent of the answers. The natural heritage was only referred to by two per cent of the participants.

The feeling of 'inheritance' and 'stewardship' was prevalent among the answers, as many participants (valid percent=45%) consider cultural heritage as the tangible and intangible things that were "inherited from their ancestors" which they should "protect for the future generations." According to the participants, there is also a connection between cultural heritage and identity. One-third of the participants (valid percent=31%) consider cultural heritage as something that defines their national identity and their homeland, as is explained by two of the participants: "It means the tradition of my land" and "the culture and cultural identity of our homeland Greece."

Next, the participants were asked their opinion on 'if the cultural

heritage has a value' for specific groups. The prevailing majority of the participants (valid percent=95.4%) agree that 'cultural heritage is valuable for all the humanity' and followed closely by 'cultural heritage is valuable for the states' (valid percent=91.1%) and 'cultural heritage is valuable for me' (valid percent=90.5%). Most participants also agree that 'cultural heritage is valuable for the tourists' (valid percent=86.4%) and 'cultural heritage is valuable for the local people.' (valid percent=84.9%). (See Table 13)

Table 13: Serres - Cultural heritage is valuable to ...

Cultural heritage is valuable ...	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
To me	1.6%	1.6%	6.3%	34.9%	55.6%
To the local people	-	2.4%	12.7%	34.1%	50.8%
To states	-	0.8%	8.1%	30.6%	60.5%
To tourists	0.8%	-	12.8%	35.2%	51.2%
To the humanity	-	2.3%	2.3%	28.7%	66.7%

Afterwards, the participants were asked their opinion on some values attributed to cultural heritage in general. According to the answers, the most agreed value attached to the cultural heritage is the 'historical value' (valid percent=100%). The second highest value attached is the 'scientific-educational value' (valid percent=96.0%), followed by the 'economic-touristic value' (valid percent=92.9%). 'Aesthetic value' of cultural heritage was agreed upon by eighty-seven per cent of the participants (valid percent=86.6%), and two-thirds of the participants (valid percent=68.6%) agreed that cultural heritage has 'political value.' (See Table 14)

Table 14: Serres - I think that cultural heritage has ... value.

I think that cultural heritage has value.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	-	0.8%	12.7%	43.7%	42.9%
Historical value	-	-	-	20.3%	79.7%
Scientific – educational value	-	1.6%	2.4%	26.2%	69.8%
Economic - touristic value	1.6%	0.8%	4.7%	29.9%	63%
Political value	4%	7.3%	20.2%	32.3%	36.3%

More than half of the participants (valid percent=57%) think that cultural heritage assets belong to all humanity, regardless of nationality and place of residency. Thirty per cent think these assets belong to the citizens of the country they are located in, and only thirteen per cent think they belong to the states where they are located. In terms of the responsibility in protecting cultural heritage assets, there is an equal distribution between the answers ‘national/regional authorities’ (valid percent=47.5%) and ‘everybody’ (valid percent=47.5%); and only five per cent of the participants think the responsible authorities are the ‘International Organizations’ (such as UNESCO or EU).

The majority of the participants think they have good knowledge about cultural heritage in general (‘fairly well knowledgeable’ valid percent=45%; ‘extremely well knowledgeable’ valid percent=11.7%); and almost sixty per cent of them (valid percent=58.9%) visit archaeological sites or museums several times a year.

4.2.4.3. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Ottoman Heritage in Serres

In the following part of the questionnaire, the participants were asked questions regarding the Ottoman monuments of Serres, namely the Bedesten, the Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque, the Mehmed Bey Mosque, and the Mustafa Bey Mosque.

In terms of visitation numbers, the results show that an overwhelming majority of the participants (valid percent=80.5%) have visited the Bedesten, and more than half of those were repeat visitors.³²⁶ On the other hand, Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque was visited by a lesser percentage (valid percent=57%) of the participants, sixty-four per cent of whom were repeat visitors.³²⁷

The most common motivations for the Bedesten were 'educational visits' (valid percent=40.0%), 'interest/curiosity' (valid percent=29.0%) and 'visiting exhibitions/events/workshops' (valid percent=25%). For the Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli Mosque), 'visiting exhibitions/events/workshops' (valid percent=25%) was the most common reason, followed almost equally by 'educational visit' (valid percent=28.0%) and 'interest/curiosity' (valid percent=27.0%).

According to the results, among the two Ottoman monuments open to the public in Serres, the Bedesten has the higher percentage of visitation by the participants. This discrepancy can be explained by Bedesten's being open to the public as a museum since 1970. In contrast, the Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli) Mosque was restored and has opened to the public within the last decade. Furthermore, since the Bedesten serves as 'the archaeological museum of Serres,' it attracts more 'educational visits', especially from schools in the area.

In terms of the knowledge on the Ottoman monuments in Serres, only thirty-four per cent of the participants think they are 'fairly well' (valid percent=30.2%) or 'extremely well' (valid percent=4%) knowledgeable about the Ottoman monuments in Serres. On the other hand, when the same question was asked about the knowledge on cultural heritage in

³²⁶ The responses show that one-third of the visitors (valid percent=33%) have only visited the monument 'once,' forty-one percent of them visited the monument '2-3 times' and twenty-six percent of them visited the Bedesten 'more than three times.'

³²⁷ Among the participants who visited Selçuk Sultan (Zincirli Mosque) sixty-three percent of them visited the monument 'once', whereas forty-three percent visited '2-3 times', and twenty-one percent visited 'more than 3 times'.

general, more than half of the participants (valid percent=56.7%) said that they are ‘fairly well’ (valid percent=45%) or ‘extremely well’ (valid percent=11.7%) knowledgeable. It demonstrates that even though most of the participants consider themselves knowledgeable about the cultural heritage, they are not very much educated about the Ottoman heritage in their town. Nevertheless, a great majority of the participants (valid percent=84.2%) stated their openness to learning more about these monuments, which is regarded as a positive approach.

In the same manner, almost nine out of ten participants (valid percent=87.1) think the Ottoman monuments in Serres are valuable for their city and fellow citizens. The highest value given to these monuments by the participants is the ‘historical value’ (valid percent=90.3%), followed by the ‘scientific-educational value’ (valid percent=85%) and the ‘aesthetic value’ (valid percent=75%). The ‘economic – touristic value’ (valid percent=68.3%) and the ‘political value’ (valid percent=53%) are slightly lower than others, but the majority of the participants still agree with them. (See Table 15)

Table 15: Serres - I think that the Ottoman monuments in Serres add ... value to Serres

I think that the Ottoman monuments in Serres add ... value to Serres.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	5.8%	6.7%	12.5%	41.7%	33.3%
Historical value	1.6%	2.4%	5.6%	30.6%	59.7%
Scientific – educational value	3.3%	-	11.7%	38.3%	46.7%
Economic - touristic value	3.3%	5.8%	22.5%	32.5%	35.8%
Political value	5.9%	16.8%	24.4%	28.6%	24.4%

On the other hand, when the values given to Ottoman monuments in

Serres are compared with those given to cultural heritage in general, we can see that the positive responses have decreased. (See Table 10)

Regarding the protection of the Ottoman monuments in Serres, the overwhelming majority of the participants (valid percent=72.5%) think that the responsibility should belong to regional and national authorities. Similar results apply to the question about the protection of Ottoman monuments in Greece. Nonetheless, when asked “who should be responsible for the protection of cultural heritage assets in general,” we see equality between the responses ‘everybody’ (valid percent=47.5%) and ‘national/regional authorities’ (valid percent=47.5%). This data shows that Serres' inhabitants tend to feel less responsible for protecting Ottoman monuments in their town and their country than for protecting cultural heritage assets of other eras.

Even though a great majority of the participants (valid percent=85.6%) think the Ottoman monuments in Serres should be protected for future generations, when it comes to personal responsibility, there is a decrease in the positive responses (valid percent=76.7%). Similar results were found for the protection of the Ottoman monuments in Greece.³²⁸ (See Table 16 & 17)

Table 16: Serres - Ottoman monuments in Serres I

Ottoman monuments in Serres	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	2.4%	0.8%	11.2%	26.4%	59.2%

³²⁸ 86.3% of the participants agree with the sentence “Ottoman monuments in Greece should be protected for the future generations; however, only 70.8% of them agree that they have a personal responsibility in protecting the Ottoman monuments in Greece.

I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	3.2%	4.8%	15.3%	31.5%	45.2%
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Table 17: Serres - Ottoman monuments in Greece I

Ottoman monuments in Greece	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	2.4%	2.4%	8.9%	32.5%	53.7%
I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	4.9%	4.1%	19.7%	35.2%	36.1%

Finally, the participants were asked if they consider the Ottoman monuments in Serres to be a part of the city's history and culture as well as their personal identities and histories. An overwhelming majority of the participants (valid percent=91.2%) consider these monuments as a part of Serres's past and culture. On the other hand, when asked about personal histories and identities, even though the majority of the participants agree that they have a personal connection with the Ottoman monuments in Serres, compared with the previous question, it is seen that a lesser percentage (75.2%) of the participants are personally attached to these monuments. (See Table 18)

Table 18: Serres - Ottoman monuments in Serres II

Ottoman monuments in Serres	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments are part of Serres' history and culture.	1.6%	4.0%	3.2%	28%	63.2%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	4.8%	7.2%	12.8%	26.4%	48.8%

Furthermore, even though most of the participants (valid percent=81.1%) consider Ottoman monuments in Greece to be a part of Greece's history and culture, compared with the similar question on the Ottoman monuments in Serres, there is a decrease in the positive results. Regarding personal attachments to the Ottoman monuments in Greece, seventy per cent of the participants (valid percent=71.3%) agree that these monuments constitute a part of their personal histories and identities. (See Table 19)

Table 19: Serres - Ottoman monuments in Greece II

Ottoman monuments in Greece	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments are part of Greece's history and culture.	0.8%	8.2%	9.8%	25.4%	55.7%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	5.7%	7.4%	15.6%	27%	44.3%

Since Serres has two idle Ottoman monuments, the Mehmed Bey Mosque and Mustafa Bey Mosque, additional questions were asked to the participants regarding the future of these monuments and the other unused Ottoman monuments in Greece. Firstly, the participants were asked if they would like these two monuments to be functional again and, if so, with what purposes. As the question was an open-ended one, not every participant replied. Yet, among those who did, the majority (valid percent=76%) favoured the idea of utilizing these monuments. Only sixteen per cent of the participants were against using these monuments, and eight per cent stated 'they don't have any idea.' The participants favoured utilizing these monuments to ensure their preservation and protection and allow public access and visitation to these monuments. Many of them stated that these monuments should be used for educational, social, and touristic purposes, such as museums, exhibition spaces, and event halls. Some participants also specifically stated that the new functions should be respectful to their original religious functions and 'not offend the Muslim faith'; therefore, they suggested that the safest function is a museum. On the other hand, a few participants said they would like to see these monuments, especially the Mehmed Bey Mosque or 'Hagia Sophia,' transformed into a church. One participant also said these monuments should be museums 'to promote the history of the Ottoman occupation of Serres.'

Likewise, when asked about utilizing the idle Ottoman monuments in Greece with new functions, most of the participants (valid percent=71.5%) agreed that these monuments should be utilized and put into new uses.

4.2.4.4 Statistical Relationships Between Participants' Demographics and Their Responses

Firstly, to evaluate if there is a relationship between the participants' gender and their answers to the questionnaire, an Independent T Test analysis was conducted. The results suggest that a meaningful statistical difference exist between the answers given by male and

female participants (CHValues: $t = -3.07$, $p = 0.003$; OttValues: $t = -1.99$, $p = 0.05$; OttProtection: $t = -2.75$, $p = 0.007$; OttIdentity $t = -2.84$, $p = 0.006$). (See Table 20)

As was seen by the t values, the female participants have higher appreciation of cultural heritage assets in general and Ottoman heritage in their towns. Furthermore, compared to male participants, they agree more with the protection of Ottoman heritage assets and feel higher personal responsibility in that. Finally, they have a higher personal and local / national attachment with the Ottoman monuments in Serres and Greece, compared to the male participants.

Table 20: Serres – SPSS Output I

Independent Samples Test									
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-Test for Equality of Means					
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper
CHValues	Equal variances assumed	3,583	,061	-3,077	127	,003	-.30283	,09841	-.49757 -.10808
	Equal variances not assumed			-2,883	84,646	,005	-.30283	,10504	-.51168 -.09397
OttValues	Equal variances assumed	7,354	,008	-2,131	123	,035	-.32333	,15175	-.62370 -.02295
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,991	81,584	,050	-.32333	,16238	-.64637 -.00028
OttProtection	Equal variances assumed	9,223	,075	-2,753	125	,007	-.42588	,15470	-.73206 -.11971
	Equal variances not assumed			-2,621	92,078	,010	-.42588	,16211	-.74784 -.10393
OttIdentity	Equal variances assumed	12,237	,001	-3,011	126	,003	-.50417	,16747	-.83558 -.17276
	Equal variances not assumed			-2,846	87,951	,006	-.50417	,17714	-.85621 -.15213

Secondly, to investigate the relationships between the participants' age and their responses, and, the amount of time participants' spent in Serres and their responses, correlation analysis were conducted. The results show that there are meaningful positive correlations between the participants' age and their responses to CHValues ($r = 0.239$, $p = 0.007$), OttProtection ($r = 0.212$, $p = 0.018$) and OttIdentity ($r = 0.185$, $p = 0.038$). On the other hand, there are no significant correlations between the time spent in Serres and their responses to the questionnaire. (See Table 21)

In addition, the results show that there is a significant correlation between the values given to cultural heritage assets in general

(CHValues) and the variables OttValues, OttProtection and OttIdentity. This suggests that as the values given to cultural heritage assets in general by the participants increase, so do the values they give to Ottoman heritage assets in their towns (CHValues-OttValues: $r = 0.469$, $p = 0.000$). (See Table 21)

Furthermore, it is seen that the values given by participants to cultural heritage assets in general also positively correlate with their feelings of personal responsibility in protecting Ottoman heritage assets (CHValues-OttProtection: $r = 0.470$, $p = 0.000$), their personal attachments to them and their associations of the Ottoman heritage with local history and identity (CHValues-OttIdentity: $r = 0.468$, $p = 0.000$). (See Table 21) This outcome supports the thesis, which was discussed in detail above, that the local inhabitants in Serres do not hold negative views for the Ottoman heritage in their towns and do not discriminate or neglect them.

Table 21: Serres – SPSS Output II

		Correlations					
		Age	For how many years?	CHValues	OttValues	OttProtection	OttIdentity
Age	Pearson Correlation	1	,374**	,239**	,165	,212	,185
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,007	,068	,018	,038
	N	128	115	127	123	125	126
For how many years?	Pearson Correlation	,374**	1	,103	-,065	,029	,039
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,274	,493	,759	,676
	N	115	116	115	112	114	115
CHValues	Pearson Correlation	,239**	,103	1	,469**	,470**	,468**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,007	,274		,000	,000	,000
	N	127	115	129	124	126	127
OttValues	Pearson Correlation	,165	-,065	,469**	1	,787**	,769**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,068	,493	,000		,000	,000
	N	123	112	124	125	124	125
OttProtection	Pearson Correlation	,212*	,029	,470**	,787**	1	,855**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,018	,759	,000	,000		,000
	N	125	114	126	124	127	127
OttIdentity	Pearson Correlation	,185*	,039	,468**	,769**	,855**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,038	,676	,000	,000	,000	
	N	126	115	127	125	127	128

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Lastly, One-Way ANOVA analysis was used for investigating if a

meaningful difference exist between the participants' responses depending on their levels of education. As can be seen below, the analysis revealed that the participants' appreciation of and attitudes towards cultural heritage assets in general and the Ottoman heritage assets in Serres and Greece do not change according to their levels of education (CHValues: $F=1.064$, $p=0.384$; OttValues $F=1.101$, $p=0.364$; OttProtection $F=0.229$, $p=0.949$; OttIdentity $F=2.259$, $p=0.053$). (See Table 22)

Table 22: Serres – SPSS Outcome III

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
CHValues	Between Groups	1,729	5	,346	1,064	,384
	Within Groups	39,973	123	,325		
	Total	41,702	128			
OttValues	Between Groups	3,944	5	,789	1,101	,364
	Within Groups	85,244	119	,716		
	Total	89,188	124			
OttProtection	Between Groups	,925	5	,185	,229	,949
	Within Groups	97,562	121	,806		
	Total	98,487	126			
OttIdentity	Between Groups	10,067	5	2,013	2,259	,053
	Within Groups	108,746	122	,891		
	Total	118,813	127			

4.3. Discussion of the Findings

Demographic characteristics of the participants in Trikala and Serres bear a resemblance to each other, both in terms of gender, age, average years of inhabitation, level of education, and employment areas. In addition, in all these areas, except the level of education, the samples also correspond to the data from the 2010 census. On the other hand, the sample differs significantly from the general population regarding the level of education. In both case studies, the participants' levels of education were higher than the general population. Nevertheless,

considering the total number of questionnaires and the populations in the relevant case studies, the sample in Trikala provides a 95% confidence level with a 10% margin of error, and the sample in Serres provides a 95% confidence level with an 8.5% margin of error. Therefore, the samples in this study are considered representative of their general populations.

Firstly, the surveys show that the participants' understanding of cultural heritage is mainly associated with tangible and intangible creations of the past and is strongly related to national and personal identity. In this sense, the answers are closely linked to the dominant western heritage discourse that emerged in 19th century Europe and was defined by Smith (2006) as the Authorised Heritage Discourse. The discourse, which initially considered materiality, aesthetic value and age value as the defining characteristics of what constitutes heritage, has been challenged in the last century and especially in the international charters, intangible and natural heritage gained recognition.³²⁹

In terms of the participants in these surveys, especially in Serres, the intangible heritage is well recognized in the definitions of cultural heritage. In this regard, the results suggest that the changes in the AHD and the international heritage discourse (primarily through the UNESCO instruments) within the last century reflect local people's opinions. In addition, the identity-conferring status of cultural heritage and the feeling of custodianship of heritage for the future generations, which are both emphasized by the AHD, are also apparent within the responses.

The data shows that most of the participants in Trikala and Serres are well-educated people with an interest and good knowledge of cultural heritage. According to their responses, they occasionally visit archaeological sites, museums, and monuments. On the other hand,

³²⁹ Smith 2006

when it comes to the Ottoman monuments in their towns, which are among the most important cultural sites in their city, the participants stated they are not very knowledgeable about them. The lack of knowledge on these monuments is most likely to result from the national education system, which is used by nation-states to educate their members on the nation's unique past and heritage. As previously explained in Chapter 3, Greece's national identity and its history discourse were constructed around its ancient Greek and Byzantine pasts; and its Ottoman past was disregarded. The exclusion of the Ottoman past from the national education system and the public sphere has most likely resulted in the limited knowledge of the Ottoman monuments by the public.

On the other hand, the changing discourse in Greece, which led to increased efforts to protect and promote Greece's Ottoman heritage, has had a positive effect on the visitation and knowledge of these monuments. This is evident in the responses to the question regarding the reasons for visitation to these monuments. Besides the answer 'visiting exhibitions/workshops/events', two of the most common reasons were 'personal interest' and educational visits.

The majority of the participants think the Ottoman monuments in their towns are valuable for the city and its inhabitants, especially in terms of their 'historical value' and 'scientific-educational value'. On the other hand, there is a certain decrease in the value of Ottoman monuments in Serres and Trikala for the participants compared to the value of cultural heritage in general. Considering that the Ottoman heritage in Greece has long been disregarded in the official heritage discourse and the national narrative favoured the Classical and the Byzantine pasts, it is no surprise that the Ottoman heritage is considered 'comparatively less' valuable.

The participants' positive approaches towards the Ottoman monuments in their towns are also apparent in the questions regarding the protection of these monuments. A vast majority of the participants agree that these monuments should be protected for future generations.

The results are similar for the protection of the Ottoman monuments in Greece. However, in terms of their protection, fewer participants agree that they have a personal responsibility to protect these monuments. Even though most of the participants consider themselves personally responsible for protecting cultural heritage assets in general, when it comes to the Ottoman monuments in their towns, many participants think the primary responsibility is with the authorities.

The decrease in personal responsibility in protecting the Ottoman monuments in Trikala and Serres and, in general, in Greece is thought to stem from three reasons. The first possibility is that when thinking and speaking hypothetically, such as protecting cultural heritage in general, people feel more personal responsibility and consider themselves as active agents. However, they are less willing to act when it comes to practicality. The second reason is more personal, and it is related to how people define cultural heritage and define themselves personally. When feelings and emotions find a reflection on the material sphere, it fosters the feeling of responsibility. Considering many participants see their ancestors, their personal and communal histories on the material remains of the Antiquity and the Byzantine periods, their feelings of ownership and responsibility about those heritages are enhanced. And thirdly, it can be related to the expert knowledge attributed to the past, archaeology, and heritage in Greece.

The surveys showed that, even though most of the participants consider the Ottoman monuments in their towns as a part of their cities' history and culture, few people consider these monuments part of their personal histories and identities. Monuments are directly related to memory,³³⁰ and they serve as the material spaces of remembrance.³³¹ It is believed that most of the participants do not have meaningful relationships with these monuments, and consequently, they do not regard them as part of their identities. This point was

³³⁰ Choay 2001.

³³¹ Riegl 1903.

supported by data from open-ended questions and in-depth personal communications with some participants. The responses revealed people who have personal memories, e.g., from their childhoods, with the Ottoman monuments in their towns, tend to have the greatest concern for the protection of these monuments and the deepest mourning for the demolished Ottoman monuments. In addition, due to negative perceptions of the Ottoman past in Greece and the religious connotations these monuments have, some participants referred to these monuments as not 'ours' but 'theirs', as in the sense that they belong to Turkish and/or Muslim people. Therefore, it was seen that the feeling of personal responsibility in protecting these monuments stems from the level of personal attachments to these monuments.

4.4. Conclusion

Smith and Waterton (2013) argued that "all heritage is inherently dissonant",³³² and when it comes to the Ottoman heritage in Greece, surely there could be no objections to that. The official history discourse in Greece, which was constructed in the 19th century, disregarded its Ottoman past and led to the deliberate and indeliberate destructions of Ottoman monuments in the Greek soil, both through the state's and citizens' hands. However, towards the end of the 20th century, the Ottoman past and its material remains gained wider recognition and protection.

In line with the recognition and inclusion of the Ottoman past within the dominant heritage discourse in Greece, the public opinion surveys in Trikala and Serres show that most participants have a positive approach towards the Ottoman monuments in Trikala. They consider these monuments a part of their local and national histories and culture, therefore valuable and should be protected and passed on to future generations. This outcome suggests that the appropriation of the Ottoman heritage in the official cultural heritage discourse in Greece

³³² Smith and Waterton 2013, 66.

has also positively impacted Greek society. However, compared to the protection of cultural heritage assets in general, fewer people tend to think they have personal responsibility in protecting these monuments, which could be related to the fact that fewer people consider Ottoman heritage to be a part of their personal identity and history.



Figure 10: Trikala - Concert taking place next to the Osman Shah (Koursoum) Mosque (taken from <https://trikalacity.gr>)

Smith (2006) considers heritage a process of meaning-making in which participants are actively engaged in and create memories and experiences.³³³ The results of the public opinion survey show that Serres citizens favour putting the idle Ottoman monuments in Serres into new uses, which in the end, would help preserve their physical integrity and protect them for future generations. They think it would also allow the public to visit and learn their history, which is in line with their willingness to learn more about the Ottoman monuments in their town. Accordingly, it is believed that utilizing these monuments with new functions and providing a space for people to engage with

³³³ Smith 2006

the monuments as well as with each other would have a positive impact on locals' perceptions and the Ottoman heritage in Trikala and Serres, as well as in Greece in general, might as well gain more acceptance by the locals.

Chapter 5: Turkey and Its Cultural Heritage

5.1. The Foundation of Modern Turkey

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 and had a history of nearly one century, but Turkish people's presence in the lands that constitute the country goes back to the 11th century. Since that time, the lands that constitute the modern Turkish republic were ruled by the Byzantine Empire, the Seljuks, and the Ottomans.

5.1.1 The Ottoman Empire

Turkic tribes had started migrating from the steppes of Central Asia towards the west and arrived in Anatolia/Asia Minor in the 11th century. After successful campaigns, they formed their state in Central Anatolia, known as the Sultanate of Rum. The Ottoman state was one of the small independent principalities (*beyliks*) in Anatolia that emerged after the diminishing central authority of the Seljuks. It was formed at the end of the 13th century by Osman Bey in Western Anatolia, neighbouring the Byzantine Empire, and by the 16th century, it reached the height of its power as it turned into an empire with lands in Europe, Asia, and Africa.³³⁴

With the 18th century and onwards, the Ottoman Empire entered a period of decline as it started falling behind the Western states in terms of military and economic strength.³³⁵ The declining strength and central authority also resulted in revolts and national uprisings in the empire, such as the Serbian uprising (1801), the revolts of Muhammad Ali of

³³⁴ Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* [Originally published as "*The Emergence of Modern Turkey*", (Oxford University Press, 2002)], 3rd edition, (Ankara: Arkadaş 2018), 35 [Hereafter cited in text as Lewis 2018].

³³⁵ Lewis 2018, 37.

Egypt (1805) and Ali Pasha of Ioannina (1820) and the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830).³³⁶ These conflicts have shown both the military and administrative weaknesses of the empire. As a result, the Ottoman state deemed that it was necessary to modernize the state and its institutions. These reforms were focused on various areas, including the military, the state administration and education. Especially with the modernized military schools, overseen by foreign experts, mainly from France,³³⁷ a class of secular military officers has emerged in the Empire.

Furthermore, due to decreasing trust in the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire following the 19th century Serbian and Greek national revolts in the Balkans, Muslim subjects with the knowledge of foreign languages – especially of French – started to get involved in the state bureaucracy, as translators and interpreters.³³⁸ Through the embassies in Europe that was established in the 18th century, political relations with the West has evolved.³³⁹ Thus, the Western ideas of democracy, equality, and citizenship were also introduced to the Muslim subjects of the Empire.

The Tanzimat (1839) and the Islahat (1856) reforms, which provided legal equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the empire, were results of these modernization processes in the Empire, as well as the French Revolution and the subsequent national uprisings. The Ottoman Enlightenment also had resulted in questioning the state governance and the Sultan's authority, and in 1876, the empire was transformed into a constitutional monarchy.

Following the territorial losses in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the Ottomans joined World War I in alliance with the 'Central Powers'.

³³⁶ Feroz Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye* [Originally published as "*Turkey: The Quest for Identity*", (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003)], revised edition, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2019), 28-29 [hereafter cited in text as Ahmad 2019].

³³⁷ Ahmad 2019, 28; Lewis 2018, 79.

³³⁸ Ahmad 2019, 31.

³³⁹ Ahmad 2019, 31; Lewis 2018, 85-7.

Even though they were successful in some fronts, such as the Gallipoli (1915-1916), on most of the other fronts, they were defeated and lost vast territories. The war ended with the Armistice of Mudros (30 October 1918) signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, giving the Allied Powers the right to occupy Ottoman lands if deemed necessary.

5.1.2. Turkish War of Independence

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the subsequent occupation of Istanbul (1918) and the partition of lands by the Treaty of Sevres (1920) led to the foundation of the Turkish National Movement.

The movement was supported by various groups, including high level Ottoman military officers – among which was also Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who later became the founder and first president of the republic – local administrative authorities and elites, local populations as well as the unorganized local militia. It aimed to free the country of foreign occupation. According to the Treaty of Sevres, which was signed with the Allied Forces and the Ottoman government, large parts of the Ottoman Empire were given to Greece on the West, Italy and France on the south and Armenia on the south East.

Turkish National Movement was a movement against the foreign occupying powers and the Ottoman government in Istanbul. After a series of congresses organized in Anatolia, it was agreed that the Ottoman government was no longer a suitable authority to pursue independence. Thus, the Grand National Assembly was founded in Ankara on 23 April 1920. The Turkish War of Independence was fought against the forces of the Allied Powers, namely Greece in the West, Armenia in the East, France in the south. The military conflicts in the east ended with the Treaty of Kars (October 1921) and in the west, the Armistice of Mudanya (14 October 1922) ended the Greco-Turkish War. The following year, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) was signed, and the independent Turkish Republic was recognized internationally.

5.1.3. The Modern Turkish Republic

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) ended the conflict and defined the borders of the modern Turkish Republic.³⁴⁰ The newly independent Republic of Turkey, the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, represented a significant disengagement from the Ottoman state regarding its regime, ideology and national identity. The new regime, which was heavily influenced by Western ideologies, aimed at establishing a secular and modern nation-state. Accordingly, the Grand National Assembly abolished the monarchy (1 November 1922), and declared the new country's regime to be a parliamentary republic (29 October 1923). The Caliphate, an Ottoman-Islamic title, was also abolished (1924).

Mustafa Kemal, who took the last name Atatürk (*Father-Turk*) after the surname law (1934), the prominent leader of the Turkish War of Independence, was selected as the first president of the new country (1923). Under his leadership, an era of reforms that were aimed at creating a secular and modernized country and nation had started.

5.2. Inventing the Turkish Nation

In its long history, Ottoman Empire had never been an ethnicity-oriented state. Its high state officials were of various ethnic origins, though as was mentioned earlier, starting with the 15th century onwards, to belong to the Ottoman administration, being a Muslim was a requirement – a situation that continued until the Tanzimat. As was

³⁴⁰ According to the treaty, Evros river was set as the border between Greece and Turkey, whereas the border with Bulgaria stayed as it was defined with the prior Treaty of Constantinople (1913) and the Bulgarian–Ottoman convention (1915). With the treaty of Lausanne, Turkey ceded its claims on Dodecanese Islands, Cyprus, Egypt and Sudan. The south-eastern border with Syria and Iraq were set with the Treaty of Ankara (1926), with the addition of the city Hatay joining the Republic of Turkey in 1939. The country's eastern borders were previously set with the Treaty of Kars (1921), signed with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

briefly discussed in the previous parts, in the Ottoman Empire, until the very end of its existence, there were almost no movements of Turkish nationalism. Until the 20th century and the defeat in World War I, ideas of nationalism were only of interest to the minorities in the Empire, and not to the majority of the Muslim inhabitants.³⁴¹ This was mostly a result of the government policies that tried to conserve the multi-religious and multi-ethnic empire. Through movements such as Ottomanism and later Pan Islamism, the ruling elite aimed at protecting the empire from disintegration. Furthermore, Muslim subjects of the Empire, who constituted the majority, were more easily moved by religious connotations than nationalistic ones.³⁴² Up until the very end of the empire, Ottomanism and Pan Islamism remained the dominant state ideologies.³⁴³

For all those reasons, there was not a common and strong Turkish national identity felt by the people in the newly independent Turkish Republic. Therefore, the new regime aimed to construct a new national identity using various ‘ethno symbolic elements’. As was done in Chapter 3, these factors to be discussed are ‘language’, ‘religion’ and ‘common roots’.

5.2.1. Language

The Turkish language was the common tongue spoken by the Turkic tribes migrating from Central Asia, and it was the official language both in Seljuk and Ottoman states. After the conversion of Turkic people to Islam, Islamic cultural elements became predominant in the Turkish way of life. Much of the previous cultural elements, such as the language, were affected by this cultural transformation.³⁴⁴

To belong to the ruling elite in the Ottoman society, one had to be a

³⁴¹ Ahmad 2019, xii.

³⁴² Ahmad 2019, 72.

³⁴³ Ahmad 2019, 74.

³⁴⁴ Lewis 2018, 12-13.

Muslim and speak Turkish.³⁴⁵ There were two different versions of Turkish used in the empire; the official Ottoman Turkish and the simple Turkish spoken by the common subjects of the empire. The Ottoman Turkish was a more complex version of the standard Turkish, enriched with vocabulary and forms from Arabic and Persian. It was written with the Ottoman-Turkish alphabet, which consisted of Arabic letters. This version of Turkish was used in state affairs and high literature (*Divan* and *Tasavvuf* literature). It was a language that could be understood by the educated only; therefore, it was only used by the elites in the society. The ordinary people of Turkish origin living in the empire spoke a simpler version of Turkish, and the folk literature was very different and plain compared to the high literature. Thus, it can be said that, through many centuries, the Turkish language did not result in the formation of Turkish group identity within the Ottoman empire, not between the ruling class and the subjects, and not among the subjects themselves.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the history of Turkish culture and language (Turcology) became an academic interest in the West, and various research on pre-Islamic Turkish culture was conducted. This research also had reflections within the Ottoman society. Turkish subjects of the empire started giving more thoughts on their ethnic identity as a group and their pre-Islamic history and culture, which also included the Turkish language.³⁴⁶ Accordingly, during the 19th century, many intellectuals made proposals to simplify the Turkish language and make it closer to the spoken form. In addition, it was also considered a necessity, as the Arabic letters were not suitable for the printing press.

The first printing house within the Ottoman lands was founded in 1493-4 by Jewish subjects of the empire, and the Armenians followed it

³⁴⁵ Lewis 2018, 12 and 447.

³⁴⁶ Lewis 2018, 467.

in 1567 and Greeks in 1627.³⁴⁷ Printing in Turkish and Arabic was forbidden.³⁴⁸ Due to resistance from the conservatives in the empire, especially from the ulama (*ulema*) class, the Muslim inhabitants of the empire could not establish their own printing houses until the 18th century. The first Turkish printing house in the Empire was opened by Ibrahim Muteferrika, a Hungarian born Muslim, in 1727. However, due to the pressures from the conservatives, it was shut down in 1742 and was re-opened once again in 1784.³⁴⁹

Through the developments in mass media and printing and the increasing communication with the West in the 19th century, a new wave of Turkish literature, heavily affected by French literature, has developed.³⁵⁰ Furthermore, in 1831 the first newspaper in the Ottoman empire was published. Even though these developments reached out to a limited and elite public, they facilitated the advancement of the Turkish language and the common Turkish identity.³⁵¹ The reforms in education also had important effects on the modernization of Muslim populations. As a result, low class and middle-class Muslim populations living in big cities could receive modern education and move up in society.³⁵² Through that, more Turkish-speaking Muslim subjects of the empire were introduced to the ideas of nationhood and *patria*, which facilitated the emergence of Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity.

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, reforms to promote the use of the Turkish language were implemented. As was also argued by intellectuals in the 19th century, Ottoman Turkish written in Arabic script was thought to be unsuitable as an educational tool, as it was so

³⁴⁷ Lewis 2018, 71.

³⁴⁸ Lewis 2018, 71

³⁴⁹ Ahmad 2019, 21; Lewis 2018.

³⁵⁰ Lewis 2018, 188.

³⁵¹ Ahmad 2019, 30.

³⁵² Ahmad 2019, 48.

hard to learn and was open to misinterpretation.³⁵³ In 1928, the Arabic Alphabet used for centuries was abandoned, and the Latin alphabet was accepted as Turkey's official script. In addition to its practical reasons, this decision was also a political one as it constituted a major separation from the Turkish nation's Ottoman past. In 1932, the Turkish Language Association (Türk Dil Kurumu) was founded to "to reveal the richness of the Turkish language".³⁵⁴ This institution also worked to purify the language from its foreign effects and loanwords, which mainly constituted Arabic and Persian vocabulary and not much of the western languages.³⁵⁵ In the end, new generations were educated with the state's new official discourse and identity as members of a secular and modern nation-state.³⁵⁶

In conclusion, even though Turkish was the official language in the Ottoman Empire, due to the religion-oriented stratification of the society, it did not result in the preservation of common Turkish group identity. Furthermore, since the commonly spoken tongue and the written forms were different, it created a barrier between the educated elite and the uneducated subjects of the empire. In the 19th century, with the effects of Ottoman modernization and increasing connection to the west, the Turkish language had started to be considered an element of common group identity. Yet, it did not facilitate a significant political effect, nor by the Ottoman state trying to protect the empire from its dissolution, neither by the common people, who considered themselves a part of the bigger Muslim community and not a separate ethnic group. It was only after the foundation of the Turkish Republic that the Turkish language was regarded as a crucial part of the national identity. The new regime used the Turkish language as a tool to homogenize the nation, to educate the new generations according to its ideology, and to distance the new Turkish state and the nation from its

³⁵³ Lewis 2018, 575-6.

³⁵⁴ TDK. <https://www.tdk.gov.tr/tdk/kurumsal/gorev-ve-hedef/>

³⁵⁵ Lewis 2018, 584-6.

³⁵⁶ Ahmad 2019, 93.

Islamic and Ottoman past.

5.2.2. Religion

The Ottoman state was an Islamic one in all aspects: It was ruled by Islamic law, its lands were considered the 'lands of Islam', its army was considered the 'army of Islam'.³⁵⁷ Likewise, its ruling elite identified themselves primarily with their religion, as Muslims, and not with their ethnic background.³⁵⁸ Furthermore, in the perception of the European states and people, the word 'Muslim' was simultaneous with the word 'Turk'.³⁵⁹

In Ottoman society, religion was the primary factor in maintaining group identity. The Ottoman society was organized according to the *millet* system in which the main criteria of separation between people was religion. The Muslim millet included people of different ethnic origins, such as Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, and people who later converted to Islam.³⁶⁰ non-Muslim subjects of the empire were Jewish subjects and Christian subjects, and the latter was grouped according to the church they belonged to, such as Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant etc.³⁶¹ The leaders of these non-Muslim communities were the patriarchs of their churches, who were under the protection of the Sultan, and their believers were allowed to practice their religion without interference.³⁶² On the other hand, even though there were no social restrictions for non-Muslims, from the 15th century onwards, being Muslim became a prerequisite of having a position in the state bureaucracy.³⁶³ This situation changed after the Tanzimat reforms, and in the first parliament after the transition to constitutional monarchy,

³⁵⁷ Lewis 2018, 20.

³⁵⁸ Lewis 2018, 20.

³⁵⁹ Lewis 2018, 20; Ahmad 2019.

³⁶⁰ Ahmad 2019, 11.

³⁶¹ Ahmad 2019, 11.

³⁶² Ahmad 2019, 15.

³⁶³ Lowry 2003.

representatives from all the religious groups existed within the empire.³⁶⁴

In the 19th century, with the emergence of nationalism, different ethnic groups within millets had developed self-recognition as separate nations, such as Slavs, Greeks and Bulgarians, which were previously all considered within the Orthodox millet. Tanzimat reforms brought the secularization of religions and accelerated the unification of peoples as separate nations through the formation of national churches.³⁶⁵

On the other hand, the ideas of nationalism and the modernization efforts in the Empire did not affect the Muslim subjects similarly, as Islam was considered as a universal religion, and there was no room for any separated, national places of worship.³⁶⁶ Even after the emergence of Turkish nationalism towards the end of the 19th century, most of the Empire's Turkish speaking Muslim subjects have continued to identify themselves not with their language or ethnicity but with their religion.

Since its beginning, the Turkish War of Independence also had a religious character as it was fought to "protect the lands and peoples of Islam against the non-Muslims."³⁶⁷ The war was fought against the Greeks and Armenians, who were also fighting for the independence of their own countries. Therefore, religion was an important factor of unification for the Turkish speaking Muslim population of the Empire.³⁶⁸ The importance of religion in defining the Turkish nation was also evident in the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey following the Lausanne Treaty after the war. According to the treaty, this exchange included people speaking Turkish as their mother tongue but religiously Orthodox, the Karamanlides, and people living

³⁶⁴ Ahmad 2019, 43

³⁶⁵ Ahmad 2019, 38.

³⁶⁶ Ahmad 2019, 38.

³⁶⁷ Lewis 2018, 542

³⁶⁸ Ahmad 2019, 87-8.

in Greece and speaking Greek but were Muslims, such as the Cretan Muslims.³⁶⁹ Hence, religion was considered a factor of defining collective identity and 'otherness'.

Religion kept its identity referring status after the foundation of the independent Turkish republic. The new regime, aimed at establishing a modern state and nation, intended to distance itself from the Ottoman past and the religious connotations embedded within the state and society. For this purpose, the caliphate was abolished, and religious law was abandoned. Constitutional secularism was provided in 1928, dismissing the law that stated the state's religion as Islam.³⁷⁰ To secularize the nation, actions such as banning religious clothing outside places of worship were taken. Religious institutions and religious education were taken under strict state control.³⁷¹ The transition from using the Arabic alphabet to the Latin alphabet can also be considered a reform made for that purpose. Likewise, it was decided that the religious prayers would take place using Turkish and not Arabic. With all its reforms, the founders of the Republic of Turkey, especially following the second half of its first decade, aimed to decrease the intensity of religion in the Turkish identity and increase the importance of other ethnic elements such as language and common roots.

In conclusion, religion constituted the major ethno-symbolic element for the group identity during the Ottoman Empire, both for the ruling elite and the common people. After converting to Islam, Turkic people have left many elements of their pre-Islamic culture, and they identified themselves as a part of the universal Muslim millet. The national 'awakening' of a common Turkish ethnic identity did not emerge until the end of the 19th century, and even after that, it was not of a revolutionary nature. During the Turkish War of Independence,

³⁶⁹ Lewis 2018, 480; Damla Demiröz, *Savaşın Barışa Giden Yolu: Atatürk – Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye – Yunanistan İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 2017, 28-31 [hereafter cited in text as Demiröz 2017].

³⁷⁰ Ahmad 2019, 93.

³⁷¹ Ahmad 2019, 90.

religion constituted a significant factor in unifying people, as non-Muslim peoples were occupying the lands of the empire. After the foundation of the independent Turkish Republic, the new regime made legal and social reforms to secularize the state and reduce the importance of religion for the Turkish national identity.

5.2.3. The Common Roots

As was discussed earlier, one of the most common elements among nation-states is to occupy a historical homeland. This land is considered ancestral, as the place where the nation was born and has been living on since then, which is intertwined with the nation's memories.³⁷² On the other hand, in the Turkish nation and the lands of modern Turkey, the situation was not as such.

Turkic people were originated from Central Asia and had only arrived in Asia Minor in the 11th century. Anatolia was inhabited since the Palaeolithic Age, and many powerful kingdoms, states, and empires, such as the Hittites, the Phrygians, the Persians, the Romans and the Byzantine Empire, ruled in the area. Likewise, ethnically, Anatolia was inhabited by people of various ethnic origins such as Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians and Arabs. In the 11th century, when the Turkic tribes arrived and started settling in the area, most of the local inhabitants were Greek-speaking Christian people. Therefore, even though Turkish people have lived in Anatolia since the 11th century, the connection between the land and the people was not an ancestral one.

Many elements of nation-states, when they do not exist, are 'imagined' and 'invented'. A glorified past that a nation can identify itself with can be created or adapted.³⁷³ The Turkish nationalism of the early Turkish Republican era is one such instance. The new regime has worked on connecting the history of the Turkish nation to that of Anatolia and

³⁷² Smith 1988.

³⁷³ Smith 1991; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992.

therefore suggesting an uninterrupted connection between the nation and its land. For this purpose, the Turkish History Association (Türk Tarih Kurumu) was founded in 1930 to research Turkish history and communicate its findings to the broader Turkish public.³⁷⁴ One of its products was the so-called 'Turkish History Thesis' which created alternative historiography and connected the Turkish nation with the Bronze Age empire of the Hittites and Sumerians.³⁷⁵ This theory promoted the idea that the Turkic people have been migrating from Central Asia towards the west for thousands of years – much before the arrival of Seljuks in the 11th century – and 'brought civilization to native populations living in various regions, including China, India, the Middle East, northern Africa, the Balkans, and parts of Europe.'³⁷⁶ It further claimed that Turkish people were direct descendants of two important civilizations that existed in the area, the Hittites and the Sumerians.³⁷⁷ Thus, according to this thesis, the connection of the Turkish nation and Anatolia dated back to the 2nd millennia BC,

³⁷⁴ Tuğba Tanyeri Erdemir, "Archaeology as a Source of National Pride in the Early Years of the Turkish Republic", *Journal of Field Archaeology*, 31(4) (2006): 381-393. [hereafter cited in text as Tanyeri Erdemir 2006]; Can Erimtan, "Hittites, Ottomans and Turks: Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey and the Kemalist Construction of Turkish Nationhood in Anatolia", *Anatolian Studies* 58 (2008): 141-71 [hereafter cited in text as Erimtan 2008].

³⁷⁵ Tanyeri Erdemir 2006; Erimtan 2008. In conjunction with the 'Turkish History Thesis', in the field of linguistics the theory named 'Sun-Language Theory' (*Güneş-Dil Teorisi*) was proposed. This theory suggested that the modern Indo-European languages were originated from Turkish language. It received strong criticisms and confuted by foreign scholars during its presentation in the Third Turkish Language Congress (1936). By the end of 1930s, this theory was completely abandoned. (Tanyeri Erdemir 2006, 390; Mesut Dinler, "The Knife's Edge of the Present: Archaeology in Turkey from the Nineteenth Century to the 1940s", *International Journal of Historical Archaeology*, 22, (2018), 739 [hereafter cited in text as Dinler 2018]. For the 'Sun-Language Theory' see İlker Aytürk, "Turkish Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40 (6) (2004).

³⁷⁶ Tanyeri Erdemir 2006, 382.

³⁷⁷ The thesis also claimed that Turks had a significant effect in the development of the Greek civilization due to their influence on the local inhabitants of the Aegean Basin. Tanyeri Erdemir 2006, 382.

making it a homeland of Turks.³⁷⁸

The development of the so-called 'Turkish History Thesis', in addition to establishing a connection with the land and nation, also served a more political objective: to create an alternative secular Turkish national identity.³⁷⁹ Through "bypassing Turkey's Ottoman centuries and instead concentrating everybody's attention on alternative Turkish ancestors",³⁸⁰ this new official discourse aimed to break the deep connection of the Turkish people with their Islamic identity and Ottoman past and to reinforce a new nationalism based on a shared homeland.³⁸¹ Furthermore, it was also an effort to recover the self-esteem of the Turkish people, as a result of losing wars and historical territories, through promoting their immemorial past and uniqueness as a nation.³⁸²

5.2.4. Of Turks and the Others

Who constituted the Turkish nation, and what differentiated them from other nations? As was mentioned earlier, the Ottoman state and society was stratified according to religion and not ethnicity; and an awareness of a separate Turkish ethnic identity among the Turkish speaking Muslim inhabitants of the Empire did not develop until the late 19th century. Before that, the term 'Turk', to refer to an ethnic group, was rarely used within the Ottoman society. It was considered a derogatory term used to define Turkic nomadic clans and, later, Turkish-speaking uneducated peasants living in Anatolia.³⁸³ Turkish people living in the Ottoman Empire primarily defined themselves as Muslims. It was only after the 19th century that Turkish nationalism and self-awareness of

³⁷⁸ Erimtan 2008.

³⁷⁹ Edhem Eldem, "Türkiye'de Arkeoloji ve Siyaset", *Toplumsal Tarih*. 232 (2013), 25 [hereafter cited in text as Eldem 2013].

³⁸⁰ Erimtan 2008, 143.

³⁸¹ Lewis 2018, 485-6.

³⁸² Lewis 2018, 486-8.

³⁸³ Lewis 2018, 4; Ahmad 2019.

Turkish identity emerged.³⁸⁴

In terms of citizenship, the Ottoman state was inclusive. Being a citizen of the empire did not depend on one's religion or ethnicity, but the person's loyalty to the Sultan and the dynasty and the empire and its institutions.³⁸⁵ On the other hand, there were clear separations in social life between different millets, as Christians and Jewish people usually lived in separate neighbourhoods and did not mix socially with the Muslims.³⁸⁶ Until the 19th century and the rise of ethnic nationalisms, the 'otherness' within the Ottoman society was decided according to one's religion, making Christians and Jews the 'Other's for the Muslim subjects of the empire.

Ottoman society consisted of people from various ethnic origins in terms of ethnicity. The population of Anatolia was diverse, including people of Turkish, Greek (*Rum*), Armenian and Arabic origin. 'Rum' – originating from Roman, as of the Roman Empire – has been used by Muslim Turkic people since the early 11th century to define the Byzantine empire, its lands, and its people. In the later periods, it came to define the Greek-speaking Orthodox people living in the Ottoman empire, especially in Minor Asia – Anatolia.³⁸⁷ Ottoman subjects of Greek origin, who were converted to Islam, voluntarily or through the *devşirme* system, maintained important positions within the Ottoman state, both administratively and militarily. The 'otherness' of the empire's Greek subjects appeared mainly following the Greek War of Independence. Afterwards, the Ottoman state positions, formerly employed by Greek subjects, started to be employed by Turkish-speaking Muslim subjects. Following the Tanzimat reforms and the transformation to constitutional monarchy, Greek Orthodox subjects were also included in the parliament. On the other hand, there were no

³⁸⁴ Lewis 2018, 4-5.

³⁸⁵ Ahmad 2019, 87.

³⁸⁶ Lewis 2018, 22.

³⁸⁷ Ahmad 2019, 3.

Greek representatives in the new parliament established following the Balkan Wars, which suggests that the Greeks were not considered the trusted subjects of the empire any more.³⁸⁸ Consequently, with the landing of the Greek army in Anatolia in 1919, the Greek state and the Greek nation became primary 'others' for the Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia.

Apart from the Greeks, another major ethnic group in Anatolia considered the 'other' after the 19th century was the Armenians. Influenced by the French Revolution and ethnic nationalisms, Armenians have developed a cultural 'resurrection' that stimulated the formation of a collective Armenian national identity, which later on aimed for their independence.³⁸⁹ During World War I, the Ottoman government, suspecting that the Greeks and Armenians were aiding the empire's enemies, issued a law ordering the relocation of first Armenians and then Greeks from battle zones to other territories. These decisions, which demonstrate the 'otherness' of Armenians and Greeks in the official discourse, resulted in many massacres and pains for these communities.³⁹⁰

During the Turkish War of Independence, the term 'nation' was used in a patriotic way, including all the Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia, including Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Circassian and Laz people.³⁹¹ Likewise, in the newly established Republic of Turkey, the term Turkish nation was used inclusively to embrace all the Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia instead of a single ethnic group.³⁹² Modelling on the nationalisms in the Western states, such as England and France, belonging to the Turkish nation was based on citizenship.³⁹³ All citizens were considered members of the Turkish nation, whatever their

³⁸⁸ Ahmad 2019, 64

³⁸⁹ Ahmad 2019, 46-7.

³⁹⁰ Ahmad 2019, 70-1

³⁹¹ Ahmad 2019, 85-7.

³⁹² Ahmad 2019, 85.

³⁹³ Lewis 2018, 452.

ethnicity or religion may be. On the other hand, the ways that defined minorities in the new republic – religious minorities – constituted a continuity with the Ottoman millet system and served to recognise the national identity with religion.³⁹⁴ The Turkish nation at the time was highly homogenized, following the forced migrations of Armenians and Greeks and the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey.

As was argued by Bora, after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, especially in its first two decades, the Greek nation and the state, within the official discourse, were not considered the primary ‘other’. The actual other for the new republic was the ‘Ottoman past’.³⁹⁵ Nevertheless, for the nationalist elites and the ordinary Turkish people, who experienced the Balkan Wars and the Turkish War of Independence, Greece and Greeks remained the principal ‘other’.³⁹⁶

5.2.5. Conclusion

Turkic people, who originated in Central Asia and migrated to Anatolia in the 11th century, have changed many elements of their culture after converting to Islam. In the subsequent centuries, these people primarily defined themselves according to their religion and their ethnic origin lost its importance as a unifying factor.

The Ottoman state and society favoured religion above all other possible criteria of group identification. Therefore, speaking a common

³⁹⁴ Amy Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul’da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik* [Originally published as “Streets of Memory: Landscape, Tolerance, and National Identity in İstanbul”, The University of Georgia Press, USA, 2010], (İstanbul: Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014), 95-97.

³⁹⁵ Tanıl Bora, “Millî Kimliğin Kuruluş Döneminde Resmi Metinlerde ‘Yunan Düşmanlığı’ Neden Eksikti, Nereye Gitmişti?”, *Defter*, (Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, cilt:11, sayı 32, 1998), quoted in Demiröz 2017, 44. The reestablishment of Greece and Greeks as the ‘other’ for the Turkish state and nation occurred after the transition to the multi-party parliamentary system in mid-20th century. Demiröz 2017, 45.

³⁹⁶ Demiröz 2017, 45.

language or sharing common roots did not produce a feeling of shared group identity, nor for the state, nor for those who were later to become the Turkish nation. Awareness of a separate Turkish ethnic identity during the Ottoman era emerged only in the late 19th century. In the era of Turkish nationalism, the Turkish language and history increased their importance as uniting factors. Nevertheless, in the War of Independence, the resistance movement was united primarily with religious ideology rather than an ethnic one.

The Republic of Turkey, a modern and secular project, aimed to create an inclusive Turkish nation united around citizenship status. The new state promoted the Turkish language and history as unifying factors of Turkish national identity, and it deliberately tried to undervalue the importance of religion within the society. Highlighting language and common roots as factors of national identity over religion were related to the secularization of the new nation-state and its aim to distinguish itself and the nation from its Islamic and Ottoman past. On the other hand, despite the new regime's efforts, religion kept its importance as a significant factor of identity for ordinary people.

The 'otherness' within the Ottoman state bureaucracy and society was also related to religion. Accordingly, a Greek subject of the empire could rise to important administrative and military positions and become a member of the elite society as long as that person was a Muslim. This situation began to change in the 19th century, with the spread of nationalisms in the Balkans and the subsequent Greek War of Independence. Yet, it was not until the beginning of the 20th century that the Ottoman subjects of Greek origin, still living in the capital and Anatolia, were considered 'undesirable minorities'. With the Balkan Wars and the subsequent occupation of the Ottoman lands following the World War, the situation changed completely.

In conclusion, Greek subjects of the empire, who until the 19th century held important positions within the state and military administration of the Ottoman empire and were included among the elites, eventually became 'other's, following the Greek War of Independence and the

Balkan Wars. Furthermore, the Greek army's landing in Anatolia stimulated Turkish nationalism, and the resistance got stronger.³⁹⁷ Even though the new Turkish state aimed to develop good relationships with its neighbours and not consider Greece as an 'enemy'; the memories of the Balkan Wars and the Turkish War of Independence made Greeks the primary 'other' for most of the new ruling elite and the common people of the Turkish nation.

5.3. The Turkish National Heritage

Nation-states are identified with an ancestral homeland, where their glorious past and memories took place. According to Eldem (2020), one of the major drawbacks of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey was their inability to connect with themselves and the remains of the past civilizations located within their territories.³⁹⁸ As explained in the previous section, the newly independent Turkish Republic attempted to solve this issue by 'inventing' a new historiography, which suggested a connection with the prehistoric civilizations of Anatolia and Mesopotamia, the Hittites and the Sumerians. This was also a way to distance itself from the Ottoman past and its heritage, which was also considered as 'the other' by the newly established Republic of Turkey, as was the case with Greece.³⁹⁹

5.3.1. The Remnants of Turkish National Past

To communicate the new Turkish historical narrative, disciplines such as archaeology, linguistics and folklore were all utilized.⁴⁰⁰ The so-called 'Turkish History Thesis' was first presented to the public during the First Turkish Congress of History in 1932. As was noted by Tanyeri

³⁹⁷ Ahmad 2019, 81; Demiröz 2017, 27.

³⁹⁸ Edhem Eldem, "Türkçe Baskıya Önsöz", In Yannis Hamilakis, *Ulus ve Harabeleri: Yunanistan'da Antikite, Arkeoloji ve Ulusal İmgelem*, (İletişim, 2020), 21.

³⁹⁹ Demiröz 2017, 42

⁴⁰⁰ Tanyeri Edemir 2006, 381.

Erdemir (2006), the congress aimed to educate the nation about ‘their’ history, and for that purpose, many history teachers – from middle school to university level – were also invited.⁴⁰¹ These efforts were substantiated by publishing new schoolbooks as well as historical articles in popular magazines.⁴⁰² Urban spaces were reorganized to serve as tangible reminders and promoters of the new historiography,⁴⁰³ and two newly established state banks, Sümerbank (1933) and Etibank (1935), were named after Sumerians and Hittites.⁴⁰⁴

The most significant tool in promoting this narrative in the early years of the republic was archaeology,⁴⁰⁵ as it could produce tangible evidence to support the ‘Turkish History Thesis’. Therefore, the first Turkish archaeological excavations were started in 1933, and scientific journals were established to promote the findings.⁴⁰⁶ The Turkish History Association became responsible for designating sites to excavate and experts to conduct archaeological works. Most of the first excavations took place in central Anatolia, and uncovered remains of prehistoric Anatolian civilizations, such as Alacahöyük, a significant religious centre near the historic Hittite capital Hattuša.⁴⁰⁷ In addition to providing material evidence needed for the new national narrative, the early Turkish excavations also boosted Turkish national pride due

⁴⁰¹ Tanyeri Erdemir 2006, 383-4.

⁴⁰² Tanyeri Erdemir 2006, 391; Dinler 2018, 739.

⁴⁰³ Mesut Dinler, “Everyone Has a Past: Selective Heritage Definitions in National Contexts”, In *The City as Palimpsest/II. Tracks, views and narrations on the complexity of historical urban contexts: Representation, knowledge, conservation*, edited by Maria Ines Pascariello and Alessandra Veropalumbo, (FedOA - Federico II University Press, 2021), 910-911 [hereafter cited in text as Dinler 2021a]. According to Dinler, the French architect Henri Prost’s Master Plan for Istanbul was criticized for “undermining Ottoman monuments in favor of the Byzantine ones”.

⁴⁰⁴ Edhem Eldem, “Cultural Heritage in Turkey: An Eminently Political Matter”, In *Essays on Heritage, Tourism and Society in the MENA Region*, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Schöningh, 2015: 83 [hereafter cited as Eldem 2015].

⁴⁰⁵ Dinler 2018.

⁴⁰⁶ Tanyeri Erdemir 2006, 384.

⁴⁰⁷ Dinler 2018, 741.

to their scientific success and international recognition.⁴⁰⁸ In the republican period, foreign excavations conducted in Turkey have also been continued, and new excavations have started, as they were encouraged by the state.⁴⁰⁹

Another related discipline that was utilized for political aims was museology. In the first years of the republican era, extensive efforts were given for establishing new museums. Between 1923-1952, thirty-four new museums were established in different cities.⁴¹⁰ As well as providing cultural spaces for the citizens, these museums also served to promote the new Turkish national narrative. For that purpose, some Ottoman monuments were turned into museums, which constituted a separation from the Ottoman past. Some new museums were established to exhibit the remains of Anatolian civilizations and promote the narrative of the Turkish nation's continuity through ages.

The first museumification efforts in the republic were focused on the Topkapı Palace, which was built in the 15th century and served as the royal residence and the empire's political centre until the 19th century. This act constituted a significant example of the new republic's efforts to distance itself from the Ottoman past.⁴¹¹ The former imperial palace was closed in 1924 to be transformed into a museum and was opened to the public in 1933.⁴¹² Accordingly, the Ottoman dynasty and

⁴⁰⁸ Tanyeri Erdemir 2006, 386; Murat Ergin, "Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye'sinde Yunan, Roma ve Bizans Dönemlerinin Algılanması ve Arkeoloji", In Scott Redford and Nina Ergin, (eds.), *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Geçmişe Bakış Açıları: Klasik ve Bizans Dönemleri*, (Istanbul: Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 15-6 [hereafter cited in text as Ergin 2010]; Dinler 2018, 741.

⁴⁰⁹ Dinler 2018, 741.

⁴¹⁰ Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu, "Geçmişten Geleceğe Türkiye'de Müzecilik Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler", *Müzeler Haftası Geçmişten Geleceğe Türkiye'de Müzecilik II: Eğitim, işletmecilik ve Turizm Sempozyumu*, (27.: 2008) Bildiriler, (Ankara: Vehbi Koç ve Ankara Araştırmaları Merkezi (VEKAM), 2009), 27 [hereafter cited in text as Yenişehirlioğlu 2009].

⁴¹¹ Dinler 2018, 738. The exhibition involved objects from the imperial life which were deemed to have aesthetic and historic values.

⁴¹² Yenişehirlioğlu 2009, 3.

monarchy have turned into “objects of the past, that could only be seen in a museum”.⁴¹³

Perhaps more symbolic than that was the conversion of Hagia Sophia from a mosque to a museum in 1935. The monument, which was built in the 6th century in the Byzantine empire, was converted to a mosque after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and has been serving that purpose since then. In 1926 the mosque was closed to the public for ‘repairs’.⁴¹⁴ Extensive conservation and restoration project has started by the Byzantine Institute (of America) in 1931, with the permission of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The monument opened as a museum in 1935. The museumification of Hagia Sophia constituted a symbolic act manifesting the newly established secular republic’s values both in the national and the international context.⁴¹⁵

The conversions of Topkapı Palace and Hagia Sophia mosque to museums, according to Dinler (2018), has ensured the new regime to distance itself from the Ottoman past without rejecting it altogether. In addition, to strengthen the new historical narrative, new museums were established.⁴¹⁶ The Ethnography Museum was opened in 1930, in the new capital, Ankara, with its exhibited objects gathered from abandoned religious places.⁴¹⁷

The establishment of the Hittite Museum, which was personally supported by president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, dates back to 1921.⁴¹⁸ With that purpose, Hittite-era artefacts from all over the country were gathered in Ankara, and the Augustus Temple, the Roman Bath and

⁴¹³ Yenişehirlioğlu 2009, 3.

⁴¹⁴ Yenişehirlioğlu 2009, 3.

⁴¹⁵ Hakan Tarhan, Yeşim Tonga Uriarte and Maria Luisa Catoni, “Embodied ideologies: Hagia Sophia Contended Status Between Mosque and Museum”, *Il Capitale Culturale*, n. 25, (2022), (Forthcoming).

⁴¹⁶ Dinler 2018, 738-739.

⁴¹⁷ Dinler 2018, 738.

⁴¹⁸ Anadolu Medeniyetleri Müzesi. [Available via: <https://muze.gov.tr/muze-detay?SectionId=AMM01&DistId=AMM> Accessed on 08/02/2022.]

one of the citadel bastions were turned into an exhibition hall.⁴¹⁹ Later, to provide a bigger space for exhibitions, the abandoned Ottoman-era buildings Mahmut Paşa Bedesteni and Kurşunlu Han were renovated in 1938 and were opened to the public in 1943.⁴²⁰ The establishment of the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations, as it is called today, was another symbolic effort to promote the newly ‘invented’ Turkish national identity.

In conclusion, cultural heritage and disciplines related to it were heavily used by the Turkish republic to prove and promote its historical narrative and political ideology. Accordingly, the Ottoman past of the nation was distanced from the daily life practices through musealization, and alternative histories that suited the nation were promoted.⁴²¹

On the other hand, these approaches have started to change following the transition into a multi-party system in the 1950s. Especially in the 1980s, the Turkish national identity was settled into the ‘Turkish-Muslim’ narrative, which resulted in recognising the Ottoman Islamic past as the ‘national heritage’, a discourse still in effect today.⁴²²

5.4. Legal Framework of Cultural Heritage Protection

This section aims to present the development of the legal framework of cultural heritage in Turkey, which has its roots in the late Ottoman era. Accordingly, the section starts with the historical development of cultural heritage legislation in the Ottoman empire and follows its advancements until today. The laws and regulations on cultural heritage are primarily examined regarding their inclusiveness and

⁴¹⁹ Dinler 2018.

⁴²⁰ Dinler 2018.

⁴²¹ Mesut Dinler, “Miras İnşasında Uzmanların Rolü”, In Bahar Aykan, (ed.), *Dünden Bugüne Bugünden Düne: Türkiye’de Kültürel Miras, Kimlik ve Bellek İnşası*, (Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2021) [hereafter cited in text as Dinler 2021b].

⁴²² Eldem 2015.

approaches towards the cultural heritage of different civilizations/eras.

Article 63 of the constitution of Turkey states that “The State shall ensure the protection of the historical, cultural and natural assets and wealth, and shall take supportive and promotive measures towards that end. Any limitations to be imposed on such privately owned assets and wealth and the compensation and exemptions to be accorded to the owners of such, because of these limitations, shall be regulated by law.”

The main legal instrument regarding the protection of cultural heritage is the Law 2863 of 1983, “On the Conservation of Cultural and Natural Property”.

5.4.1. Historical Background

Interest in archaeology and cultural heritage within the Ottoman empire emerged later than Western states and mainly were affected by them. In the second half of the 18th century, with the European states building their national museums and getting in competition with each other over ‘owning’ the artefacts of the past civilizations, the Ottoman lands, especially those in the Middle East and North Africa, became one of their main targets.⁴²³ The Ottoman government surely noticed this pursuit of discovering artefacts from the Ottoman lands; however, they were not given much importance, as the antiquities were not considered of high value by the Ottomans. According to Eldem (2011), this approach has started to change with the effects of three major events; the exportation of the Parthenon marbles by Lord Elgin, the concern of the Westerners regarding the antiquities during the siege of Athens by the Ottomans in 1826, and the exploitation of the Ephesus

⁴²³ Zainab Bahrani, Zeynep Çelik and Edhem Eldem, “Introduction: Archaeology and Empire”, In Zainab Bahrani, Zeynep Çelik and Edhem Eldem, (eds.), *Scramble for the Past: A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire, 1753–1914*, (SALT/Garanti Kültür A.Ş., İstanbul) [hereafter cited in text as Bahrani, Çelik and Eldem 2011].

archaeological site in the 1860s by the English John Turtle Wood.⁴²⁴ Consequently, the Ottomans' perception of antiquities had shifted from a 'Blissful Indifference' to an 'Anguished Concern'.⁴²⁵ In addition to the defensive stance triggered by the European interest in the Ottoman lands, the establishment of archaeological practice and museums were also related to the Westernization of the empire, as these practices and institutions were associated with modernity.⁴²⁶ Last but not least, the Ottomans' increasing interest in antiquities was also triggered by the "search for a new imperial identity".⁴²⁷ In the end, all these factors have resulted in the establishment of Ottoman museology and archaeology in the second half of the nineteenth century.⁴²⁸

The first decree regarding antiquities in the Ottoman empire, 'Regulations on Ancient Objects' (*Asar-ı Atika Nizamnamesi*), was issued in 1869.⁴²⁹ The main focus of this law was small objects rather than monuments or sites.⁴³⁰ It consisted of only seven articles, which were all related to archaeological excavations and findings.⁴³¹ According to this decree, any archaeological excavation to take place within the empire's borders required official permission from the state. The exportation of antiquities (except coins) was banned; however, the antiquities found

⁴²⁴ Edhem Eldem, "From Blissful Indifference to Anguished Concern: Ottoman Perceptions of Antiquities, 1799–1869", In Zainab Bahrani, Zeynep Çelik and Edhem Eldem, (eds.), *Scramble for the Past: A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire, 1753–1914*, (SALT/Garanti Kültür A.Ş., İstanbul, 2011) [hereafter cited in text as Eldem 2011].

⁴²⁵ Eldem 2011.

⁴²⁶ Eldem 2011; Mehmet Özdoğan, "Ideology and Archaeology in Turkey", In Lynn Meskell, (ed.), *Archaeology Under Fire, Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) [hereafter cited in text as Özdoğan 1998].

⁴²⁷ Bahrani, Çelik and Eldem 2011, 32.

⁴²⁸ Eldem 2015.

⁴²⁹ Eldem 2011, 281.

⁴³⁰ Balin Koyunoğlu and Ö. Eren Koyunoğlu, *Heritage in Turkey*, (DutchCulture: Centre for International Cooperation, 2019) [hereafter cited in text as Koyunoğlu and Koyunoğlu 2019].

⁴³¹ Dinler 2018, 734.

during excavations could be sold to the state or people living in the empire. If the antiquities were found on private land, the antiquities belonged to the landowner.⁴³² According to Eldem (2011), this decree constituted the first steps of a modern approach in the management of antiquities and archaeological sites in the empire.⁴³³ Even though it was aimed to be a protectionist law, in practice, it did not have much effect due to the political strength of Great Powers over the Ottoman government.⁴³⁴ As was pointed out by Eldem (2015), the ruling elite of the empire considered these developments a requirement of modernization, and they did not have a genuine concern for the protection of antiquities.⁴³⁵ The Imperial Museum (Müze-i Hümayun) was also established the same year.

Another decree on antiquities was issued in 1874. This decree defined 'historic artefacts' as the movable and immovable disused artefacts belonging to the pre-Ottoman period.⁴³⁶ According to this regulation, in terms of ownership of antiquities, findings from excavations were divided equally between the excavators, landowners, and the empire, each getting one-third of the findings.⁴³⁷ Furthermore, this regulation allowed the exportation of antiquities on the condition that they were

⁴³² Eldem 2011. On the contrary to the protectionist nature of the law, according to the Article 6, the antiquities could be exported, if they were requested by foreign states and the Sultan allowed it.

⁴³³ Eldem 2011, 282.

⁴³⁴ Eldem 2015, 74-75.

⁴³⁵ Eldem 2015, 75.

⁴³⁶ Neriman Şahin Güçhan and Esra Kurul, "History of the Development of Conservation Measures in Turkey: From the mid-19th Century Until 2004", *Metu Journal of The Faculty of Architecture*, 26 (2), (2009), 22-3 [hereafter cited in text Şahin Güçhan and Kurul 2009]. According to Şahin Güçhan and Kurul, as the Ottoman-era artefacts (and monuments) were still actively used and the maintenance of them were done by vakfs (pious foundations), they were excluded from the definition of 'historic artifact'.

⁴³⁷ Edhem Eldem, "An Ottoman Archaeologist Caught Between Two Worlds: Osman Hamdi Bey (1842-1910)", In David Shankland, (ed.), *Archaeology, Anthropology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia: The Life and Times of F. W. Hasluck, 1878-1920*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2004), 122 [hereafter cited in text as Eldem 2004].

registered with the Ministry of Public Instruction.⁴³⁸

According to Eldem (2015), the concept of 'national heritage' was first introduced with the Law of 1884.⁴³⁹ This law was heavily influenced by the Greek law of 1834, and it established a system in which the Imperial Museum was the main actor in the management of cultural heritage.⁴⁴⁰ The definition of 'historic artefact' was extended to include all movable and immovable artefacts (used or unused) dating to the pre-Ottoman period.⁴⁴¹ With this law, all archaeological sites and antiquities existing and founded within the Ottoman lands were designated as the property of the empire, and the exportation of antiquities was strictly forbidden.⁴⁴² Furthermore, foreign archaeological expeditions were only allowed through permission from the Imperial Museum and the Ottoman state; and the antiquities found in these works were to be sent to the Imperial Museum.⁴⁴³

The 1884 law was inclusive as it considered the remains of all the past civilizations as Ottoman property without excluding any.⁴⁴⁴ On the other hand, as this law was deeply based on the Western conception of cultural heritage, Islamic elements of art and architecture were not considered of high value and were not included in the protection measures defined by this law.⁴⁴⁵ This situation changed in line with both external and internal contexts. The growing interest of the

⁴³⁸ Eldem 2004, 131.

⁴³⁹ Eldem 2015, 77.

⁴⁴⁰ Eldem 2015, 77.

⁴⁴¹ Şahin Güçhan and Kurul 2009, 22.

⁴⁴² Eldem 2015, 77; Özdoğan 1998, 115. On the other hand, there were many cases in which the antiquities were given to the foreign excavators or foreign officials as gifts by the Sultan himself. Furthermore, due to loose state control in lands away from the capital, some of the antiquities were illegally smuggled to Western countries. Therefore, even though the Law 1884 introduced strict control over the antiquities, in practice, it could not fully achieve that. See, Eldem 2004.

⁴⁴³ Eldem 2004, 135.

⁴⁴⁴ *Osmanlı Asar-ı Attika Nizamnamesi* (1884), Article 1.

⁴⁴⁵ Eldem 2015, 79.

westerners towards Islamic heritage and the changing political ideology of the empire towards Pan-Islamism increased the importance attached to these assets by the empire.⁴⁴⁶ Accordingly, the last Ottoman regulation of antiquities, the law of 1906, granted the Islamic heritage with the official protection status.⁴⁴⁷

The Law 1884, with slight changes and additions, stayed in effect after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey as well, until 1973, when a new cultural heritage regulation was established.⁴⁴⁸ The new law (no.1710) had minor changes from the previous legislation, which was in effect since the late-Ottoman era, and was mainly concerned with historic preservation.⁴⁴⁹ The law 1710 (Eski Eserler Kanunu) possessed a holistic approach to preservation – instead of focusing on monuments and singular buildings – and introduced new concepts such as ‘site’, ‘historical site’, ‘archaeological site’ and ‘natural site’.⁴⁵⁰ The law reiterated the state ownership of antiquities and included the expropriation of archaeological sites that were privately owned.⁴⁵¹

5.4.2. The Current Law of Cultural Heritage Protection in Turkey

The current law regarding the protection of cultural heritage in Turkey is the Law 2863 of 1983, “On the Conservation of Cultural and Natural Property”. Major amendments to the law were made in 1987 and 2004.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁶ Eldem 2015, 79-80.

⁴⁴⁷ Eldem 2015, 80.

⁴⁴⁸ Eldem 2013

⁴⁴⁹ Dinler 2018, 735.

⁴⁵⁰ Şahin Güçhan and Kurul 2009, 29; Dinler 2021b, 123.

⁴⁵¹ Melike Z. Dağıstan Özdemir, “Türkiye’de Kültürel Mirasın Korunmasına Kısa Bir Bakış”, *Planlama, TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası Yayını*, 2005 (1), [hereafter cited in text as Dağıstan Özdemir 2005].

⁴⁵² Tamer Gök, “Conservation Of Cultural Heritage In Turkey: Development Of Legal Rules And Institutions”, In *Historical Perspective Of Heritage Legislation: Balance Between Laws And Values : Conference Proceedings*, (Tallinn: ICOMOS Estonia NC, 2016).

Law 2863 “defines movable and immovable cultural and natural property to be protected, regulates proceedings and activities, describes the establishment and duties of the organisation that shall set principles and takes implementation decisions in this field.” (Article 1) The law covers both movable and immovable cultural and natural properties. (Article 2). According to the legislation (Article 5), the Turkish state has the absolute ownership of cultural property located above or underground, or in the sea, within boundaries of the country.

Article 3 of the law defines cultural property as “movable and immovable property on the ground, under the ground or under the water pertaining to science, culture, religion and fine arts of before and after recorded history or that is of unique scientific and cultural value for social life before and after recorded history.” Natural property, on the other hand, is defined as “all assets on the ground, under the ground or under the water pertaining to geological periods, prehistoric periods until the present time, that are of a unique kind or require protection due to their characteristics and beauty.” (Article 3) The law also defines ‘conservation site’, ‘archaeological site’ and ‘site.’

The further classification includes ‘Immovable Cultural and Natural Property’ and ‘Movable Cultural and Natural Property’.

5.4.2.1. Immovable Cultural and Natural Property

Article 6 of the law defines immovable cultural and natural property as;

- a) “Natural property to be protected and the immovable property built until the end of the 19th century,
- b) The immovable property created after the mentioned date that the Ministry of Culture and Tourism deems necessary to be protected considering its importance and characteristics,
- c) Immovable cultural property situated in the conservation site,
- d) Buildings that were stages of great historic events during the

National War of Independence and the Foundation of the Republic of Turkey that are not subject to time and registration rules due to their importance for national history, areas to be identified as such and houses used by Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK.”

The identification and registration of these types of monuments are made under the coordination of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism by the relevant institutions. For the identification and registration of the immovable cultural properties under the ownership of registered and annexed foundations are made by the General Directorate for Foundations. (Article 7)

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism has the rights of ownership and possession of the immovable cultural property. (Article 5) In addition, such properties may also be owned by registered and annexed foundations, which are administered and controlled by the General Directorate for Foundations. (Article 7, para.5) Immovable cultural properties may also be owned by real and legal persons. In that case, the Turkish state has the right to expropriation for immovable cultural property. (Article 15)

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is responsible to “take the necessary measures or have others take the necessary measures to conserve immovable cultural and natural property, regardless of ownership or administration”. (Article 10) In the case of ownership by real and legal persons, the Ministry may provide financial and technical assistance. (Article 12)

The ministry is allowed to transfer the rights of possession and usage to other state institutions as well as natural and legal entities. (Article 14)

5.4.2.2. Movable Cultural and Natural Property

Article 23 of the law defines movable cultural and natural property as:

- a) “All kind of cultural and natural property from geological

periods, prehistory and recorded history, having documentary value in terms of geology, anthropology, prehistory, archaeology and art history reflecting the social, cultural, technical and scientific characteristics and level of the period they belong to.

Cultural property of ethnographic quality relating to science, religion and mechanical (mihaniki) arts including artefact tools and equipment reflecting the social mission of peoples.

Coins pertaining to the period of the Ottoman Sultans Abdülmecit, Abdülaziz, V. Murat, II. Abdülhamit, V. Mehmet Reşat and Vahdettin can be bought and sold domestically without being registered according to this Law.

- b) Due to their importance for national history, documents and goods of historic value relating to the National Independence War period and the Foundation of the Republic of Turkey, personal belongings, documents, books, correspondences and similar movables of Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK.”

The state is responsible for protecting the movable cultural and natural property under state ownership. Private ownership of such property by real and legal persons is allowed under certain circumstances, but the state has the right to expropriation. (Article 24) The law allows real and legal persons to create collections of movable cultural property through permits issued by the ministry. (Article 26) Private collectors can sell movable cultural property in their possession by notifying the Ministry, in which case, the ministry would have the priority right to buy. (Article 26)

5.4.2.3. A General Overview

Law 2863 and its further amendments in the constitution constitute the general legal framework for protecting cultural heritage in Turkey. It is

considered an improved version of the previous legislation, the law 1710/ 1973, and therefore, constitutes a continuity in most aspects.⁴⁵³ According to the legislation, the cultural heritage assets located and found in the country are regarded as the state's property, but it also allows for private ownership in some instances.

The new law introduced the terminology 'cultural property' and 'natural property' instead of 'old artefacts', which suggested an inclusive definition, not just limited to historic artefacts.⁴⁵⁴ On the other hand, the law still has practical limitations to the recognition of cultural property, as it defines 'immovable property' as assets "built until the end of the 19th century". (Article 6)

As another innovation, the new law introduced an obligation of preparing conservation plans for conservation sites, which proposes that planning became a significant part of the conservation process. In that aspect, the holistic approach to protection, which was first introduced in 1973, was also maintained.⁴⁵⁵

Especially in the 2000s, with the start of the accession negotiations with the European Union, Turkey has implemented new legislations and regulations, which also affected cultural heritage protection. One of the major changes was the empowerment of local administrations over the protection and promotion of cultural heritage.⁴⁵⁶ Furthermore, in addition to the indirect effects of changes in the public administration, there were also specific laws regarding cultural heritage. These laws include:

⁴⁵³ Dağıstan Özdemir 2005, 23.

⁴⁵⁴ İclal Dinçer, "Türkiye'de Kültürel Miras Politikaları ve Uygulama Araçları", In Asu Aksoy and Deniz Ünsal, (eds.), *Kültürel Miras Yönetimi*, T.C. Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayını No: 2573 (2012), 71.

⁴⁵⁵ Dağıstan Özdemir 2005,

⁴⁵⁶ Gül Pulhan, "Cultural Heritage Reconsidered in the Light of Recent Cultural Policies", In Serhan Ada and H. Ayça İnce, (eds.), *Introduction to Cultural Policy in Turkey*, (İstanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2009), 141 [hereafter cited in text Pulhan 2009]

- “The law 5225, ‘Incentives for Cultural Investments and Enterprises’ (2004)
- The law 5226, ‘Conservation of Cultural and Natural Properties’ (2004)
- The Law 5366, ‘Conservation by Renovation and Use By Revitalization of the Deteriorated Historical and Cultural Immovable Property’ (2005)
- ‘Foundation Law’ (2008)”⁴⁵⁷

These laws introduced financial aids for the protection of cultural and natural property, but more importantly, they introduced tax deductions for financial supports made for cultural heritage protection and allowed the privatization of cultural property.

5.4.3. International Legislation

Turkey is a member state of UNESCO (1946) and a signatory to many international conventions on cultural heritage. These include⁴⁵⁸:

- UNESCO⁴⁵⁹
 - Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict (1954) Hague Convention
 - Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural

⁴⁵⁷ Pulhan 2009, 142-3. With the law 5226, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism was allowed to lease registered immovable cultural property to private sector. (Pulhan 2009, 145)

⁴⁵⁸ T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Teftiş Kurulu Başkanlığı, Uluslararası Sözleşmeler. [Accessible via: <https://teftis.ktb.gov.tr/TR-263662/uluslararasi-sozlesmeler.html> Accessed on: 31/01/2022]

⁴⁵⁹ UNESCO, The State Parties: Turkey, Ratified Convention (UNESCO/LA). [Accessible via: http://portal.unesco.org/la/conventions_by_country.asp?language=e&contr=TR&typeconv=1 Accessed on: 31/01/2022]

Property (1970) Paris Convention

- Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972).
- Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003).
- COUNCIL OF EUROPE⁴⁶⁰
 - European Cultural Convention (1954).
 - Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe (1985).
 - European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (1969).

5.4.4. Discussion

The cultural heritage legislation of Turkey has its origins in the 19th century, in the establishment of Ottoman archaeology and museology following the Westernization of the empire. These developments were triggered by the increasing interest in the antiquities found on and below the Ottoman lands. The Ottoman state, which did not show much affection and interest in the antiquities, in the beginning, has gradually become more aware of their value and has started to take legal precautions to prohibit their export by foreigners. Therefore, the first legislations regarding antiquities aimed to ensure state ownership, regulate archaeological excavations that would take place in Ottoman lands and determine the status of the findings.

The interest shown by the Westerners in the antiquities in the Ottoman lands was primarily targeted towards the Classical antiquities, Roman and Greek, and the remains of Ancient Egypt. There did not exist a

⁴⁶⁰ Council of Europe, Culture and Cultural Heritage Standards. [Accessible via: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/standards> Accessed on: 31/01/2022]

cultural attachment to these relics by the Ottomans, as they did not consider themselves the descendants of these civilizations – contrary to the Greek state, which treated the remains of Ancient Greece as sacred national relics. On the other hand, as these remains were considered of high value by the Western states who competed to turn their ‘national museums’ into ‘universal museums’, and thus to promote their superiority; the Ottoman state as well decided to establish its own museum and by these means to become a member of the ‘civilized West’. Due to these reasons, the first Ottoman legislations on cultural heritage were inclusive. The laws were not excluding the remains of ‘other’ cultures, but rather considering them valuable, reflecting on the dominant Western perception of heritage. The inclusion of the Islamic cultural artefacts into the Ottoman antiquities legislation has also taken place following the arising Western interest in these artefacts.

The Republic of Turkey has inherited many institutions and regulations from the Ottoman empire it succeeded to. The legislation on cultural heritage was among those inherited from the empire. This continuity produced a strong legal system, which enhanced the state ownership and the state’s role in the protection of antiquities. The first heritage law of the republic, which was issued in 1973, aimed at implementing the contemporary international developments in heritage management, which were developed by institutions such as UNESCO, into the Turkish legislation. Likewise, the current legislation on heritage, law 2863, were written and further improved according to developments in the international context.

The cultural heritage legislation in Turkey maintained the state ownership of antiquities and further pushed for preventing illicit excavations and exportations of antiquities. Within its history of almost a century, even though the cultural policies of governments have shifted occasionally between ‘embracing the traces of all civilizations that existed in Anatolia as ‘ours’ and ‘promoting ‘the’ Turkish national heritage’, these changes did not have tangible effects in cultural heritage legislations.

5.5. The Byzantine Heritage in Turkey

5.5.1. The Architectural Legacy

According to Akyürek (2010), the Republic of Turkey consists of lands that correspond to the core of the Byzantine Empire, which explains the significant number of Byzantine remains in the country.⁴⁶¹ Furthermore, due to having its capital, Constantinople, in its borders, Turkey houses some of the most significant architectural and artistic creations of the Byzantine Empire.

For the purposes of this study, in line with the classification made in Chapter 3.5.1., regarding the Ottoman architecture in Greece, the Byzantine architectural monuments in Turkey are also classified according to their uses as religious monuments and secular monuments. Religious Byzantine monuments consist of churches, chapels, monasteries, baptisteries, and holy springs (*ayazma*); whereas secular architecture includes monuments such as aqueducts, baths, bridges, cisterns, fortifications, harbours, hippodrome, palaces and monumental buildings (like obelisks, columns). Some architectural remains such as burial places and underground cities encompass both religious and secular functions.

5.5.2. The Levels of Protection

As was noted by many scholars, such as Özdoğan and Akyürek,⁴⁶² the Seljuks and the Ottomans did not pursue a project of deliberate destruction towards Byzantine monuments. On the contrary, many monuments continued to be actively used with their original functions or newly adapted functions, which explains the vast number of

⁴⁶¹ Engin Akyürek, "Byzantine Art History in Modern Turkey", In Scott Redford and Nina Ergin, (eds.), *Perceptions of the Past in the Turkish Republic: Classical and Byzantine Periods*, (Leuven, Paris and Valpole, Peeters, 2010), 205 [hereafter cited in text as Akyürek 2010].

⁴⁶² Özdoğan 1998, Akyürek 2010,

surviving Byzantine monuments today.⁴⁶³ On the other hand, the architectural elements that were not needed fell into disuse and a ruinous state with time.⁴⁶⁴ The continuous use with the existing function mostly took place in the case of secular public architectural elements such as military buildings (fortifications, towers), bridges, aqueducts and cisterns. The citadel of Ankara, the Theodosian Walls in Istanbul, the Valens Aqueduct (Istanbul) and Cistern Basilica (Istanbul) are some examples of these types of monuments which survived until today. Most of the transformed monuments were religious ones.

As explained in the previous sections, the interest in material remains of ancient civilizations arose in the 18th century in the Western states, which resulted in a search for traces of these civilizations worldwide. These interests mainly included Hellenic, Roman and Byzantine civilizations, and naturally, the lands of the Ottoman Empire were one of the primary targets in this endeavour. On the other hand, for the Ottoman state, there was no such interest at the time, which Eldem (2011) defines as the era of 'blissful indifference'.⁴⁶⁵ In this period, according to the official request made by the notorious Lord Elgin to the Ottoman administration for taking them away, Byzantine remains such as columns and sarcophagi were lying around the Ottoman capital with no uses.⁴⁶⁶ In addition to the Ottoman state, the ordinary people were uninterested in these remains but attributed supernatural powers to them and considered them talismanic.⁴⁶⁷ The antiquities, at the time, were considered by the Ottomans as 'bargaining chips' with the Western states and diplomats.⁴⁶⁸

The establishment of Ottoman archaeology and museology towards the

⁴⁶³ Akyürek 2010, 206.

⁴⁶⁴ Akyürek 2010, 206.

⁴⁶⁵ Eldem 2011.

⁴⁶⁶ Eldem 2011, 289-291.

⁴⁶⁷ Eldem 2011, 291. Interestingly, a similar approach from local people towards antiquities was also observed in Greece, at the time. See, Hamilakis 2007.

⁴⁶⁸ Eldem 2011, 294.

end of the 19th century changed official perceptions of Byzantine heritage. Like the other modernization examples of the Reformation era, these developments were also heavily shaped by Western ideology and mainly consisted of emulating Western institutions and perspectives on cultural heritage.⁴⁶⁹ Therefore, the Byzantine heritage, which was deemed of high value within the Western heritage discourse, was also implemented in the Ottoman archaeology and museology, with no distinction.⁴⁷⁰ The first collection of antiquities in the empire was founded in 1846 in Istanbul, and in 1891 this collection became the newly established Imperial Museum.⁴⁷¹ Soon, new museums were established in Ottoman provinces as well.⁴⁷² The collections of the early Ottoman museums consisted of antiquities representing Hellenic, Roman and Byzantine cultures⁴⁷³, which represents the reflection of the dominant Western ideology. On the intellectual and scientific side, the Byzantine archaeological and art historical studies were firstly conducted by foreign experts during the Ottoman era, with the inclusion of Turkish subjects towards the last decade of the Empire.⁴⁷⁴

The first archaeological campaigns by the Turkish state in the early years of the Republic were focused on the pre-Classical civilizations, in line with nationalistic archaeology discourse of the era which aimed at ‘discovering the Turkish roots of Anatolia’.⁴⁷⁵ On the other hand, this was not due to the dismissal of Byzantine heritage by the official discourse but a matter of ideological priority and limited resources.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁶⁹ Özdoğan 1998, 111-3.

⁴⁷⁰ Özdoğan 1998, 113.

⁴⁷¹ Özdoğan 1998, 114.

⁴⁷² Özdoğan 1998, 114-5.

⁴⁷³ Özdoğan 1998, 115. In time, Near Eastern and Egyptian antiquities were also added to these collections.

⁴⁷⁴ Akyürek 2010, 206-7.

⁴⁷⁵ Akyürek 2010, 207-8.

⁴⁷⁶ Akyürek 2010, 208. As was further explained by Akyürek, Byzantine studies in other fields such as history continued to prosper in the early republican era, as many history

On the contrary, the discipline of archaeology in the early republican period is considered tolerant to the heritage of all Anatolia, including those of Greek, Roman and Byzantine.⁴⁷⁷ For example, scientific studies on the Byzantine heritage, which started in the Ottoman era, have continued under the new republic. Even though these works were overwhelmingly conducted by foreign experts and research institutions,⁴⁷⁸ it is a fact that they could not have taken place if the state had not permitted them. Furthermore, the conversions of Hagia Sophia (1934) and Chora Church (1948) to museums with uncovering and restoring their marvellous Byzantine mosaics were significant events demonstrating the early republic's approach to the Byzantine heritage.⁴⁷⁹

In general, it can be concluded that in the Early Republican Era (1923 – 1950), the official discourse related to the Byzantine heritage in Turkey was far from being negative and excluding but respectful. The archaeological works conducted in this period and museumification of former Byzantine monuments demonstrate that the state considered Byzantine heritage in Turkey as a part of the nation's collective heritage, even if it was not the 'national heritage'.

Today, several factors affect the physical well-being of the Byzantine heritage in Turkey. Aside from the natural factors (such as time and disasters) and human impacts (such as vandalization, illicit digging), governmental policies are considered another significant factor that affects the preservation of Byzantine heritage in Turkey. The adverse effects of cultural policies on the Byzantine heritage stem from (1) conflicting economic and social interests, (2) problems regarding the

books were written in and translated to Turkish, including also children's books.

⁴⁷⁷ Ergin 2010, 13.

⁴⁷⁸ Akyürek 2010, 208. The only exception to those were the excavations directed by Arif Müfid Mansel in 'Balabanaga Mescidi' (1930) a formerly unknown Byzantine church converted to a mosque and the Rhegion at the Hebdomon (1940-1948). Akyürek 2010, 209.

⁴⁷⁹ Akyürek 2010, 208.

cultural heritage management legislation and practices and (3) conflicting political interests.

One of Turkey's most significant threats to Byzantine heritage is rapid and unplanned urbanization. The Byzantine heritage located in the urban centres, especially in Istanbul, was heavily affected by the urbanization following migrations in the 1950s and 1960s. In this period, the rapid and unplanned transformation of the cities resulted in the destruction of historical architecture.⁴⁸⁰ During the construction of many large buildings and boulevards between 1956-1960, many architectural elements of Byzantine – as well as Ottoman – architecture were discovered, yet many of them were demolished without even documenting.⁴⁸¹ According to the report by the TAY project in 2008, the biggest threat to the preservation of Byzantine heritage continues to be urbanization. This report, which was focused on the Marmara region, within which important Byzantine centres Istanbul and Iznik are located, shows that major sources of destruction for the Byzantine monuments are new constructions of buildings and roads.⁴⁸² Industrialization and agriculture are also other economic factors that affect the wellbeing of Byzantine heritage, especially for those in the rural areas.

Secondly, the structural as well as operational problems within the cultural heritage legislation, causes damage to Byzantine heritage in Turkey. The recent developments in the cultural heritage legislation, which were discussed in the previous section, brought together the decentralization as well as the privatization of cultural heritage management.⁴⁸³ The decentralization of heritage preservation allowed municipalities to conduct conservation activities, which were usually done through contractors without the necessary knowledge and

⁴⁸⁰ Akyürek 2010, 209.

⁴⁸¹ Akyürek 2010, 209-210.

⁴⁸² TAY Project, Tahribat Raporu, 2008.

⁴⁸³ Pulhan 2009.

expertise. The outcomes of these restoration projects were almost always very poor and damaged the characteristics of the monuments, which in the end, as was stated by Pulhan (2009), “creates ugly hybrids with neither historical integrity nor aesthetic sensitivity.”⁴⁸⁴ The Palace of the Porphyrogenitus (late 13th century) or *Tekfur Sarayı* was victimised by the restoration works conducted in 2013, which “adorned” the monument with a modern roof and wooden windows. Additionally, in terms of problems related to the cultural heritage management legislation and practices in Turkey, the lack of sufficient control mechanisms and ineffective penalties on crimes against cultural heritage results in the spread of illicit digging, which damages Byzantine cultural heritage.

Last but not least, one of the major problems affecting the preservation and management of Byzantine heritage in contemporary Turkey is governmental policies. Especially within the last two decades, the intensified uses of cultural heritage for political motivations had serious, tangible impacts on cultural heritage management in Turkey.

The first example of the recent political uses of archaeology was the threats made by the Turkish ministry for the cancellation of excavation permits of foreign archaeological teams. In 2010, the Turkish ministry communicated that all the excavations conducted in Turkey by German teams would be cancelled unless German authorities returned an artefact sent to Berlin in 1917 for restoration.⁴⁸⁵ Similar warnings were also made to other foreign countries.⁴⁸⁶ Another such incident happened in 2016. Following the diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Austria, the excavations in the ancient cities of Ephesus and Limyra, which the Austrian Archaeological Institute conducted since 1895 and

⁴⁸⁴ Pulhan 2009, 154.

⁴⁸⁵ Eldem 2013, 22-3.

⁴⁸⁶ The Guardian, (2013, January 21), “Turkey wages ‘cultural war’ in pursuit of its archaeological treasures”. Available via <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/21/turkey-cultural-war-archaeological-treasure> [Accessed on 11/02/2022]

1970, respectively.⁴⁸⁷

The most significant example of the political uses of cultural heritage and, more specifically, of the Byzantine heritage is, without a doubt, the conversions of Hagia Sophia churches around Turkey, from museums or idle monuments to mosques. The first of these conversions took place in 2007 in Vize (Kırklareli), followed by the conversions of Hagia Sophia in İznik in 2011 and the Hagia Sophia in Trabzon in 2013.⁴⁸⁸ In 2020, Hagia Sophia Istanbul, one of the most important centres of Orthodox Christianity, if not ‘the’ most, was also converted to a mosque. The former Chora Church, a museum at the time, was also transformed into a mosque, just a month after Hagia Sophia Istanbul. These changes in the monuments’ functions had tangible results both in terms of their physical characteristics as well as their visitation. Many architectural elements of the Byzantine era, including frescoes and mosaics, have become inaccessible to the public.

5.5.3. The Legal Status

This study focuses on the material immovable monuments of the Byzantine era in Turkey. Therefore, the status of the Byzantine monuments in Turkey within the current cultural heritage legislation will be discussed according to their classification, rights of ownership, and management. As there is no distinction between the remains of different civilizations within the legislation,⁴⁸⁹ these provisions apply

⁴⁸⁷ Shaw Gary, (2016, September 7), “Archaeological work at Ephesus shut down by Turkish government”, *The Art Newspaper*. Available via <https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2016/09/07/archaeological-work-at-ephesus-shut-down-by-turkish-government> [Accessed on 11/02/2022]

⁴⁸⁸ Pınar Aykaç, “Contesting the Byzantine Past: Four Hagia Sophias as Ideological Battlegrounds of Architectural Conservation in Turkey”, *Heritage & Society*, vol. 11, no.2, (2019) [hereafter cited in text as Aykaç 2019].

⁴⁸⁹ The only limitation within the law (article 6-a) is that it defines “natural property to be protected and the immovable property built until the end of the 19th century”. However, the Article 6-b overrules this limitation for the culturally and historically significant monuments. “The immovable property created after the mentioned date that the Ministry

without any difference to the Byzantine monuments.

5.5.3.1. Classification

The current Turkish legislation on cultural heritage is inclusive in terms of the cultural properties it encompasses. The examples of the types of immovable properties covered by the legislation are stated in Article 6. These examples include many architectural elements of prehistoric as well as pre-Islamic civilizations, such as “rock-cut tombs, stones with inscription, painting, and relief, cave paintings, mounds (höyük), tumuli, archaeological sites, acropolis and necropolis, bridges, aqueducts, waterways, cisterns and wells, ancient road ruins, obelisks.” Furthermore, the article also includes non-Islamic religious monuments such as “synagogue, basilica, church, monasteries” and decorative elements “frescoes, reliefs, mosaics”.

On the other hand, none of these monuments -Byzantine and non-Byzantine- are automatically classified as protected property, but they need an administrative act to be classified (Article 7). The classification decision is made according to the “history, art, region and other characteristics of the cultural property” and “to the extent of the means of the state.” (Article 7, para. 2). Therefore, the classification decisions might be economically or politically motivated.

5.5.3.2. Ownership

According to Article 5 of Law 2863, both the movable and immovable cultural properties belong to the state, regardless of the ownership of the land they are located in. This also includes any possible property that might exist under the surface but has not yet been found. Therefore, even if the land belongs to real or legal persons, in the case of the discovery of cultural properties, they are legally state-owned.

of Culture and Tourism deems necessary to be protected considering its importance and characteristics.”

On the other hand, paragraph 2 of the article defines an exemption to state ownership. According to this exemption, movable and immovable cultural properties that are located above or below the surface in a land that belongs to a foundation is not state property, as it states, “registered and annexed foundation property subject to a separate status due to its special qualities shall not be covered by this provision.”

Regarding the immovable Byzantine monuments, which is the focus of this research, the legislation shows that these monuments can be owned by either the state or registered and annexed foundations.

Most of the Byzantine religious monuments were transformed into mosques in the Ottoman era and became *vakf* (foundation) properties. After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the status of the vakfs did not change; therefore, they were allowed to control their assets. Accordingly, some former Byzantine monuments are owned by the Directorate General of Foundations today. Among these monuments is the former cathedral of the Panagia Chrysokephalos, which is used as the Ortahisar Fatih Camii in central Trabzon, Hagia Sophia Trabzon and Hagia Sophia İznik.

On the other hand, even though law 2863 does not allow private ownership, some immovable cultural properties in Turkey are privately owned. These properties used to belong to minority community foundations and were confiscated by the state at some point or, in some cases, were transferred to private ownership.⁴⁹⁰ One such example is the Panagia Pantobasillissa Church (13th century), located in Tirilye, Bursa. After the Exchange of Populations, the monument came under private ownership and was recently purchased by the Metropolitan Bishop of Bursa, of the Fener Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, to be restored and serve as a church once again.⁴⁹¹ Another

⁴⁹⁰ Global Art and Heritage Law Series, Turkey Report 2020, 19.

⁴⁹¹ Municipality of Mudanya, Kemerli Kilise, accessed February 09,2020.

<https://mudanya.bel.tr/yerler/tarihi-yapilar/kemerli-kilise>

similar example is the former Agios Georgios church (Antalya), which following the Population Exchange lost its community and came under private ownership. The monument was used as a warehouse for some time and afterwards fell into despair. Today it is owned by the Suna ve İnan Kıraç Foundation and used as a museum.⁴⁹² Another similar example is the Mor Yuhanna Church (4th century), located in Mardin, which is a private property, whose owner tried to sell the church online.⁴⁹³

5.5.3.3. Management-Public Access-Function

The majority of the Byzantine monuments that the Ministry of Culture and Tourism owns are open to the public as monuments, museums or sites or located in public spaces; therefore, public access to these heritages is achieved. They are managed by the local branches of the ministry. Furthermore, some Byzantine monuments belong to municipal authorities, who have the authority over their usages. Two examples are the Yerebatan and Şerefiye cisterns in Istanbul; both are being used as museums and occasionally hosting events.

Article 14 of the law allows the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to lease out cultural properties that it owns to other state institutions and private associations, and legal and real persons. According to the article, in the cases of leasing immovable cultural property to state institutions, such organizations should be working for public service, and the uses should be for public benefit. On the other hand, no such terminology exists for leasing to legal and real persons.⁴⁹⁴ This suggests

⁴⁹² Vehbi Koç Vakfı Ansiklopedisi, Kaleiçi Müzesi, accessed February 09,2020.

<https://ansiklopedi.vkv.org.tr/Kategoriler/Kurumlar/Vehbi-Koc-Kurumlari-Vakfi/Kaleici-Muzesi>

⁴⁹³ Rudaw.net, (2020, November 06), 'Historical church for sale in Turkey's Mardin', accessed February 09, 2022. <https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/06112020>

⁴⁹⁴ Article 14 "The transfer of usufruct rights pertaining to immovable cultural and natural property to be protected to state departments, public institutions and organisations for periodic use in public service, to national associations serving the public

that legal and real persons who rented registered immovable cultural property are free to use the monuments for the purposes they prefer, as long as they do not damage the structure physically. In such cases, open public access to the function cannot be secured. Currently, there is no Byzantine monument in Turkey which was leased to private owners.

The Directorate General of Foundations also has the right to lease out the immovable cultural properties under their ownership.⁴⁹⁵ In the occasion of leasing such property to real and legal persons, these monuments must be “used without violation of their character”. (Article 14, para. 2) This regulation allows different contemporary uses for such properties, which majorly affected the religious Byzantine monuments in Turkey. Following the governmental decisions to convert the former Hagia Sophia churches which were being used as museums (the ones in İznik, Trabzon, İstanbul) into mosques, the Directorate General of Foundations, who owns these monuments, transferred their management to the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Eventually, as was argued in the previous section, their uses as Islamic religious spaces limited the public access to some of the Byzantine architectural and decorative elements of these monuments.

5.5.3.4. *Preservation:*

According to Article 10 of law 2863, regardless of the ownership of the cultural properties, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to inspect and make sure that the necessary precautions

interest or leasing such property to real and legal persons shall be subject to permission by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.”

⁴⁹⁵ See, Directorate General of Foundations, Immovable Cultural Properties. Available via <https://www.vgm.gov.tr/our-activities/cultural-properties/immovable-cultural-properties> [Accessed on February 10, 2022]; and Directorate General of Foundations, Conditional Leasing on Restoration. Available via <https://www.vgm.gov.tr/our-activities/investments/leasing-conditional-on-restoration-or-renovation> [Accessed on February 10, 2022].

for the monuments' survival are undertaken. With law 5226 of 2004, the local municipalities and governorships and other state institutions were allowed – with the authorization of the ministry – to carry out the conservation works. For the immovable cultural property under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Foundations, the responsibility of preservation belongs to the Directorate General of Foundations. The preservation of the immovable cultural property owned by legal and real persons are conducted by these persons in accordance with the law. The state has the right of expropriation for the immovable cultural properties owned by legal and real persons who do not carry out their obligations for protection. On the other hand, for the monuments that are not classified as cultural property, there are no obligations for the owners to restore these monuments.

5.6. Conclusion

The ideas of nationalism and national sovereignty were introduced to the Ottoman empire through its lands in the Balkans and Orthodox subjects. Even though these developments led to independence movements among the non-Muslim subjects of the empire and subsequent territory losses, an 'awakening' and recognition of a separate Turkish national identity among the Turkish speaking subjects of the Ottoman empire did not take place until the end of the 20th century. The main pillars of the Turkish national identity constructed at the time were the Turkish language and Islam religion. The centuries-long military and territorial losses against the non-Muslim nations as well as the foreign occupation of Anatolia by the non-Muslim states, strengthened the unification around the common religious belonging. This ideology led to a common resistance and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The newly independent state, aiming to create a modern nation in the western sense, deemed it was necessary to ensure the connection between the nation and its land. A new national narrative was created for that purpose, which suggested that the bronze age civilizations, the Hittites and the Sumerians, were ancestors

of the modern Turkish nation. Archaeology, history, folklore and philology were all utilized to provide the evidence needed to promote this narrative. Among them all, archaeology was of the highest importance since it could produce the material proofs necessary.

The newly established Turkish Republic constituted a continuity with the Ottoman empire regarding the institutions and practices related to cultural heritage. Ottoman archaeology and museology, established in the 19th century, was influenced by and established by implementing the Western concepts of heritage. Accordingly, the material remains of the classical civilizations were valued. Even though the Hellenic and Byzantine civilizations were associated with the Greek nation and state, there were not any hostilities or deliberate exclusion towards those heritages. Likewise, the Republic of Turkey had the same perception. A newly independent state aiming to become a part of the Western world, the Turkish state tried to prove its worth and capability by showing respect to and taking care of the heritage deemed to be the core of European civilization.

Central heritage management policies in the republic's early years were ideologically motivated. Hence, they focused on discovering the pre-classical civilizations and distancing the state and the nation from their Ottoman past. Overall, it can be said that these policies were even beneficial for the preservation of the Byzantine heritage in Turkey. On the other hand, from the 1950s and onwards, the integrity of the Byzantine heritage has been challenged by ideological and socio-economic factors. The rapid urbanization of the towns, industrialization, agricultural production, and tourism brought the destruction of cultural heritage. Yet, these factors had affected the Byzantine heritage and all cultural heritage.

On the other hand, starting with the 1980s, the growing popularity of the new Turkish nationalism and the Turkish-Islamic narrative resulted in the increased interest and care shown to the Seljuk and Ottoman pasts and heritage and the exclusion of the Byzantine. This discourse, which had supported both in the public and political spheres, resulted

in the 're-Ottomanization' and 're-conquest' of the Byzantine cultural heritage in Turkey, which was materialized in the conversion of former Byzantine churches that were being used as a museum, into mosques. Unavoidably, this approach and contemporary practices have affected the tangible and intangible aspects of the Byzantine cultural heritage in Turkey.

Chapter 6: Locals' Perceptions of Byzantine Heritage in Turkey

6.1. İznik

6.1.1. Its Past and Present

İznik (historically known as Nicaea) is a town located in northwest Anatolia, and it is a municipality of Bursa, the 4th most populous city in Turkey. The town is situated 85kms from Bursa city centre, and it's positioned next to the lake which bears the same name.

The earliest traces of human activity in the area date back to 2.500 BCE and were found in Karadin, Çiçekli, Yüğücek and Çakırca mounds within the district.⁴⁹⁶ According to Strabo, the emergence of a major settlement in today's İznik took place towards the end of 4th BCE.⁴⁹⁷ In 316 BCE, a city was founded here by Antigonos, one of the generals of Alexander the Great, who named it Antigoneia, after himself.⁴⁹⁸ After defeating Antigonos and taking over control of the area in 301 BCE, Lysimachus changed the city's name to Nicaea.⁴⁹⁹ Soon after, the city became a part of the Kingdom of Bithynia in 281 BCE.⁵⁰⁰ The city's town plan consisted of fortifications encircling the city, with two main roads crossing each other in the centre of the city and leading to four main

⁴⁹⁶ T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Tanıtma Genel Müdürlüğü, *İznik*, 2011.

⁴⁹⁷ Semavi Eyice, *İznik: Tarihçesi ve Eski Eserleri*, (İstanbul: Sanat Tarihi Araştırmaları, 1991), 3 [hereafter cited in text as Eyice 1991].

⁴⁹⁸ Jane Taylor, *Imperial Istanbul: A Traveller's Guide*, (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 253-254 [hereafter cited in text as Taylor 1998]; Sencer Şahin, "Hellenistik ve Roma Çağlarında İznik/Nikaia", In Işık Akbaygil, Halil İnalçık and Oktay Aslanapa, (eds.), *Tarih Boyunca İznik*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2004), 6 [hereafter cited in text as Şahin 2004].

⁴⁹⁹ Taylor 1998, 254.

⁵⁰⁰ Clive Foss, *Nicaea: A Byzantine Capital and Its Praises*, (Brookline, Mass.: Hellenic College Press, 1996), 1 [hereafter cited in text as Foss 1996].

city gates.⁵⁰¹ This historic plan is still preserved in modern İznik.



Figure 24: İznik and İznik Walls - Aerial View (taken from <https://www.bursa.com.tr>)

Nicaea became a part of the Roman empire in 74 BCE.⁵⁰² During the Roman era, Nicaea continued to prosper and became an important town in the region of Bithynia, thanks to the fertile lands surrounding it, as well as the town's strategic location and easy access to both inland and sea trade routes.⁵⁰³ In the 4th century, Nicaea became the location of the First Ecumenical Council (325), which the emperor Constantine the Great also attended.⁵⁰⁴ The Seventh Ecumenical Council (787), summoned by Empress Irene, where important decisions were taken on iconoclasm, also took place in Nicaea, in the church of

⁵⁰¹ Taylor 1998, 254.

⁵⁰² Şahin 2004, 7.

⁵⁰³ Foss 1996, 1.

⁵⁰⁴ Taylor 1998, 256

Hagia Sophia.⁵⁰⁵ Due to these historical events, Nicaea became an important centre during the Byzantine era, and still today, İznik holds a significant religious value, especially for Christians. The town was noted to be a rich and populous town in the 10th century during the visit (959) of emperor VII. Constantinos (913-959).⁵⁰⁶

In the late 11th century, for a brief period, the city fell into the control of the Sultanate of Rum, who made it their capital city.⁵⁰⁷ Afterwards, Nicaea was re-captured again in 1097 by the Byzantines. In 1204, after the conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade, Nicaea and its surrounding area were controlled by Theodore Lascaris, who established the Byzantine Empire of Nicaea and declared himself as the Byzantine emperor. During this time, it served as the empire's capital, and an Imperial Palace was built here.⁵⁰⁸ In addition, with Nicaea becoming the capital, it also became a centre of education⁵⁰⁹ and a cultural revival.⁵¹⁰ After the reconquest of Constantinople in 1261 by the Empire, Nicaea's importance relatively decreased.⁵¹¹

Finally, the Ottomans conquered the city in 1331 and eventually changed its name to İznik.⁵¹² As noted by a traveller who visited the town shortly after its conquest, Nicaea was in decay, and there were few inhabitants.⁵¹³ With its conquest by the Ottomans, new building activity started. This activity, which was personally supported and

⁵⁰⁵ Taylor 1998, 256.

⁵⁰⁶ Casim Avcı, "Bizans Döneminde İznik", In *Uluslararası İznik Sempozyumu, 5-7 Eylül 2005*, (İznik: İznik Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 93.

⁵⁰⁷ Mustafa Demir, "Selçuklu Hakimiyetinde İznik Şehri", In *Uluslararası İznik Sempozyumu, 5-7 Eylül 2005*, (İznik: İznik Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 239.

⁵⁰⁸ Michael Angold, "Nikaia Kenti: MS 1000-1400", In *Işık Akbaygil, Halil İnalcık and Oktay Aslanapa*, (eds.), *Tarih Boyunca İznik*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2004), 36 [hereafter cited in text as Angold 2004].

⁵⁰⁹ Angold 2004, 39.

⁵¹⁰ Taylor 1998, 256-257.

⁵¹¹ Angold 2004, 41.

⁵¹² Prusa (Bursa) was conquered by the Ottomans in 1326. Angold 2004, pp. 43.

⁵¹³ Angold 2004, 45.

overseen by Sultan Orhan himself, shows the importance given to İznik by the Ottomans.⁵¹⁴ In the Ottoman era, especially from the 15th century onwards, İznik became an important centre of ceramics and tiles production, which was also acknowledged internationally.⁵¹⁵

Many of the town's Christian inhabitants of Nicaea, including the Byzantine governor and elites, left for Constantinople after the Ottomans captured Nicaea.⁵¹⁶ In the years that followed its conquest, the town's population was very low, and not only the houses but also the farms and fruit gardens of the inhabitants were all located within the city walls.⁵¹⁷ According to the Ottoman registers, there were around 1.969 inhabitants in İznik in 1530, 2.490 inhabitants in 1550, and 1.700 inhabitants in 1603.⁵¹⁸ Many of the 16th and 17th-century travellers noted that during these centuries, İznik was in decay, and its population was constantly decreasing, primarily due to bad weather conditions, unhealthy water supply, and epidemics caused by the swamps in the lake area.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁴ Angold, 2004, 44.

⁵¹⁵ Today many pieces of İznik tiles and ceramics are exhibited in museums abroad such as the Rijks Museum (Amsterdam), the Victoria & Albert Museum (London), the British Museum (London), the Metropolitan Museum (New York).

⁵¹⁶ They also took with them many valuable icons, manuscripts and remains of two holy women, to Constantinople, which was permitted by the sultan Orhan. (Angold 2004, 44).

⁵¹⁷ Heath W. Lowry, "Gezginlerin Gözünden ve İdari Kayıtlardaki Bilgilerin Işığında Osmanlı Döneminde İznik, 1331-1923", In Işık Akbaygil, Halil İnalçık and Oktay Aslanapa, (eds.), *Tarih Boyunca İznik*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2004), 136 [hereafter cited in text as Lowry 2004].

⁵¹⁸ Lowry 2004, 146 and 155.

⁵¹⁹ Lowry 2004.



Figure 25: İznik Hagia Sophia - Photo By Guillaume Berggren (1870s-1880s)

The town suffered intensive damage during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-22. Many of its historical buildings were either damaged intensively or were destroyed entirely, and its population was highly decreased. According to Eyice, who visited the town in 1947, the situation was not very different.⁵²⁰ The town started flourishing once again after the 1960s, especially with new inter-city roads.⁵²¹

Today, the total population of the İznik district is 44.102 people, with

⁵²⁰ Semavi Eyice, "İznik'den Hatıralar ve Düşünceler", In *Uluslararası İznik Sempozyumu, 5-7 Eylül 2005*, (İznik: İznik Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 328 [hereafter cited in text as Eyice 2005].

⁵²¹ Eyice 2005, 337.

25.744 people living in the İznik town centre.⁵²² The district's economy is mainly dependent on farming, and 80% of the population is employed in agricultural production.⁵²³

6.1.2. Historical Sites and Monuments

Archaeological research in İznik did not uncover many remains from the Hellenistic area. On the other hand, the Roman past of Nicaea is visible through some important historical monuments, such as the city walls, its monumental gates, and the theatre.⁵²⁴



Figure 26: İznik Walls & Yenişehir Gate

One of the most significant historical assets of İznik is its historic walls. The modern city is still located within and circled by these walls, which

⁵²² TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute) - Address Based Population Registration System (Abprs) - Results Of 31 December 2020. Available via <https://www.tuik.gov.tr/>

⁵²³ Personal communication with Mehmet Bektaş, the Deputy Mayor of İznik, on 25/08/2021.

⁵²⁴ Haluk Abbasoğlu and İnci Delemen, "Antik Nikaia'dan Günümüze Kalanlar", In Işık Akbaygil, Halil İnalçık and Oktay Aslanapa, (eds.), *Tarih Boyunca İznik*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2004), 189.

were first built by Lysimachus around 300 BCE.⁵²⁵ However, no traces of this period have survived.⁵²⁶ In the Late Roman period, the city walls were extended by moving them further away from their original location; thus, they reached a perimeter of 4970 meters in total instead of 2960 meters.⁵²⁷ The walls that exist today were mainly constructed in the Byzantine period, whereas some small parts were built after the Goth raids in the 3rd century.⁵²⁸ The walls were repaired and strengthened in different periods, including the Ottoman era.⁵²⁹ Four monumental gates were located on these walls, the İstanbul Gate, the Yenişehir Gate, the Lefke Gate, and the Lake Gate; however, the latter does not survive today.



Figure 27: İznik - Roman Theatre (taken from <https://www.bursa.com.tr>)

⁵²⁵ Taylor 1998, 259.

⁵²⁶ Clive Foss, "İznik'in Bizans Surları 260-1330," In Işık Akbaygil, Halil İnalçık and Oktay Aslanapa, (eds.), *Tarih Boyunca İznik*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2004), 249 [hereafter cited in text as Foss 2004].

⁵²⁷ Şahin 2004, 3.

⁵²⁸ Taylor 1998, 259; Foss 2004, 249-261.

⁵²⁹ Taylor 1998, 259.

The Roman theatre is the oldest surviving monument in İznik, and it's located on the southwestern edge of the town. Its construction started in the 2nd century in the age of emperor Trajan and kept its original function until the mid-3rd century.⁵³⁰ In the later centuries, the theatre area was used for burials, as was shown by the archaeological works on site, which uncovered tombs and the foundations of two Byzantine churches.⁵³¹ These works also uncovered pottery kilns dating back to the 11th – 12th centuries, suggesting that pottery makers also inhabited the area after the theatre lost its original function.⁵³²

Another Roman-era monument worth mentioning is the Obelisk, also locally known as 'Beştaş' and 'Dikilitaş', which is located nearly 5 kilometres from İznik. This obelisk, built in the early 2nd century, consists of five marble blocks on the top of each other – it is believed to have a 6th one on the top but did not survive – and is a funerary monument for Gaius Cassius Philiscus – a notable of Nicaea.⁵³³ The aqueduct, the remains of which are visible around the Lefke Gate, belongs to the Roman period as well but was rebuilt in the 9th century.⁵³⁴

Most of the existing historical monuments in İznik belong to the Ottoman era. From as early as the 14th century, after the conquest of İznik, new buildings started to be constructed in İznik. Unfortunately, some historical monuments in the town, including Ottoman-era monuments and Byzantine-era monuments – such as the Koimesis

⁵³⁰ The excavations in the monument revealed some materials which were used as tickets, and these findings along with the relieves of swords and shields on the walls, suggest that the theatre was also used for gladiator fights. (Personal communication with Aygün Ekin Meriç, the director of the Roman Theatre Excavations, on 25/08/2021.)

⁵³¹ Urs Peschlow, "Nikaia / İznik Kiliseleri", In Işık Akbaygil, Halil İnalcık and Oktay Aslanapa, (eds.), *Tarih Boyunca İznik*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2004), 212-214 [hereafter cited as Peschlow 2004].

⁵³² Personal communication with Aygün Ekin Meriç, the director of the Roman Theatre Excavations, on 25/08/2021.

⁵³³ Foss 1996, 3.

⁵³⁴ Foss 1996, 118.

Church- were either damaged or destroyed by the passing centuries and due to the Greco-Turkish War in 1922.

Among the surviving Ottoman-era monuments, one of the most significant ones is the Yeşil (Green) Mosque built between 1378-1392. It is considered one of the symbols of İznik due to its prominent architectural and decorative elements, such as the colourful tile-decorated *minaret*. Another important monument is the Nilüfer Hatun İmareti, which was built in 1388 by Sultan Murad I for the memory of his late mother. The monument served the same purpose until the late 19th century and was opened as a museum in 1960. Today, it serves as the Archaeological Museum of İznik, as the new building is being constructed and planned to be opened in May 2022.⁵³⁵ Other important Ottoman-era monuments in İznik include Hacı Özbek Mosque,⁵³⁶ Yakup Çelebi Zaviyesi,⁵³⁷ Süleyman Paşa Medresesi,⁵³⁸ 1. Murad Hamamı,⁵³⁹ Mahmut Çelebi mosque and Şeyh Kudbettin mosque and tomb.⁵⁴⁰

6.1.3. İznik's Byzantine Monuments

Nicaea became an important city in the Byzantine Empire, especially from the 4th century onwards. For more than half a century, it was where the royal palace and the patriarchy were located.

Nicaea has been subjected to destructive earthquakes and occupations throughout its Byzantine history, which damaged many of its

⁵³⁵ Personal communication with Ertuğrul Kaya, the vice museum director of İznik Museum, on 24/08/2021.

⁵³⁶ This mosque which was built in 1333 was the first mosque to be built in İznik.

⁵³⁷ It belongs to the 14th century and consists of a small *tekke* and tomb.

⁵³⁸ An early 14th century Ottoman medrese which the oldest surviving medrese in İznik. It is currently used as 'Çiniciler Çarşısı', a marketplace for local made potteries and tiles.

⁵³⁹ The monument houses Museum of İznik Ceramics and its garden serves as a marketplace for local made potteries and tiles.

⁵⁴⁰ Both Mahmut Çelebi mosque and Şeyh Kudbettin mosque and tomb belong to the 15th century.

Byzantine monuments. With the Ottoman conquest of the town, many of its Christian inhabitants left for Constantinople, and in the following centuries, conversions to Islam also took place. Therefore, due to its decreasing Christian population in town and the general decline in town's population after the 15th century, many Byzantine monuments fell into disuse and decay.




Figure 28: İznik Hypogeum - Interior Wall Paintings (taken from <https://www.bursa.com.tr/>)

Among the Byzantine-era monuments that still exist in and around İznik, the Hypogeum (underground tomb) is the oldest surviving one. It is located just 5 kilometres out of the İznik town centre and dates to the early Byzantine period.

Apart from the three Byzantine churches, Hagia Sophia, Koimesis Church, and the Lake Basilica, which will be discussed in detail below, there are also remains of four other churches that have been discovered in İznik. These are the remains of the church (Church A) near Istanbul Gate, the remains of the church (Church C) near Yenişehir Gate, the

remains of the church to the southeast of the Roman theatre (Church B), and the remains of the church (Church D) in the Roman theatre.⁵⁴¹ Unfortunately, due to the lack of extensive archaeological works on these remains, their dating and naming cannot be done accurately.⁵⁴²



Figure 29: İznik - Remains of Church A

⁵⁴¹ For the four churches that are mentioned, see Foss 1996, 108-110 and Peschlow 2004, 208-215. According to sources, a church named the Church of Saint Tryphon, which was a well-known church as a place of miracle enactment, also existed in Nicaea. (Foss 1996, 106-107) Different modern scholars associated this church with either the Church A or the Church C. However, according to Peschlow, there is not enough archaeological evidence to suggest that any of the four unnamed church remains found in İznik today are the remains of the Saint Tryphon Church. (Peschlow 2004, 215)

⁵⁴² Peschlow 2004.




Figure 30: İznik - Remains of Church B



Figure 31: İznik - Remains of Church C

As for the scope of this case study, the monuments that are selected for the public opinion survey are the Hagia Sophia Church, Koimesis Church, Böcek Ayazma (Baptistery), and the Lake Basilica.

6.1.3.1. Hagia Sophia Church



Figure 32: İznik - Hagia Sophia / Orhan Camii (taken from <https://www.kulturportali.gov.tr/>)

Hagia Sophia is located at the heart of modern İznik, on the intersection of the two main streets of the town, Atatürk Street and Kılıçaslan Street. This area, which houses buildings of many public institutions and private businesses, is frequented by countless cars and pedestrians daily. In addition, the monument has an ample, open, green space on its southern and eastern sides, where people can sit and relax. Facing the monument directly, on its southern side, are many coffee places where the local people spend their time. Due to its central location, Hagia Sophia enjoys visibility by the locals and visitors of the town alike.

The first Hagia Sophia church was built at the same spot in the 6th century, during the reign of Justinian, on the place of a gymnasium that

previously existed there.⁵⁴³ This church, also referred to as the ‘Great Church’ in historical sources, is where the Seventh Ecumenical Council (787) occurred.⁵⁴⁴ The first church was destroyed due to the earthquake in 1065, and the new Hagia Sophia was rebuilt on its ruins – the very building we see in Iznik today.⁵⁴⁵



Figure 33: İznik Hagia Sophia (taken from <https://enbursa.com/>)

When the Ottomans conquered Nicaea, the church was converted into a mosque, and a minaret was added.⁵⁴⁶ The monument suffered damage from Timur’s invasion in 1402 and a fire in the following century.⁵⁴⁷ During the reign of Sultan Suleyman, the monument was restored by the renowned Ottoman architect Sinan,⁵⁴⁸ possibly to repair

⁵⁴³ Taylor 1998, 260.

⁵⁴⁴ Peschlow 2004, 202.

⁵⁴⁵ Taylor 1998, 260.

⁵⁴⁶ Peschlow 2004, 215-216; Angold 2004, 44.

⁵⁴⁷ Taylor 1998, 260.

⁵⁴⁸ Taylor 1998, 260.

damages caused by a fire.⁵⁴⁹ Due to the city's fading importance in the later Ottoman period, the monument fell into disrepair. In the 19th century, the monument stood in a state of ruin: its roofing had collapsed, and its interior was covered in trees and bushes.⁵⁵⁰




Figure 34: İznik - Hagia Sophia (taken from <https://enbursa.com/>)

After the foundation of the republic, the monument's ownership was transferred to the Directorate General of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü), which was under the authority of the Turkish Prime Ministry.⁵⁵¹ In the early republican era, the monument was still in

⁵⁴⁹ Pınar Aykaç, "Resmi ve Resmi Olmayan Kültürel Miras Koruma Pratikleri İkilemindeki İznik ve Trabzon Ayasofyaları", In Bahar Aykan, (ed.), *Dünden Bugüne Bugünden Düne: Türkiye'de Kültürel Miras, Kimlik ve Bellek İnşası*, (Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2021), 7 [hereafter cited in text as Aykaç 2021].

⁵⁵⁰ Eyice 2005, 332.

⁵⁵¹ Aykaç 2021, 7. Many other former Byzantine monuments that were converted into mosques in the Ottoman era were also transferred to the ownership of the same state organization after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

ruinous condition with no function.⁵⁵² Between 1935-1939, the German Archaeological Institute conducted archaeological excavations in the monument.⁵⁵³ In the context of the preparations for the 10th International Congress of Byzantine Studies, which was to take place in 1955 in Turkey, general maintenance works were undertaken on the Byzantine monuments around the country.⁵⁵⁴ During the maintenance works on Hagia Sophia, the soil deposits that covered the monument's interior were cleaned, and a ground mosaic, an *omphalion*, was discovered.⁵⁵⁵ On the other hand, the monument was not repaired during these works, and it was not turned into a museum, even though it was a significant attraction for visitors coming to İznik.⁵⁵⁶



Figure 35: İznik - Hagia Sophia / Orhan Camii - Interior

⁵⁵² As was stated by Aykaç (2021), in 1933 the branch of the Directorate General of Foundations that has the authority over İznik decided to demolish three mosques in İznik, among which Hagia Sophia was also included, and sell their lands; since they considered these monuments to be 'insignificant'. See Aykaç 2019, 8 and Aykaç 2021, 7.

⁵⁵³ Aykaç 2019, 2021.

⁵⁵⁴ Aykaç 2021, 9.

⁵⁵⁵ Eyice 2005, 332.

⁵⁵⁶ Aykaç 2021, 9.

Since 1983 and onwards, the contemporary function of the monument has become an ongoing debate between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Directorate General of Foundations, who wanted to use the monument as a 'monument-museum' and a mosque, respectively.⁵⁵⁷ The monument stayed idle, in half-ruins, until the restoration works started in 2006. After the restoration works were over, in 2011, the Directorate General of Foundations transferred the rights of usage and management to the Directorate of Religious Affairs. On 6 November 2011, the monument was officially transformed into a mosque and started functioning as such.



Figure 36: İznik - Hagia Sophia / Orhan Camii - Entrance

It should be noted that even if the monument was not officially a museum until its conversion to a mosque in 2011, in practical terms, it

⁵⁵⁷ Aykaç 2019, 8-10 and 2021, 10-15.

functioned as a 'monument-museum' and was visited by foreign and domestic tourists alike.⁵⁵⁸ Another historical event in the monument's contemporary life was the Orthodox religious ceremonies which took place on 26 December 2000. On this date, with the permission of the Turkish government, the Fener-Rum Orthodox Patriarchy hold a religious ritual in Hagia Sophia celebrating the two-thousandth birth anniversary of the prophet Jesus.⁵⁵⁹



Figure 11: İznik - Hagia Sophia / Orhan Camii - Interior

⁵⁵⁸ Aykaç 2021, 15.

⁵⁵⁹ The decision to allow religious prayers in some historical monuments, in the context of 'religious tourism' was jointly made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The monuments that were selected for this occasion included, among some others, the House of the Virgin Mary and Saint Jean Church in Ephesus (İzmir) and the Saint Paul's Church in Tarsus (Mersin). See Aykaç 2019, 9 and 2021, 12.

Today the monument is used as a mosque. During prayers times, *ezan* – call to prayer – is played from its minaret, and worshippers gather inside the monument to perform their rituals. Outside the prayer times, the monument is open for visitation. The Christian past of the monument is visible through the *omphalion* mosaic on the ground, the partly surviving Deisis fresco on the northern wall, the seats of the clergy in the apse, and the two smaller domed rooms with decorative paintings among which one has a sarcophagus. The entrance to the monument is free of charge.

6.1.3.2. Koimesis (Dormition) Church



Figure 12: İznik - Koimesis Church – Photo By Guillaume Berggren (1870s-1880s) (taken from: thebyzantinelegacy.com)

The remains of the Koimesis Church are located in the south-eastern part of İznik, on the junction of Mahmut and Kaymakam Salih Taşkın

Streets. The plot is now situated in a residential area, surrounded by modern apartments.

Koimesis Church was built before 730⁵⁶⁰ as a part of the Hyakinthos Monastery. In the literature, the monument is also referred to as the Hyakinthos Monastery of the Church of the Dormition.⁵⁶¹ The church was damaged in 1065 due to an earthquake, and its dome, supporting arches, and narthex were rebuilt and redecorated.⁵⁶² The monument was among the most important Christian sanctuaries in Nicaea. It was also a royal burial place: some members of the royal family, such as the emperor Teodoros I. Laskaris and his wife Anna Angelina, were buried here.⁵⁶³ After the Ottoman conquest of Nicaea, the Christian inhabitants of the town resettled in the area around the Hyakinthos Monastery, which continued to be the Christian neighbourhood of Iznik until the end of the Ottoman period.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶⁰ Peschlow 2004, 203; Foss 1996, 97.

⁵⁶¹ Seda Nehir Gümüşlü, "A Long-Neglected Past Between the Roman and Ottoman: A Re-Assessment, Valorization and Re-Presentation of Byzantine Cultural Heritage In Turkey", (PhD diss., Middle East Technical University, 2021), 316.

⁵⁶² Angold 2004, 34; Peschlow 2004, 207.

⁵⁶³ Angold 2004, 35-6; Peschlow 2004, 214; Foss 1996, 98-9.

⁵⁶⁴ Angold 2004, 46.



Figure 39: İznik – Remains of the Koimesis Church

According to Foss, this church received significant scholarly attention due to its “unusual plan and its striking mosaic decoration”,⁵⁶⁵ which remained intact until 1921.⁵⁶⁶ The Koimesis Church was destroyed during the Greco-Turkish War in 1922. Today, only the foundations and a couple of structural elements of the church survive. The church remains are located below the current street level and are visible for the visitors and passersby alike. On the other hand, since the area is not busy or touristic but a residential area, mostly the people who live in the neighbourhood pass by these remains. Although semi-high walls encircle the space, there is no fencing around these walls. Therefore, it is weak in security, which might endanger the monument’s physical integrity.

6.1.3.3. Böcek Ayazma (Baptistery)

This monument is located 100 meters away from the Koimesis Church,

⁵⁶⁵ Foss 1996, 98.

⁵⁶⁶ Foss 1996, 99.

on Mahmut Street, and is thought to be a part of the Hyakinthos Monastery. It was a reserve of spring water considered sacred by the Orthodox Christian inhabitants in the area.⁵⁶⁷ The monument is a single domed structure, with a fountain at its centre, which is reached by a few steps down the street level.



Figure 40: İznik - Böcek Ayazma

The monument was noted to be in poor condition and neglected during Eyice's visit in the mid 20th century.⁵⁶⁸ Today, the entrance to the monument is closed by an iron-fenced door, not allowing visitation. The surroundings and the monument's interior – as could be seen from between the fences – are in bad condition and require cleaning and maintenance.

⁵⁶⁷ Eyice 2005, 332.

⁵⁶⁸ Eyice 2005, 332.

6.1.3.4. Lake Basilica



Figure 41: İznik - Lake Basilica (taken from: arkeofili.com)

The Lake Basilica is located eastern coast of İznik Lake, approximately 50 meters from the shore to the south of the Lake Gate, 1.5 – 2 meters deep in the water.

The existence of remains under İznik Lake was first mentioned in the 16th century, and it was a known fact in the following centuries by both the locals and travellers alike.⁵⁶⁹ These remains mostly became visible due to low tides. In 2014, examining aerial photography of the area, these remains were rediscovered and identified as basilical church foundations.⁵⁷⁰ This discovery was named one of the most exciting

⁵⁶⁹ Mustafa Şahin, “İznik Gölü’ndeki Bazilika İlk Olarak Ne Zaman Keşfedildi”, *Bursa Günlüğü*, (Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2020), 68.

⁵⁷⁰ Mustafa Şahin, “Hava Fotoğrafları ve Arkeoloji Biliminde Yeni Bir Keşif: İznik Gölü Bazilikası”, *YÖK Yüksek Öğretim Dergisi*, Sayı:10, (Ekim-Kasım-Aralık 2018), 78 [hereafter cited in text as Şahin 2018].

discoveries of 2014 by the Archaeology magazine, published by the Archaeological Institute of America.⁵⁷¹ The archaeological works on the basilica have started in the following year, and they still continue. In addition to small remains such as coins, stamps, amphora fragments, and roofing tiles, these works also discovered many burials inside and around the basilica.⁵⁷² The archaeological evidence suggests that the basilica was built after 390,⁵⁷³ and it is thought to be an early Byzantine church dedicated to the Saint Neophytos.⁵⁷⁴

As the archaeological works are still ongoing, the area is fenced around and closed to the public, but plans for building a visitor centre are in progress.⁵⁷⁵

6.1.4. Results of the Public Opinion Survey

6.1.4.1. Demographics

In this survey, out of the 83 participants, 48 were male (valid percent=58.5%), and 34 were female (valid percent= 41.5%).⁵⁷⁶ The average age of the participants was thirty-nine ($\mu=39.2$; $\sigma=11.4$), with the youngest participant being eighteen years old and the oldest seventy-four.

All the participants in this survey have been living in İznik, ranging from one year to seventy-one years, with an average of twenty-seven

⁵⁷¹ Eric A. Powell, (January/February 2015), "Sunken Byzantine Basilica", Available from <https://www.archaeology.org/issues/161-1501/features/2789-turkey-submerged-byzantine-basilica>

⁵⁷² Mustafa Şahin and Ahmet Bilir, "Underwater Survey in Lake Iznik – 2015", *North Meets East Aktuelle Forschungen zu antiken Häfen III*, Hamburg, Germany, 15 - 17 March 2016, 75-84 [Hereafter cited in text as Şahin and Bilir 2016].

⁵⁷³ Şahin 2018, 80.

⁵⁷⁴ Şahin and Bilir 2016, 82.

⁵⁷⁵ Personal communication with Mustafa Şahin, director of the Lake Basilica excavations, on 24/08/2021.

⁵⁷⁶ There was one missing value.

years ($\mu=28.2$; $\sigma=15.1$). In terms of education, the majority of the participants had a university degree (valid percent=55.4%) or higher (valid percent=2.4%). Around one-third of the participants were high school graduates (valid percent=31.3%), and almost nine per cent (valid percent=9.6%) had at least five years of primary school education.

The majority of the participants (valid percent=62.2%) were employed in the private sector, and more than half of them (valid percent=36.6%) had their own jobs. The public sector employees were around one-fourth of the population (valid percent=26.8%). The other categories were students (valid percent=2.4%), retired people (valid percent=7.3%) and unemployed people (valid percent=1.2%).

6.1.4.2. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Cultural Heritage

Following the questions on personal information, the participants were asked what 'cultural heritage' means to them.

The majority of the participants (valid percent=70%) consider cultural heritage as the tangible remains of the past, and only one-fourth of the sample (valid percent=24.2) considers the intangible elements. As for the natural elements, only a few participants (valid percent=5.8%) consider them as cultural heritage.

Most of the participants (valid percent=40.2%) relate cultural heritage to the distant past, 'civilizations lived long before today'. At the same time, they consider cultural heritage as an educational tool to understand how people/civilizations used to live. According to the participants (valid percent=31.5%), cultural heritage assets are the inheritance of previous generations and should be protected to pass on to future generations. Also, for the participants, cultural heritage assets (valid percent=28.3%) have an identity status attached either to themselves personally, to their place, or their nation.

According to the participants, cultural heritage assets are valuable the most for 'themselves' (valid percent=94.9%) and 'tourists' (valid percent=93.5%). It is followed by 'states' (valid percent=86.4%) and

‘humanity’ (valid percent=84.8%). On the other hand, only a bit more than half of the participants (valid percent=63.6) agree that cultural heritage is valuable for ‘local people’. (See Table 23)

Table 23: İznik - Cultural Heritage is valuable to ...

Cultural heritage is valuable ...	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
To me	1.3%	-	3.8%	14.1%	80.8%
To the local people	5.2%	11.7%	19.5%	28.6%	35%
To states	1.4%	4.1%	8.1%	14.9%	71.5%
To tourists	1.3%	2.6%	2.6%	16.9%	76.6%
To the humanity	1.3%	2.5%	11.4%	8.9%	75.9%

The participants mostly associate cultural heritage with ‘historical value’ (valid percent=96.2%) and ‘economic/touristic value’ (valid percent=96.1%). Most participants acknowledge ‘Scientific/Educational value’ and ‘aesthetic value’ of cultural heritage (valid percent=90.9% and valid percent=89.5%, respectively). On the other hand, even though more than half of the participants (valid percent=61%) agree that cultural heritage has ‘political value’; compared to the responses to the previous categories, there is a certain decrease in the number of participants who agree that cultural heritage assets have ‘political value’. (See Table 24)

Table 24: İznik - I think that cultural heritage has ... value.

I think that cultural heritage has value.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	1.3%	2.6%	6.6%	21.1%	68.4%
Historical value	-	-	3.8%	6.4%	89.8%
Scientific – educational value	-	1.3%	7.8%	18.2%	72.7%
Economic - touristic value	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	14.1%	82%
Political value	7.8%	11.7%	19.5%	22%	39%

According to more than half of the participants (valid percent=55.2%), cultural heritage assets belong to 'everybody/all of us'. The second most common category is 'citizens/locals' (valid percent=23.5%) and the third one is the 'states/officials' (valid percent=12.9%)

On the other hand, nearly half of the participants (valid percent=45%) think the main responsibility in protecting cultural heritage assets belongs to 'states/officials'. There is almost an equality between the replies 'everybody/all of us' (valid percent=27.9%) and 'citizens/locals' (valid percent=27%).

Almost half of the participants (valid percent=49.4) consider themselves to be 'somewhat' knowledgeable about cultural heritage. More than one-third of them stated that they are 'fairly well' knowledgeable (valid percent=30.9%) or 'extremely well' knowledgeable (valid percent=7.4). The participants who believe that they do not have much knowledge on cultural heritage were only a bit more than ten per cent ('very little' knowledge, valid percent=12.3%; and 'not at all' knowledge, valid percent=2.5%). On average, the participants consider themselves between 'somewhat' and 'fairly well' knowledgeable on cultural heritage ($\mu=3.3$; $\sigma=0.8$).

The majority of the participants (valid percent=70.9%) stated that they visit cultural heritage sites, monuments, and museums at least once a year. Among them, the most common reply was 'several times a year' (valid percent=35.4%), followed by 'once a year' (valid percent=19), 'weekly' (valid percent=8.9%), and 'monthly' (valid percent=7.6%). On the other hand, almost twenty per cent of the sample (valid percent=19%) stated they visit cultural heritage sites, monuments, and museums 'less than once a year' whereas ten per cent (valid percent=10.1) said they never visit these sites.

Before moving on to more specific questions on the Byzantine monuments in town, the participants were asked their knowledge of İznik's history and its cultural heritage.

According to the results, most of the participants (n=67) consider Hagia Sophia as the symbol/landmark of İznik. The other most common answers were Yeşil Mosque (n=42), İznik city walls and gates (n=40), the Roman Theatre (n=28) and the Lake Basilica (n=22).

Many participants think that the cultural heritage assets in İznik are 'fairly' protected (valid percentage=42.7%) or worse than that (valid percent=41.5%). There is an equality between the participants who think they are 'poorly' protected (valid percent=20.7) and 'very poorly' protected (valid percent=20.7). Few participants (valid percent=14.4) think they are 'well' protected and only a couple (valid percent=2.4) think they are 'very well' protected. On average, the participants think the cultural heritage assets in İznik are between 'poorly' and 'fairly' protected ($\mu=2.56$, $\sigma=1.04$).

6.1.4.3. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Byzantine Heritage in İznik

In the last part of the questionnaire, the participants' interests, knowledge, and attitudes towards the Byzantine heritage in İznik were investigated.

Firstly, the participants were asked if they knew of any Byzantine-era

monuments in İznik. The most common reply was Hagia Sophia, as nearly half of the participants (valid percent=44.5%) named it. Following that, the most named monuments were 'city walls and gates' (valid percent=37.3%), the 'Lake Basilica' (valid percent= 21.6%), and the 'Roman theatre' (valid percent=20.4%). The monuments that only a few participants stated were the 'obelisk' (valid percent= 12%), 'Koimesis Church' (valid percent= 8.4%), and 'Böcek Ayazma' (valid percent=7.2%).

Almost all the participants (valid percent=98.8%) stated that they had visited Hagia Sophia at least once in their lives. Most of the reasons for visitation were related to religious practices, personal interest, and accompanying friends and family.

Nearly all of the participants (valid percent=97.6%) said they knew about the Lake Basilica, and most of them (valid percent=78.9%) went to see it.⁵⁷⁷ Böcek Ayazma was known by relatively fewer people (valid percent=77.9%), among which the majority (valid percent=80%) had visited the site.

When asked if they would like to learn more about the Byzantine monuments in İznik, the majority of the participants (valid percent=93%) responded positively.

Most of the participants stated that the Byzantine monuments in İznik are either 'fairly' protected (valid percent=35.8) or 'poorly' protected (valid percent=34.6%). The number of the participants who think these monuments are 'well' or 'very well' protected (valid percent=13.6 and 1.2, respectively) are equal to those who think they are 'very poorly' protected (valid percent=14.8%). On average, the participants in this survey think these monuments are between 'poorly' and 'fairly' protected ($\mu=2.52$, $\sigma=0.95$).

The majority of the participants (valid percent=61.8%) think that the

⁵⁷⁷ Even though the site is not yet open for visitation, these participants went to the site to check the remains from the shore.

Byzantine monuments in Īznik are valuable for the town and its citizens. In contrast, few of them (valid percent=21.1%) think they are not. On the other hand, some participants (valid percent=17.1%) stated that these monuments are valuable for the town but not for its inhabitants, as the locals do not 'care' about these monuments.

In terms of the values that the Byzantine monuments in Īznik add to the town, the overwhelming majority of the participants (valid percent=94.7%) agree that they add 'historical value' to the town. The majority of the participants also believe that these monuments add 'aesthetic value' (valid percent=89.3%), 'scientific/educational value' (valid percent=89.2%) and 'economic/touristic value' (valid percent=86.3%) to Īznik. The 'political value' is agreed upon by more than half of the participants (valid percent=67.6%), although it's less agreed upon compared to the other values. (See Table 25)

Table 25: Īznik - I think that the Byzantine monuments in Īznik add ... value to Īznik.

I think that the Byzantine monuments in Īznik add value to Īznik.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	-	5.3%	5.3%	25.3%	64%
Historical value	-	-	5.3%	17.3%	77.4%
Scientific – educational value	-	5.4%	5.4%	32.4%	56.8%
Economic - touristic value	1.4%	8.2%	4.1%	17.8%	68.5%
Political value	8.1%	16.2%	8.1%	28.4%	39.2%

Almost all the participants (valid percent=98.7%) agree that the Byzantine monuments in Īznik should be protected for future generations. They (valid percent=96.1%) also consider themselves personally responsible for protecting these monuments. (See Table 26)

Table 26: İznik - Byzantine monuments in İznik I

Byzantine monuments in İznik	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	-	-	1.3%	10.3%	88.4%
I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	-	2.6%	1.3%	15.6%	80.5%

The majority of the participants (valid percent=93.5%) agree that archaeological works, such as excavation and conservation, should be conducted in these monuments. On the other hand, even though more than half of the participants (valid percent=71.6%) agree that these monuments should be utilized for new purposes, there is a certain decrease in the sum of positive answers when compared to those in the other questions, which will be discussed in the next section. (See Table 27)

Table 27: İznik - Byzantine monuments in İznik II

Byzantine monuments in İznik	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Archaeological works (excavation/restoration) should be conducted on these monuments.	1.3%	1.3%	3.9%	18.5%	75%
These monuments should be utilized with new functions.	6.8%	13.5%	8.1%	25.7%	45.9%

Nearly all the participants (valid percent=97.4%) agree that the

Byzantine monuments in İznik are part of the town's history and culture. On the other hand, even though the majority, fewer participants (valid percent=70.9%) seem to consider these monuments part of their personal histories and culture. (See Table 28)

Table 28: İznik - Byzantine monuments in İznik III

Byzantine monuments in İznik	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments are part of İznik's history and culture.	-	-	2.6%	3.9%	93.5%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	6.9%	12.5%	9.7%	18.1%	52.8%

When these last six questions were asked in a more general context, for the Byzantine monuments in Turkey, it is seen that the results were more or less the same, with only minor changes. (See Table 29)

Table 29: İznik - Byzantine monuments in Turkey

Byzantine monuments in Turkey	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	-	-	-	10.4%	89.6%
I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	-	1.4%	1.4%	19.2%	78%
Archaeological works (excavation/restoration) should be conducted on these monuments.	1.3%	-	6.8%	18.9%	73%
These monuments should be utilized with new functions.	6.8%	5.5%	20.5%	20.5%	46.7%
These monuments are part of Turkey's history and culture.	-	-	2.7%	13.7%	83.6%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	4.2%	9.7%	9.7%	16.7%	59.7%

6.1.4.4 Statistical Relationships Between Participants' Demographics and Their Responses

Firstly, to evaluate if there is a relationship between the participants' gender and their answers to the questionnaire, an Independent T Test analysis was conducted. The results show that there is not a meaningful statistical difference between the answers given by male and female participants on the questions about the values associated

with cultural heritage in general (CHValues: $t = -1.088$, $p = 0.283$) and the willingness to protect the Byzantine heritage in their towns and country (ByzProtection: $t = -1.616$, $p = 0.111$). (See Table 30)

On the other hand, the analysis revealed a meaningful statistical difference between the genders and their responses to the questions about the values of the Byzantine heritage assets in İznik and Turkey, and to what extent they consider this heritage to be a part of their personal identities as well as local and national identities. According to the results, female participants in İznik regard the Byzantine heritage to be more valuable compared to the male participants (ByzValues: $t = -3.038$, $p = 0.003$), and they associate themselves and their communities with this heritage more than the male participants do (ByzIdentity: $t = -2.289$, $p = 0.025$). (See Table 30)

Table 30: İznik – SPSS Output I

Independent Samples Test									
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper
CHValues	Equal variances assumed	.269	.606	-1,082	76	.283	-.13186	.12188	-.37460 .11088
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,081	66,683	.284	-.13186	.12196	-.37532 .11159
ByzValues	Equal variances assumed	5,766	.019	-2,763	73	.007	-.42195	.15271	-.72629 -.11760
	Equal variances not assumed			-3,038	69,374	.003	-.42195	.13889	-.69900 -.14489
ByzProtection	Equal variances assumed	9,531	.003	-1,416	76	.161	-.13281	.09381	-.31966 .05403
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,616	63,158	.111	-.13281	.08218	-.29702 .03140
ByzIdentity	Equal variances assumed	21,142	.000	-2,102	74	.039	-.34517	.16424	-.67242 -.01792
	Equal variances not assumed			-2,289	69,676	.025	-.34517	.15083	-.64601 -.04433

Secondly, to investigate the relationships between the participants' age and their responses, and the amount of time the participants spent in İznik and their responses, correlation analysis were conducted. The results revealed that, there is a significant correlation between the age and the values attached to cultural heritage in general ($r = 0.245$, $p = 0.032$). On the other hand no significant relationships between the age and other responses were discovered (Age-ByzValues: $r = 0.169$, $p = 0.150$; Age-ByzProtection: $r = 0.031$, $p = 0.789$; Age-ByzIdentity $r = 0.016$,

$p=0.893$). In terms of the 'years of inhabitation' and the responses to the questions, no significant correlations were found (Inhabitation-CHValues: $r=0.087$, $p=0.449$; Inhabitation-ByzValues: $r=-0.168$, $p=0.149$; Inhabitation-ByzProtection: $r=-0.166$, $p=0.150$; Inhabitation-ByzIdentity: $r=-0.057$, $p=0.625$). (See Table 31)

The results show a significant correlation between the values given to cultural heritage assets in general and the values given to Byzantine monuments in İznik (CHValues-ByzValues: $r=0.482$, $p=0.000$).

However, it is seen that no significant correlation exist between the values given to cultural heritage assets in general and the feelings of personal responsibility in protecting Byzantine heritage (CHValues-ByzProtection: $r=0.154$, $p=0.180$); which is believed to stem from the dominant heritage discourse that treats experts as the main responsible party in heritage preservation. On the other hand, there are significant correlations between the values given to Byzantine heritage and the personal responsibility in protecting the Byzantine heritage assets (ByzValues-ByzProtection: $r=0.445$, $p=0.000$) as well as the participants' personal, local and national associations with the Byzantine heritage in İznik and Turkey (ByzValues-ByzIdentity: $r=0.386$, $p=0.001$). (See Table 31)

Table 31: İznik – SPSS Output II

		Correlations					
		Age	For how many years?	CHValues	ByzValues	ByzProtection	ByzIdentity
Age	Pearson Correlation	1	,407**	,245*	,169	,031	,016
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,032	,150	,789	,893
	N	80	79	77	74	77	75
For how many years?	Pearson Correlation	,407**	1	,087	-,168	-,166	-,057
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,449	,149	,150	,625
	N	79	81	77	75	77	75
CHValues	Pearson Correlation	,245*	,087	1	,482**	,154	,178
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,032	,449		,000	,180	,126
	N	77	77	79	75	77	75
ByzValues	Pearson Correlation	,169	-,168	,482**	1	,445**	,386**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,150	,149	,000		,000	,001
	N	74	75	75	76	76	75
ByzProtection	Pearson Correlation	,031	-,166	,154	,445**	1	,523**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,789	,150	,180	,000		,000
	N	77	77	77	76	79	77
ByzIdentity	Pearson Correlation	,016	-,057	,178	,386**	,523**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,893	,625	,126	,001	,000	
	N	75	75	75	75	77	77

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Lastly, One-Way ANOVA analysis was used for investigating if there is a meaningful difference between the participant responses to the questionnaire depending on their levels of education. The analysis revealed that the participants' appreciation of and attitudes towards cultural heritage assets in general and towards the Byzantine heritage assets in İznik and Turkey do not change according to their levels of education (CHValues $F = 1.069$, $p = 0.384$; ByzValues $F = 0.848$, $p = 0.521$; ByzProtection $F = 0.902$, $p = 0.485$; ByzIdentity $F = 1.063$, $p = 0.388$). (See Table 32)

Table 32: İznik – SPSS Output III

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
CHValues	Between Groups	1,493	5	,299	1,069	,384
	Within Groups	20,384	73	,279		
	Total	21,877	78			
ByzValues	Between Groups	1,977	5	,395	,848	,521
	Within Groups	32,650	70	,466		
	Total	34,628	75			
ByzProtection	Between Groups	,756	5	,151	,902	,485
	Within Groups	12,238	73	,168		
	Total	12,994	78			
ByzIdentity	Between Groups	2,798	5	,560	1,063	,388
	Within Groups	37,383	71	,527		
	Total	40,180	76			

6.2. Trabzon

6.2.1. Its Past and Today

Trabzon (Trebizond/Τραπεζούς) is a city located in the northeast of Turkey, on the Black Sea region. It was first founded as a Greek colony in 765 BCE by Greek colonists from Miletus.⁵⁷⁸ The town was ruled by the Persians, Alexander the Great (312-280 BCE), Kingdom of Pontus (280-263 BCE), Roman Empire (63 BCE-395), Byzantine Empire (395-1204), the Empire of Trebizond (1204-1461) and Ottoman Empire (1461-1923), respectively.⁵⁷⁹ Due to its strategic location, Trabzon has always been an important city both as a commercial centre and a military outpost throughout its long history.

In the Byzantine period, Trebizond was one of the major centres of the empire in Anatolia. Its strategic location on the Black Sea coast and its access to inland trade routes, such as the Silk Road, made Trebizond a point of contact between the East and the West and the North, so it thrived as a commercial centre.⁵⁸⁰ Due to this importance, Venetian and Genovese merchants founded colonies in the city.⁵⁸¹ Furthermore, circled by the sea on its north and the Pontic Alps on the south, it was an easily defendable position, so it also served as a military outpost and a stronghold for the empire.⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁸ Antony Eastmond, "Introduction: The Lure of Trebizond", In Antony Eastmond, (ed.), *Byzantium's Other Empire: Trebizond*, (Istanbul: Koç Üniversitesi, Anadolu Medeniyetleri Araştırma Merkezi, 2016), 11 [hereafter cited in text as Eastmond 2016a].

⁵⁷⁹ Ömer İskender Tuluk, "Osmanlı Dönemi Trabzon'unda Mimari Yapı Kültürü", In Ömer İskender Tuluk and Halil İbrahim Düzenli, (eds.), *Trabzon Kent Mirası: Yer-Yapı-Hafıza*, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2010), 33 [hereafter cited in text as Tuluk 2010].

⁵⁸⁰ Eastmond 2016a, 11.

⁵⁸¹ Antony Eastmond, "The Empire of Trebizond", In Antony Eastmond, (ed.), *Byzantium's Other Empire: Trebizond*, (Istanbul: Koç Üniversitesi, Anadolu Medeniyetleri Araştırma Merkezi, 2016), 32 [hereafter cited in text as Eastmond 2016b].

⁵⁸² Antony Eastmond, *Art and Identity in Thirteenth-Century Byzantium: Hagia Sophia and the Empire of Trebizond*, (England : Ashgate/Variorum 2004) [hereafter cited in text as Eastmond 2004].

After the fall of Constantinople to the armies of the Fourth Crusade in 1204, Trebizond became one of the three states that claimed itself as the new centre of the Byzantine Empire.⁵⁸³ The Empire of Trebizond (*Pontus Rum İmparatorluğu* in Turkish) was founded by Alexios I Grand Komnenos (1204-14). His grandson, Manuel I Grand Komnenos (1238-63), adopted the imperial Byzantine title, 'Faithful Emperor and Autocrator of the Romans'.⁵⁸⁴ This imperial title continued to be used by the rulers of Trebizond even after the reconquest of Constantinople by Michael VIII Palaiologos of Nicaea in 1261, which meant the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire in its capital. In 1282, John II Grand Komnenos finally agreed to withdraw his title with the treaty signed with Michael VIII in Constantinople.⁵⁸⁵

The Empire of Trebizond existed as an independent state until 1461, until its conquest by the Ottomans.⁵⁸⁶ Within this period, Trebizond prospered further thanks to its location as a commercial hub and the silver mines in the Pontic Alps. This wealth of the empire and the emperors are especially evident within the buildings they endowed in the city, among which is the church of Hagia Sophia. The Empire of Trebizond was also a place of intellectual life⁵⁸⁷ and an ecclesiastical centre.⁵⁸⁸ Trabzon went under the Ottoman rule in 1461, when its last emperor, David Grand Komnenos, surrendered the city to Sultan Mehmed II.

Trebizond was historically home to many different ethnicities, including Greeks, Georgians, and Armenians, which was also

⁵⁸³ Eastmond 2004, Preface.

⁵⁸⁴ Eastmond 2004, 1.

⁵⁸⁵ Eastmond 2004, 4.

⁵⁸⁶ Although they were independent, they were also considered as a vassal state and was paying annual tribute first to the Georgians, then Selcuks and finally to the Mongols. Eastmond 2004.

⁵⁸⁷ Eastmond 2016b, 54.

⁵⁸⁸ Eastmond 2004, xx.

manifested in its buildings.⁵⁸⁹ The population of Trebizond before its conquest by the Ottomans is thought to be around 4.000-5.000 people, among which the Greeks were the majority and Armenians, Genovese, and Venetians were the minorities.⁵⁹⁰ The Islamification and Turkification of Trebizond did not occur immediately after its passing to the Ottoman rule, as the population twenty-five years after its conquest was still majorly Greek and Christian,⁵⁹¹ a situation which continued until the end of the 15th century.⁵⁹² Between 1523-1583, the city's population changed due to new arrivals, religious conversions to Islam, and forced migrations of Christians out of the city.⁵⁹³ By 1583, most of the city's population consisted of Muslims, yet the city still preserved much of its pre-conquest characteristics.⁵⁹⁴

In the mid-19th century, according to a diplomatic report written in 1855, the population of Trabzon was nearly 50.000 people.⁵⁹⁵ Following the Exchange of Populations in 1923, the majority of the remaining Greek population of Trabzon left the city and migrated to Greece.⁵⁹⁶

Today, Trabzon's population is 811.901. The primary economic activities in Trabzon are agriculture and livestock, and the majority of the population is employed in these sectors.⁵⁹⁷ In addition to its historical assets, with its well-preserved natural habitat, high plateaus, lakes and caves, Trabzon is also a major touristic destination for domestic and foreign visitors.

⁵⁸⁹ Eastmond 2016a, 24.

⁵⁹⁰ Heath W. Lowry, *Trabzon Şehrinin İslamlaşması ve Türkleşmesi 1461-1583*, (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2012), 37-8 [hereafter cited in text as Lowry 2012].

⁵⁹¹ Lowry 2012, 17.

⁵⁹² Lowry 2012, 15.

⁵⁹³ Lowry 2012.

⁵⁹⁴ Lowry 2012, 216.

⁵⁹⁵ Lowry 2012, 38.

⁵⁹⁶ Eastmond 2016a, 24 & Eastmond 2016b, 32.

⁵⁹⁷ Official website of Trabzon Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Sosyo Ekonomik Yapı. Available via <https://www.trabzon.bel.tr/fck-sayfalar.aspx?id=4224> Accessed on 15.12.2021.

6.2.2. Historical Sites and Monuments

In the Roman era, especially during the reign of emperor Hadrian (117-138), an extensive building activity took place in Trebizond, as was the case with the rest of the empire. Under his reign, the city's port, hippodrome, theatre, and aqueducts were rebuilt.⁵⁹⁸ Unfortunately, not many of these monuments exist today.

One of the most significant historical assets of Trabzon is its castle and the city walls, which were used continuously. Trabzon Castle dates back to the 4th century BCE.⁵⁹⁹ The oldest parts of the city walls were in the Citadel (*Yukarihisar*) area built before 257.⁶⁰⁰ The city walls were extended towards the coast and the harbour in the future periods. According to the historical sources, between 1204-1260, city walls in the Citadel (*Yukarihisar*) area were reinforced, and many new buildings, including a palace, were built.⁶⁰¹ The Middle City (*Ortahisar*) was also reinforced in 1378, and the lower city (*Aşağıhisar*) was encircled with walls between 1302-25.⁶⁰²

Other important historical monuments include the Zağnos and Tabakhane Bridges and the aqueducts of İmaret Deresi, Kuzgundere, and Kavaklı. Zağnos Bridge was built during the Roman era, repaired in the later periods, and is still being used today. Tabakhane Bridge dates back to Late-Roman, Early-Byzantine era and took its final form in the 19th century.⁶⁰³ İmaret Deresi aqueduct (6th century) was built during the reign of Justinian and had further restorations in the upcoming centuries. The existing monument is the product of the 13th

⁵⁹⁸ Tuluk 2010, 31.

⁵⁹⁹ Trabzon İl Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğü, *Trabzon*, 2010, 11 [hereafter cited in text as Trabzon 2010].

⁶⁰⁰ Tuluk 2010, 33-34.

⁶⁰¹ Tuluk 2010, 34.

⁶⁰² Tuluk 2010, 34.

⁶⁰³ Trabzon 2010, 59.

century, like the other two aqueducts mentioned.⁶⁰⁴

Among the Ottoman-era monuments of the city, some of the most significant ones are Gülbahar Hatun Mosque (1514), İskender Paşa Mosque (1529), İskender Paşa Hamam, Fatih Hamam (15th century), the bedesten (late 15th century), and some historical inns such as Taş Han (14th century) and Alaca Han (18th century),⁶⁰⁵ Cephanelik (the arsenal, built in 1887). The mansion built by Konstantin Kabayanidis at the beginning of the 19th century, which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk resided during his trips to Trabzon, is today a museum called Atatürk Köşkü and considered an important historical monument of the city by its inhabitants. Another 19th-century mansion, which was the property of Kostaki Teophylaktos, is another late Ottoman-era monument used as the Trabzon City Museum.

6.2.3. Trabzon's Byzantine Monuments

As was mentioned above, the historical city walls of Trabzon were extended and used during the Byzantine era as well. Most of the remaining parts of the walls date to the Byzantine era and the Komnenos rule. During the Empire of Trebizond, a royal palace was also built in the citadel, whose remains are still visible today. Another historical monument built during the Komnenos era is the Zağnos Tower, which is being used as a public library today.

Within the first two centuries of the Ottoman rule in Trabzon, seven Christian places of worship (churches and chapels) were converted into Muslim religious monuments.⁶⁰⁶ These include the main cathedral of

⁶⁰⁴ Trabzon 2010, 59.

⁶⁰⁵ Among which are the, Hacı Yahya Han and Sabır Han. Tuluk 2010, 41.

⁶⁰⁶ The transformation of Christian places of worship to Muslim places of worship in Trabzon is not limited to the first two hundred years after Trabzon's conquest and it continues takes place in the following ages as well. Ömer İskender Tuluk, Halil İbrahim Düzenli and Evrim Düzenli, "Osmanlı'da Fetih Sonrası Dinsel Mekanı Camileştirme Anlayışı: Trabzon Örneği (1461-1665), In Ömer İskender Tuluk and Halil İbrahim Düzenli, (eds.), *Trabzon Kent Mirası: Yer-Yapı-Hafıza*, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2010), [hereafter

the city Panagia Chrysocephalos Church, Saint Eugenios Church, a chapel in the Kemer kaya neighbourhood, Saint Sophia Church, Saint Andrea Church, a church/chapel in the Kinkidar neighbourhood, and Saint Philip Church.⁶⁰⁷

The former cathedral of the Panagia Chrysokephalos is located in the city's centre, in the Ortahisar district. It is thought to be first constructed in the 10th or 11th centuries and was rebuilt by Manuel I Grand Komnenos (1238-63).⁶⁰⁸ This monument is considered to be the location where he was coronated and took the imperial title 'Faithful Emperor and Autocrat of the Romans'.⁶⁰⁹ The church was transformed into a mosque when the Ottomans took control of the city. It is still being used as a mosque named Ortahisar Fatih Camii.

The Church of Saint Eugenios, another historical Byzantine-era church, was also rebuilt in the 13th century.⁶¹⁰ Under the Ottoman rule, it was also transformed into a mosque named Yeni Cuma Camii and continues to be used as such. The Church of Saint Philip was located outside the city walls of Trabzon. It became the city's main cathedral after Saint Eugenios Church's conversion to a mosque. In the 17th century, it was also transformed into a mosque named Kudrettin Camii. The monument is still serving as a mosque.

Vazelon Monastery is located 35 km away from Trabzon city centre. It was a monastery complex built between 270-317. It was repaired in 565, during the reign of the emperor Justinianus and had also seen other renovations in the future eras. It was used actively until 1923 when it was finally deserted. Today it stands idle, covered by plants.

cited in text as Tuluk, Düzenli and Düzenli 2010].

⁶⁰⁷ Tuluk, Düzenli and Düzenli 2010.

⁶⁰⁸ Eastmond 2004, 27.

⁶⁰⁹ Eastmond 2004, 1.

⁶¹⁰ Eastmond 2004, 27-8.

6.2.3.1. Hagia Sophia Church



Figure 42: Trabzon Hagia Sophia (taken from İHA)

Hagia Sophia is located in the western part of Trabzon. Historically, the church was located 2 kilometres away from the fortified city, covered by fields by the Black Sea shore.⁶¹¹ Today, it's situated in a residential area, and modern roads stand between the church and the sea.

Hagia Sophia was built by the emperor Manuel I Grand Komnenos in the 13th century. It was in the centre of a monastic complex fortified with high walls, out of which only the church survives today.⁶¹² The church and its surroundings were also used for burials as the archaeological works on the monument were discovered.⁶¹³ The bell tower located on its west dates to the 15th century, to the last decades of the Empire of Trebizond.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹¹ Antony Eastmond, "Hagia Sophia at Trebizond", In Antony Eastmond, (ed.), *Byzantium's Other Empire: Trebizond*, (Istanbul: Koç Üniversitesi, Anadolu Medeniyetleri Araştırma Merkezi, 2016), 59 [hereafter cited in text as Eastmond 2016c].

⁶¹² Eastmond 2004, 27; Eastmond 2016c, 60.

⁶¹³ Eastmond 2004, 34; Eastmond 2016c, 61.

⁶¹⁴ Ioanna Rapti, "The Tower Frescoes: Art at the End of the Empires", In Antony

Hagia Sophia, according to Eastmond, was built as a “material manifestation of a Byzantine imperial identity in exile”.⁶¹⁵ Its unique paintings are significant examples of the 13th century Byzantine art and also served political aims, i.e. to justify Manuel I as the true and rightful Byzantine Emperor,⁶¹⁶ and to materialize “the promise of a renewed, superior empire.”⁶¹⁷ Hagia Sophia also embodies Armenian, Georgian and Seljuk elements of architecture which makes it a significant monument in terms of art history and architecture.⁶¹⁸

Throughout its history, the monument had various uses, including a church, a mosque, a museum, a storehouse, a stable, and a cholera hospital.⁶¹⁹ According to Eastmond, the factors that helped the church’s survival were its location outside the city centre and its later usage as a mosque.⁶²⁰ After the conquest of Trabzon by the Ottomans, the monument continued its function as a church for a long period.⁶²¹ According to Eyice (1991b), the monument was converted to a mosque in 1583.⁶²² In 1701, the traveller Joseph Pitton de Tournefort noted that the monument was partially used as a mosque and partially in ruins⁶²³. At the beginning of the 19th century, the mosque was abandoned due to a lack of an active community.⁶²⁴ Fallremayer in 1840 found the narthex being used as a stable.⁶²⁵ The wall paintings of the monument were covered with plaster in the 1860s, and the monument had started to be

Eastmond, (ed.), *Byzantium’s Other Empire: Trebizond*, (Istanbul: Koç Üniversitesi, Anadolu Medeniyetleri Araştırma Merkezi, 2016).

⁶¹⁵ Eastmond 2004, Xx and 3.

⁶¹⁶ Eastmond 2004.

⁶¹⁷ Eastmond 2016c, 97.

⁶¹⁸ Aykaç 2021, 18.

⁶¹⁹ Eastmond 2016a, 24

⁶²⁰ Eastmond 2016c, 59.

⁶²¹ Aykaç 2019, 10 and 2021, 18.

⁶²² Eyice 1991, 222, as quoted in Aykaç 2021, 18.

⁶²³ Eastmond 2016c, 59.

⁶²⁴ Eyice 1991, 223 as quoted in Aykaç 2021, 18.

⁶²⁵ Eastmond 2016c, 59.

used as a military storehouse in the 1880s.⁶²⁶ In 1893, when Millet visited the city, the monument was in poor condition.⁶²⁷

Hagia Sophia was also neglected during the early years of the republic and the years of World War II.⁶²⁸ The monument went under conservation works between 1957 and 1962, during which the paintings were uncovered.⁶²⁹ Following these works, it was opened as a museum in 1958.⁶³⁰ Like the Hagia Sophia in Iznik, starting with the 1980s, this monument became a subject of a dispute between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Directorate General of Foundations over its contemporary function.⁶³¹ Finally, following the court decision in favour of the Directorate General of Foundations, Hagia Sophia was opened to the public as a mosque in 2013.⁶³²

⁶²⁶ Eyice 1991, 223 as quoted in Aykaç 2021, 18.

⁶²⁷ Eastmond 2016a, 9.

⁶²⁸ Aykaç 2021, 19-20.

⁶²⁹ David Winfeld, "Sancta Sophia, Trebizond: A Note on the Cleaning and Conservation Work", *Studies in Conservation*, 1963, 118 as quoted in Aykaç 2021, 21.

⁶³⁰ Tuluk, Düzenli & Düzenli 2010, 107-9.

⁶³¹ Aykaç 2019, 11-12 and 2021, 23-28.

⁶³² Aykaç 2019, 12.

6.2.3.2. Saint Anna (Küçük Ayvasıl) Church



Figure 43: Trabzon - Saint Anna Church - Exterior

Saint Anna church is the oldest church standing in Trabzon. It was rebuilt in the 9th century (884/5) during the reign of emperor Basil I.⁶³³ It was also used as a burial place for the court members, as was apparent in the 13th – 14th century imperial portraits decorating the monument's interior.⁶³⁴ The paintings once decorated the interior of the monument are almost entirely lost. There are two Roman-era columns with Ionic column heads in the naos and a marble relief placed on the entrance door. The church was operational until 1923.⁶³⁵

⁶³³ Eastmond 2004, 31.

⁶³⁴ Eastmond 2016b, 52.

⁶³⁵ The Byzantine Legacy, available from: <https://www.thebyzantinelegacy.com/trebizond>



Figure 44: Trabzon - Saint Anna Church - Interior

The monument is located in central Trabzon, in Çarşı (*marketplace*) area, frequented daily by many people. It is surrounded by modern buildings, and there is a small open-space café next to it. The monument is open daily between 08:00-17:00 with free admission. A guard is working in the monument, but no informative boards or materials are placed.

6.2.3.3. Saint John (Kaledibi) Church



Figure 45: Trabzon - Saint John (Kaledibi) Church

The former Saint John Church, also referred to as Kaledibi Church, is located in the Hızırbey neighbourhood. It was built in the 13th century and was repaired in the mid-19th century and the end of the 20th century.⁶³⁶ It stands next to the Kaledibi Primary School and shares its premises. The monument went under works of conservation in 1998.⁶³⁷ Today it is used as a multipurpose hall but closed for visitation at other times.

⁶³⁶ Trabzon Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Saint John Kilisesi. Accessible via <https://www.trabzon.bel.tr/fck-sayfalar.aspx?id=4258>

⁶³⁷ Trabzon İl Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğü, Saint John Kilisesi. Accessible via <https://trabzon.ktb.gov.tr/TR-57682/st-john-kilisesi.html>

6.2.3.4. Sümela (Virgin Mary) Monastery



Figure 46: Trabzon - Sümela (Virgin Mary) Monastery (taken from: kulturportali.gov.tr)

Sümela Monastery is located in the Maçka district of Trabzon, approximately 50 km away from the city centre. It is a monastery complex built on a rocky cliff on Karadağ (Mt.Melas), 300 meters over Altındere Valley.

It was first founded in the 4th century as a church in the name of the Virgin Mary. During the Komnenos era, it expanded into a monastery complex, and it took its final form during the reign of Alexios III.⁶³⁸ The complex consists of the main church built inside a cave, small chapels, a holy spring (*ayazma*), a library, a kitchen, and rooms for students and

⁶³⁸ Trabzon Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Sümela Manastırı. Accessible via <https://www.trabzon.bel.tr/fck-sayfalar.aspx?id=4259>

guests.⁶³⁹ In addition to being an important ecclesiastical centre, it was also a centre for knowledge and culture due to its extensive library.

After the conquest of Trabzon by the Ottomans in 1461, the monument continued to be used with the same purpose until 1923. Throughout the 20th century, it was unused.



Figure 47: Trabzon - Sümela (Virgin Mary) Monastery

The monastery complex is well known for its spectacular location and magnificent paintings decorating its church, including imperial portraits. According to Trabzon Municipality, Sumela Monastery is the most visited monument among the religious monuments in Trabzon.⁶⁴⁰ Since 25/02/2000, the monastery complex has been included in the

⁶³⁹ Trabzon 2010, 18.

⁶⁴⁰ Trabzon Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Sümela Manastırı. Accessible via <https://www.trabzon.bel.tr/fck-sayfalar.aspx?id=4259>

UNESCO Tentative List.

6.2.3.5. *Panagia Theoskepastos (Kızlar) Monastery*



Figure 48: Trabzon - Panagia Theoskepastos (Kızlar) Monastery
(taken from: turizmgunlugu.com)

The Monastery of Panagia Theoskepastos, locally known as Kızlar (Girls) Monastery, is located in the southern slopes of Boztepe.⁶⁴¹

It was built in the 14th century, during the reign of Alexios III (1349-1390). It has been renovated a couple of times in its history and took its final form during the 19th century.⁶⁴² The monastery complex consists of a cave church with a holy spring (ayazma) inside, a chapel, and a couple of rooms. Inside the cave church, there are inscriptions and frescoes, including Alexios III, his wife, and his mother.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴¹ Trabzon 2010, 51.

⁶⁴² Trabzon 2010, 52.

⁶⁴³ Trabzon 2010, 52.




Figure 49: Trabzon - Panagia Theoskepastos (Kızlar) Monastery

The monument was recently opened to the public as a museum after the restoration works were completed. It will be used as a space for cultural events and contemporary exhibitions. A ticket is needed for visitation.

6.2.4. Results of the Public Opinion Survey

6.2.4.1. Demographics

In this survey, out of 123 participants, 69 were male (valid percent=56.1%), and 54 were female (valid percent= 43.9%). The average age of the participants was thirty-six ($\mu=36.3$; $\sigma=12.6$), with the youngest participant being eighteen years old and the oldest sixty-seven years old.

All of the participants were living in Trabzon, ranging from six months to sixty-six years, with an average of twenty-nine years ($\mu=28.8$; $\sigma=15.7$). In terms of education, nearly half of the participants are university graduates (valid percent=44.7%) and higher (Master's Degree/Ph.D. Degree) (valid percent=4.1%). The second highest group

is the high school graduates (valid percent=38.2%), followed by 'ilköğretim' (primary school, 1st to 8th class) (valid percent=5.7%) and 'ilkokul' (primary school, 1st to 5th class) (valid percent=7.3%).

In the sample, most of the participants were working in the private sector (valid percent=%62), and almost half of them were self-employed (valid percent=%29.8). Around twenty per cent (valid percent=%20.7) of them were public employees, eight per cent (valid percent=%8.3) were students, followed by housewives (valid percent=%1.7 and participants who were not working⁶⁴⁴ (valid percent=%7.4).

6.2.4.2. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Cultural Heritage

Following the questions on personal information, the participants were asked what 'cultural heritage' means to them.

According to the majority of the participants (valid percent=64%), 'cultural heritage' is related to the material productions of the past. They associate 'cultural heritage' with 'historical monuments and artefacts', 'architecture', 'museums', and 'archaeology'. The intangible aspects are expressed by fewer people (valid percent= 33,4%), and they include 'traditions and customs', 'oral literature', and 'folk dances'. Only a few participants stated the natural aspects (valid percent=2.6%).

Most of the participants (valid percent=42.7%) consider cultural heritage as an 'inheritance' from the past generations that they are the 'stewards' of. They mostly consider cultural heritage as something related to their self and communal identities, as this heritage was passed to them from 'their ancestors'. Especially in terms of intangible aspects of cultural heritage, one-third of the participants (valid percent=33.8%) believe 'customs and traditions' are 'national' values that they must protect by 'teaching' them to the coming generations. In addition, some of the participants (valid percent=23.5%) stated that the cultural heritage assets are important for us to 'understand' the history

⁶⁴⁴ This includes unemployed people and retired people.

and past civilizations.

Next, the participants were asked their opinion on 'if the cultural heritage has a value' for specific groups. Nearly all the participants stated that cultural heritage is valuable to them (valid percent= 97.5%). It was followed by 'states' (valid percent=85.1%) and 'all humanity' (valid percent=82.2%). The least agreed upon category was 'locals' (valid percent=72.2%). (See Table 33)

Table 33: Trabzon - Cultural Heritage is valuable to ...

Cultural heritage is valuable ...	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
To me	-	-	2.5%	19.3%	78.2%
To the local people	4.3%	3.5%	20%	27%	45.2%
To states	1.8%	5.3%	7.9%	23.7%	61.4%
To tourists	-	1.7%	5.2%	23.5%	69.6%
To the humanity	1.7%	2.5%	13.6%	18.6%	63.6%

According to the majority of the participants, cultural heritage assets have historical value (valid percent=97.5%). It is followed closely by economic/touristic value (valid percent=93.9%), aesthetic value (valid percent=92.1%) and scientific/educational value (valid percent=90.6%). 'Political value' of cultural heritage assets is agreed upon by fewer people, even though more than half of the participants believe cultural heritage assets have 'political value' (valid percent=71.9%). (See Table 34)

Table 34: Trabzon - I think that cultural heritage has ... value.

I think that cultural heritage has value.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	0.9%	1.8%	5.3%	22.8%	69.3%
Historical value	-	-	2.5%	16.1%	81.4%
Scientific – educational value	-	1.7%	7.6%	22%	68.6%
Economic - touristic value	1.7%	-	4.3%	13.9%	80%
Political value	7%	3.5%	17.5%	25.4%	46.5%

The participants were asked to whom cultural heritage assets belong. Among the categories defined, the most appearing reply was ‘citizens/locals’ (valid percent=38.7%) of the place where the heritage assets are located. It was followed by ‘states’ (valid percent=28.5%) and ‘everybody/whole humanity’ (valid percent=20.4%). The less common answers were ‘past generations’ (valid percent=8.2%), ‘next generations’ (valid percent=3.4%) and ‘international organizations’ (valid percent=0.8%).

In terms of the responsibility in protecting cultural heritage assets, the majority of the participants think the main responsibility is on the ‘states’ and its institutions (valid percent=52.4%). It is followed by ‘citizens/locals’ (valid percent=28.6%) and ‘everybody/all of us’ (valid percent=19%).

The majority of the participants stated they are ‘somewhat’ knowledgeable on cultural heritage (valid percent=55%). The ones who considered themselves ‘fairly well’ knowledgeable was twenty-five per cent (valid percent=25%), and those who believe to be ‘extremely well’ knowledgeable were around seven per cent (valid percent=7.5%). On the other hand, around nine per cent of the participants (valid

percent=9.2%) stated they have 'very little' knowledge on cultural heritage, and around three per cent (valid percent=3.3%) of them said they are not knowledgeable 'at all'. On average, the survey participants consider themselves to be 'somewhat' knowledgeable on cultural heritage ($\mu=3.24$, $\sigma=0.85$).

When it comes to visiting cultural heritage sites, monuments, and museums, most of the participants (valid percent=66.9%) stated that they visit them at least once a year. Most of the participants visit heritage sites 'several times a year' (valid percent=38%), followed by 'once a year' (valid percent=25.6%). Nineteen per cent of the participants (valid percent=19%) visit 'less than once a year', and fourteen per cent (valid percent=14%) never visit any cultural sites.

Before moving on to more specific questions on the Byzantine monuments in town, the participants were asked their knowledge of Trabzon's history and its cultural heritage.

Firstly, they were asked to state some of the monuments that they consider the landmarks and symbols of their city. Out of the five most named monuments, Sümelâ Monastery was the most common reply (106 times). Hagia Sophia was the second-highest, and 78 participants out of 123 stated that they consider it one of Trabzon landmarks. The other most stated monuments were Kızlar Monastery ($n=35$), Atatürk Köşkü ($n=29$), and Trabzon Castle and city walls ($n=28$).

Most of the participants (valid percent=45.5%) think the cultural heritage assets in Trabzon are 'fairly' protected. Around the same number of the participants think they are 'well' protected (valid percent=19%) and 'poorly' protected (valid percent=18.2%). Fifteen per cent of them (valid percent=15.7%) think they are 'very poorly' protected, and only two people (valid percent=1.7%) think they are 'very well' protected. On average, the participants think the cultural heritage assets in Trabzon are fairly protected ($\mu=2.73$, $\sigma=1$).

6.2.4.3. Public Interest and Attitude Towards Byzantine Heritage in Trabzon

In the last part of the questionnaire, the participants' interests, knowledge, and attitudes towards the Byzantine heritage in Trabzon were investigated.

Firstly, the participants were asked if they knew of any Byzantine-era monuments that still survive in Trabzon. The most common appearing answers were the Sümela (Virgin Mary) Monastery (valid percent=28.7%) and Hagia Sophia (valid percent=24.2%). Trabzon Castle and city walls (valid percent=9.8%) and Panagia Theoskepastos (Kızlar) Monastery (valid percent=6.8%) were also named by the participants. Some participants stated that "there are some, but they do not know their names".

The overwhelming majority of the participants (valid percent=92.6%) stated that they visited Hagia Sophia at least once in their lives. Sümela (Virgin Mary) Monastery also had a high visitation rate (valid percent=77.1%) among the participants. On the other hand, the visitation numbers for Saint Anna (Küçük Ayvasıl) Church and Saint John (Kaledibi) Church were much lower (valid percent= 29.7% and valid percent=18.1%, respectively). Panagia Theoskepastos (Kızlar) Monastery was known by most of the participants (valid percent=76.6%); however, many participants (valid percent=61.1%) have not visited the place before.

When asked if they would like to learn more about the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon, the majority of the participants (valid percent=82.2%) were positive.

Most of the participants think the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon are 'fairly well' protected (valid percent=44.5%). There is almost an equality between the answers 'well protected' (valid percent=21%) and 'poorly protected' (valid percent=20.2%). On the other hand, more than ten per cent of the participants (valid percent=10.9%) believe the

historical monuments are ‘very poorly’ protected. Overall, the participants think the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon have ‘fair’ physical integrity ($\mu=2.86$, $\sigma=0.985$).

The majority of the participants (valid percent=68.8%) believe that the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon are valuable for the city and its citizens. Almost one-third of them (valid percent=27.5%) believe they are not valuable. Around four per cent of them (valid percent=3.7%) stated that ‘they should be, but they are not’.

The overwhelming majority of the participants think these monuments add ‘economic/touristic value’ (valid percent=90.6%) and ‘historical value’ (valid per cent 89.9%) to their city. ‘Aesthetic value’ added by the Byzantine monuments to Trabzon is agreed by eighty-five per cent (valid percent=85.4%) of the participants, and ‘scientific/educational value’ is agreed by around eighty per cent of the participants (valid percent=81.2%). ‘Political value’ of these monuments is agreed by around sixty per cent of the participants (valid percent=62.9%), even though it is the least agreed category among the stated values. (See Table 35)

Table 35: Trabzon - I think that the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon add ... value to Trabzon.

I think that the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon add value to Trabzon.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Aesthetic value	1.7%	3.4%	9.5%	32.8%	52.6%
Historical value	0.8%	1.7%	7.6%	31.9%	58%
Scientific – educational value	0.9%	2.6%	15.4%	35%	46.2%
Economic - touristic value	1.7%	0.9%	6.8%	27.4%	63.2%
Political value	7.8%	7.8%	21.6%	26.7%	36.2%

The majority of the participants (valid percent=91.8%) agree that the

Byzantine monuments in Trabzon should be protected for future generations. On the other hand, when asked about personal responsibility in protection, even though most of them (valid percent=77.9%) agree that they have personal responsibility, relatively fewer people consider themselves responsible for protecting these assets. (See Table 36)

Table 36: Trabzon - Byzantine monuments in Trabzon I

Byzantine monuments in Trabzon	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	0.8%	1.6%	5.7%	17.2%	74.6%
I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	0.8%	11%	10.2%	25.4%	52.5%

When it comes to archaeological works such as excavations and restorations, many people agree that (valid percent=72.9%) such works should be conducted on the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon. A bit more than half of the participants (valid percent=55.1%) agree on utilizing the idle Byzantine monuments in the city with new functions. (See Table 37)

Table 37: Trabzon - Byzantine monuments in Trabzon II

Byzantine monuments in Trabzon	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Archaeological works (excavation/restoration) should be conducted on these monuments.	5.9%	9.3%	11.9%	26.3%	46.6%
These monuments should be utilized with new functions.	21.2%	13.6%	10.2%	22%	33.1%

The majority of the participants (valid percent=89.8%) consider the Byzantine monuments in Trabzon to be a part of the city's history and culture. Relatively less than that, but still a big percentage of them (valid percent=79.5%) also consider these monuments part of their personal histories and culture. (See Table 38)

Table 38: Trabzon - Byzantine monuments in Trabzon III

Byzantine monuments in Trabzon	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments are part of Trabzon's history and culture.	-	0.8%	9.3%	18.6%	71.2%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	6%	6%	8.5%	23.1%	56.4%

When these last six questions were asked in a more general context, for the Byzantine monuments in Turkey, it is seen that the results were relatively more positive, with a positive change between +0.1% (in "I

have a personal responsibility in protecting these monuments”) to +5% (in “These monuments are part of Turkey’s history and culture”). (See Table 39)

Table 39: Trabzon - Byzantine monuments in Turkey

Byzantine monuments in Turkey	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	-	0.8%	2.5%	13.4%	83.2%
I have a responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	0.8%	7.6%	13.6%	22.9%	55.1%
Archaeological works (excavation/restoration) should be conducted on these monuments.	5.3%	8.8%	11.4%	24.6%	50%
These monuments should be utilized with new functions.	16.5%	18.3%	8.7%	20%	36.5%
These monuments are part of Turkey’s history and culture.	0.9%	0.9%	3.5%	18.3%	76.5%
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%	17.5%	66.7%

6.2.4.4. Statistical Relationships Between Participants’ Demographics and Their Responses

Firstly, to evaluate if there is a relationship between the participants’ gender and their answers to the questionnaire, an Independent T Test

analysis was conducted. The results show that there is not a meaningful statistical difference between the answers given by male and female participants on the questions about the values associated with cultural heritage in general (CHValues: $t = 0.851$, $p = 0.397$), the values of the Byzantine heritage assets in İznik and Turkey (ByzValues: $t = -0.78$, $p = 0.938$), and their approaches to protect the Byzantine heritage in their towns and in Turkey (ByzProtection: $t = 0.436$, $p = 0.664$). On the other hand, the analysis revealed a meaningful statistical difference between the genders and their responses to the question to what extent they consider this heritage to be a part of their personal identities as well as local and national identities. According to the results, female participants in Trabzon associate themselves and their communities with the Byzantine heritage more than the male participants do (ByzIdentity: $t = -2.721$, $p = 0.008$). (See Table 40)

Table 40: Trabzon – SPSS Output I

Independent Samples Test									
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower Upper
CHValues	Equal variances assumed	,028	,867	,851	119	,397	,08259	,09707	-,10961 ,27480
	Equal variances not assumed			,857	112,917	,393	,08259	,09633	-,10824 ,27343
ByzValues	Equal variances assumed	2,370	,126	-,078	119	,938	-,01056	,13510	-,27807 ,25695
	Equal variances not assumed			-,081	119,000	,936	-,01056	,13103	-,27000 ,24889
ByzProtection	Equal variances assumed	,121	,729	,436	121	,664	,05596	,12833	-,19811 ,31003
	Equal variances not assumed			,442	118,493	,660	,05596	,12674	-,19501 ,30692
ByzIdentity	Equal variances assumed	18,906	,000	-2,587	117	,011	-,34605	,13378	-,61100 -,08111
	Equal variances not assumed			-2,721	109,622	,008	-,34605	,12717	-,59809 -,09402

Secondly, to investigate the relationships between the participants' age and their responses, and the years of inhabitanance in Trabzon and their responses, correlation analysis were conducted. (See Table 3) The results revealed that, there are no significant correlations between neither the age (Age-CHValues: $r = 0.063$, $p = 0.493$; Age-ByzValues: $r = -$

0.093, $p=0.310$, Age-ByzProtection: $r=-0.034$, $p=0.709$; Age-ByzIdentity $r=-0.102$, $p=0.272$), nor the years of inhabitation (Inhabitation-CHValues: $r=-0.123$, $p=0.186$; Inhabitation-ByzValues: $r=-0.109$, $p=0.242$; Inhabitation-ByzProtection: $r=0.033$, $p=0.719$; Inhabitation-ByzIdentity $r=-0.130$, $p=0.165$), and the participants' answers to the questions on cultural heritage in general and the Byzantine heritage. (See Table 41)

The results show significant correlations between the values given to cultural heritage assets in general and the values given to Byzantine monuments in Trabzon (CHValues-ByzValues: $r=0.486$, $p=0.000$), the feelings of personal responsibility in protecting Byzantine heritage (CHValues-ByzProtection: $r=0.403$, $p=0.00$) and the participants' personal, local and national associations with the Byzantine heritage in Trabzon and Turkey (ByzValues-ByzIdentity: $r=0.300$, $p=0.001$). Likewise, significant correlations exist between values given to Byzantine monuments and the feelings of personal responsibility in protecting Byzantine heritage (ByzValues-ByzProtection: $r=0.516$, $p=0.000$), as well as the participants' personal, local and national associations with the Byzantine heritage in İznik and Turkey (ByzValues-ByzIdentity: $r=0.427$, $p=0.000$). (See Table 41)

Table 41: Trabzon – SPSS Output II

		Correlations					
		Age	For how many years?	CHValues	ByzValues	ByzProtection	ByzIdentity
Age	Pearson Correlation	1	,608**	,063	-,093	,034	-,102
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,493	,310	,709	,272
	N	123	119	121	121	123	119
For how many years?	Pearson Correlation	,608**	1	-,123	-,109	,033	-,130
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,186	,242	,719	,165
	N	119	119	117	117	119	115
CHValues	Pearson Correlation	,063	-,123	1	,486**	,403**	,300**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,493	,186		,000	,000	,001
	N	121	117	121	120	121	117
ByzValues	Pearson Correlation	-,093	-,109	,486**	1	,516**	,427**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,310	,242	,000		,000	,000
	N	121	117	120	121	121	117
ByzProtection	Pearson Correlation	,034	,033	,403**	,516**	1	,365**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,709	,719	,000	,000		,000
	N	123	119	121	121	123	119
ByzIdentity	Pearson Correlation	-,102	-,130	,300**	,427**	,365**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,272	,165	,001	,000	,000	
	N	119	115	117	117	119	119

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Lastly, One-Way ANOVA analysis was used for investigating if there is a meaningful difference between the participant responses to the questionnaire depending on their levels of education.(See Table 4). The analysis revealed that the participants' appreciation of and attitudes towards cultural heritage assets in general and towards the Byzantine heritage assets in Trabzon and Turkey do not change according to their levels of education (CHValues $F = 0.872$, $p = 0.483$; ByzValues $F = 0.075$, $p = 0.99$; ByzProtection $F = 1.206$, $p = 0.312$; ByzIdentity $F = 1.225$, $p = 0.304$). (See Table 42)

Table 42: Trabzon – SPSS Output III

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
CHValues	Between Groups	,977	4	,244	,872	,483
	Within Groups	32,474	116	,280		
	Total	33,451	120			
ByzValues	Between Groups	,167	4	,042	,075	,990
	Within Groups	64,529	116	,556		
	Total	64,696	120			
ByzProtection	Between Groups	2,374	4	,594	1,206	,312
	Within Groups	58,089	118	,492		
	Total	60,463	122			
ByzIdentity	Between Groups	2,682	4	,670	1,225	,304
	Within Groups	62,391	114	,547		
	Total	65,072	118			

6.3. Discussion of the Findings

First, in terms of participant demographics, the two case studies bear a resemblance to each other and are therefore considered comparable. The participants have similar attributes in age, gender, average years of inhabitation, level of education, and employment status.

Participants in both towns think of cultural heritage as consisting primarily of tangible elements. The importance given to the materiality of heritage by local communities reflects the values attached to culture by the Authorized Heritage Discourse. Intangible cultural heritage was mentioned by the minority of the participants in both case studies, even though both İznik and Trabzon have internationally acknowledged intangible cultural heritage assets. İznik, in addition to being an important religious centre during the Byzantine era, was also the place of exceptional ceramic tile craftsmanship during the Ottoman era, two characteristics that assisted the town's inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List and Trabzon, on the other hand, which protected its importance as a Christian Orthodox religious centre in the Ottoman-era with its expanding monasteries, has also been inhabited

by various ethnic and religious populations throughout its long history. The long existence of a mixed and complex population facilitated the appearance of a diverse and rich cultural production, especially in terms of languages, oral traditions, music, and dance. Yet, these folkloric elements were rarely referred to by the participants in the survey. On the last point, natural inheritance of the areas which have been intertwined with the cultural traditions – such as the fairs and gatherings in high plateaus of Trabzon or the İznik Lake, which has always been connected to the town and its inhabitants – was almost never mentioned by the participants. In conclusion, it is seen that the participants in İznik and Trabzon still consider cultural heritage in line with the historical views of the AHD, and their opinions have not yet shifted accordingly with the contemporary changes in the international heritage discourse.

For the participants in İznik and Trabzon, cultural heritage is strongly related to identity, whether national, local/topical or personal. Its relation with the ‘national’ identity is apparent mainly in the answers which define cultural heritage as ‘*our national characteristics*’, ‘the total of values which constitutes *us*’ (as a group / as a nation), and ‘what *our ancestors* have left for us’.⁶⁴⁵ Local/topical identity is apparent in the participants’ answers in which the cultural heritage is defined as ‘İznik’, ‘Trabzon’, ‘our town’s historical buildings’.⁶⁴⁶ Personal identification is evident in all the aforementioned replies in which the participants defined heritage related to ‘them’ or ‘their ancestors’. Furthermore, connected to all these are the ideas of inheritance and stewardship. Participants in both case studies highlighted that cultural heritage assets are what was left to them by the previous generations (stated in more neutral terms) or their ancestors (showing their personal attachment to those people) that they have to protect and pass on to future generations (regardless of their personal relationship to

⁶⁴⁵ Emphasis added by the author.

⁶⁴⁶ Emphasis added by the author.

them) or their children (personal attachment). Considering cultural heritage as an 'inheritance' and the feelings that they are their 'stewards', again, respond to heritage discourse named as the AHD.

Regarding the value of cultural heritage assets to specific groups, which include 'me', 'locals', 'states', 'tourists' and 'humanity', the highest categories in both case studies were 'me' and 'tourists'. Likewise, in both case studies, the least agreed-upon group was 'locals'. Assessed together with participants' answers to other questions and their personal feedback while conducting the surveys, it was seen that the participants think the local inhabitants in İznik and Trabzon do not consider cultural heritage assets valuable they do not protect them as they should have. On the other hand, compared to them, 'tourists' show much higher appreciation to these assets as 'they come from another side of the world just to see them' and 'they protect even a single piece of rock in their countries with the greatest care'. In addition to that, according to the participants, the second-highest value of cultural heritage is its 'economic/touristic' value, which demonstrates that the locals strongly associate cultural heritage and tourism. They consider cultural heritage assets to be market products and a commodity.

There is a recognizable disparity between the results of the two case studies regarding the ownership of the cultural heritage assets. According to most of the participants in Trabzon, cultural heritage assets belong to the people (valid percent=38.7%) and the state (valid percent=28.5%) where they are located. On the other hand, according to the majority of the participants (valid percent=55.2%) in İznik, cultural heritage assets belong to 'everybody/all of us', regardless of their citizenship or where they live. These results suggest that the participants in İznik are much more inclined to the universality of cultural heritage.

In terms of protecting the cultural heritage assets in general, both the participants in İznik and Trabzon believe the primary responsibility is on the state and state institutions (valid percent=45% and valid

percent=52.4%, respectively). The role of citizens/locals is also acknowledged by almost one-third of the sample in both case studies. However, comparing these results with those of the 'ownership', it is seen that the responsibility of states and state institutions is much higher than the ownership. This shows that, even though the participants mainly consider the 'citizens/locals' and 'everybody/all of us' as the owners of cultural heritage, when it comes to protection, they do not think these categories are the main responsible ones. Therefore, according to these results, it is suggested that the personal responsibility of protecting cultural heritage assets is not yet widely recognized by the participants of these surveys.

Participants in both case studies consider themselves slightly more informed than average on cultural heritage. On the other hand, the surveys showed that they were less knowledgeable about the Byzantine monuments in their town. In Iznik, around twenty per cent of the participants stated that they did not know at all about Böcek Ayazma, whereas some participants did know the location but not the name of the monument. For the Koimesis Church, fewer participants knew its name and location, even though it is in very close proximity to Böcek Ayazma. Likewise, in Trabzon, it was realized that the majority of the participants did not know the names of Saint Anna (Küçük Ayvasıl) Church and Saint John (Kaledibi) Church. Even when they were told about their exact location, they were still unable to recall, which shows that they did not know about these monuments. In line with the level of knowledge, these monuments were visited by a lesser percentage of the participants compared to the ones known by many (such as Hagia Sophia in Iznik and Trabzon, and Sümela Monastery in Trabzon).

The lower visitation percentages for the Byzantine monuments in the selected case studies can also be explained by their uses. In Iznik, Böcek Ayazma is closed for visitation whereas the remains of the Koimesis Church, even though visible from the street level, are in a very poor condition and in a ruinous state. In Trabzon, Saint Anna (Küçük

Ayvasıl) Church is open to visitation, but from its interior decorations, almost nothing survives. Sain John (Kaledibi) Church is located within the primary school's facilities and is used only when an event takes place. Considering that the location is in a residential area – even though central location – it is not seen by a passerby, but one must have prior knowledge of its location to visit it. Yet, all these monuments are located on the official websites of municipalities and local branches of ministries; therefore, an interested inhabitant living there could easily get informed about them.

On the other hand, the Byzantine monuments which are open to the public, except Saint Anna (Küçük Ayvasıl) Church, are the ones which have the highest percentage of visitation. These monuments are Hagia Sophia in İznik and Trabzon – both are being used as a mosque now –, Sümela Monastery and Panagia Theoskepastos (Kızlar) Monastery. The reasons for visiting these monuments were majorly attending religious rituals (for Hagia Sophias), personal interest, accompanying friends and family, or visiting nearby places (such as the café/restaurant located next to Hagia Sophia in Trabzon).

The same questions about cultural heritage values were asked to understand the locals' perceptions of the Byzantine monuments in these towns. They then were compared to the values attached to cultural heritage in general. In İznik, among the five value categories defined (aesthetic, historical, scientific/educational, economic/touristic, political), it is seen that there was only a minimal negative change in the categories 'aesthetic value' ($\Delta = -0.2\%$), 'historical value' ($\Delta = -1.5\%$) and scientific/educational value' ($\Delta = -1.7\%$). On the other hand, there were significant changes in the categories 'economic/touristic value' ($\Delta = -9.8\%$) and 'political value' ($\Delta = +6.6\%$). The In-depth conversations with the participants revealed that these changes are strictly related to the conversion of İznik Hagia Sophia from a museum to a mosque. The participants stated that when it was a museum, the monument was visited by many foreign tourists as each day, a couple of tour busses used to come to İznik. However, after its conversion to a mosque, the

situation changed completely, as there were no foreign visitors or touristic tours to İznik anymore. According to the participants, who worked in businesses related to tourism such as souvenir shops and ceramic/tiles artisans, both the city and themselves were also negatively affected economically. The change in the 'political value' was also affected by the conversion of Hagia Sophia. Even though fewer participants in İznik agreed that cultural heritage assets constitute 'political value', the government's decision to convert the monument to a mosque was a symbolic and political act, therefore, affected the participants' response to this question. Many of them stated that 'cultural heritage assets should not have a political value, but as was seen by Hagia Sophia, they are used for political agendas and, therefore, constitute political values.'

In Trabzon, it is seen that, compared to İznik, there is a bigger decrease between the values attached to the Byzantine monuments in their town and cultural heritage assets in general. The smallest decrease is in the 'economic/touristic value' ($\Delta = -3.3\%$), followed by 'aesthetic value' ($\Delta = -6.7\%$) and 'historical value' ($\Delta = -7.6\%$). The two highest decreases were in 'political value' ($\Delta = -9\%$) and 'scientific/educational value' ($\Delta = -9.4\%$). The results show that, as opposed to İznik, the conversion of Hagia Sophia Trabzon to a mosque in 2013 did not affect much the opinions of the participants in Trabzon in terms of Byzantine monuments' 'political values'. It is thought to be related to the fact that since the year 2010, Orthodox Christians have been allowed to hold religious ceremonies once a year in Sümela Monastery. Therefore, the religious usages of Hagia Sophia and Sümela Monastery are thought to equalize the political symbolism. The relatively slighter decrease in 'economic/touristic value' can also be explained by the further restorations that took place in Hagia Sophia after its conversion to a mosque. The frescoes and mosaics that were completely covered up using curtains and wooden structures were removed during the last restoration works, which allowed the monument to be used as a museum outside the prayer times. The decrease in the visitation

numbers, especially foreign tourists, stated by all the shop owners around Hagia Sophia, were probably recovered after these works. Furthermore, it is also observed that in recent years, Trabzon has been receiving foreign visitors, who are mostly from Middle Eastern and Gulf countries and are mostly Muslim, as opposed to İznik. Therefore, it is believed that the conversion of the monument to a mosque did not have a huge impact on tourism.

In terms of protecting the Byzantine monuments in İznik and Trabzon, the majority of the participants in both case studies agree that they should be protected for future generations. On the other hand, when it comes to personal responsibility in protecting these monuments, there is a discrepancy between the results in İznik and Trabzon. Almost all the participants in İznik agree that they have a personal responsibility to protect the Byzantine monuments in İznik. On the other hand, in Trabzon, even though the overwhelming majority of the participants (valid percentage=91.8%) agree that these monuments should be protected, fewer people (valid percentage=77.9%) agree that they have a personal responsibility in their protection. Compared with the results of the other questions in the survey, it is seen that this difference does not stem from the fact that these are Byzantine monuments. The participants in Trabzon mainly consider the state and state institutions as the primary responsible party in protecting cultural heritage assets.

In conducting archaeological works, such as restorations and excavations, on the Byzantine monuments in their town, it is seen that İznik participants conditionally agreed, whereas the participants in Trabzon were less approving. In İznik, the participants stated that these works should occur only if absolutely necessary. Participants in İznik and Trabzon stated that these works should respect the monuments' original characteristics and protect their authenticity, referring to the 'restoration disasters' that have occasionally kept happening in Turkey in the past decades.

Similarly, there were significant decreases in the percentage of the participants who agreed to utilize the Byzantine monuments in Turkey.

Many participants stated that these monuments should only be used as museums and cultural centres and should not be transformed into functions that contrast their original uses, i.e., transforming churches into mosques. Considering the question of archaeological works on Byzantine monuments, the results show that the government's cultural politics and practices, especially in the last decade, are not agreed upon by many inhabitants of these towns.

The last two questions in the questionnaire were about the perception of Byzantine monuments as a part of the participants' personal histories and identities and those of their towns'. It is seen that the Byzantine pasts of both İznik and Trabzon are well recognized by the majority of the participants in these surveys. On the other hand, even still a majority, fewer people consider these monuments as parts of their personal identities. The in-depth questions revealed that even though the participants refer to these monuments as 'not of their own cultures', they do have a sense of belonging, as they are located in 'their towns and countries' therefore 'theirs'. Thus, the feelings of belongingness of the Byzantine monuments in their towns are not based on personal attachments related to their self-identities but on their attachments to the land and country they live in.

6.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the public opinion surveys conducted in İznik and Trabzon reveal meaningful insights into the inhabitants' relationship with cultural heritage in general and the Byzantine heritage in their towns.

In terms of cultural heritage in general, the participants in both towns agree that cultural heritage has historical, aesthetic, scientific/educational, economic/touristic. It is seen that participants consider cultural heritage assets as a commodity and expect touristic/economic outcomes from them. However, the overall knowledge of cultural heritage is not very high in both towns, which is

especially evident in the Byzantine monuments in their towns, as many of them did not know the existence of some monuments.

The participants do not hold negative views towards the Byzantine heritage. They consider Byzantine heritage as an important part of their town's history and culture, and many participants also feel a personal attachment to these monuments. They consider these monuments valuable for their towns and themselves and believe they should be protected for future generations. They are in favor of the utilization of idle Byzantine monuments as museums or cultural monuments but not with contradictory functions to their original uses. On the other hand, multiple functions (such as a mosque and a museum) are also seen to be acceptable for the public, as long as these transformations do not harm monuments' physical characteristics and their touristic value. It is believed that using these monuments for new purposes would strengthen their physical integrity and increase their importance for the local inhabitants.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This research was mainly triggered by the researcher's professional observations and personal experiences, which were shaped predominantly in Turkey and Greece during the one-and-a-half years he lived in Elefsina and Athens for a master's programme in cultural management. The researcher's previous working experiences in investigating locals' and visitors' perceptions of heritage, mainly focusing on archaeology and archaeological sites, had a major impact on the development of this study.⁶⁴⁷ In addition, experiencing the negative impacts of political uses of heritage in his daily life, as well as the exclusivist nature of nationalisms towards 'the Other' – cultures, peoples, heritages – which unfortunately still exist in both countries, the researcher has developed an academic interest in investigating the relationship between the public and 'the Other's' heritage.

The research aimed to understand public perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage in Greece and Turkey. The term public in this study refers to the state administration and the people. The state's perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage were examined by analysing historical and contemporary heritage legislations and management policies. The people's perceptions were investigated through selecting two case studies from both countries and conducting public opinion surveys in these towns.

The two main research questions of the study were:

- What is the public (the state and the people) perception towards the Ottoman heritage in Greece?
- What is the public (the state and the people) perception

⁶⁴⁷ At this point, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Işıl Gürsu and Dr. Lutgarde Vandepuit of the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA) for including me in the Aspendos Cultural Heritage Management Project, and their continuous professional and personal support since then.

towards the Byzantine heritage in Turkey?

The secondary research questions were formulated separately for the *states' perceptions* and the *people's perceptions*, and they are stated below.

States' perceptions:

- What constituted 'the national' heritage and 'the Other's' heritage in the contexts of Greek and Turkish nation-states?
- To what extent do existing cultural heritage legislation include Byzantine / Ottoman heritage?
- To what extent is the Byzantine / Ottoman heritage involved in the states' cultural policies?
- How do the states' perceptions affect the preservation of 'the Other's' heritage?

Peoples' perceptions:

- How do the locals interact with the Byzantine / Ottoman heritage in their towns in their daily lives?
- What kind of values are attached to the Byzantine / Ottoman monuments in their towns by the locals?
- To what extent do the locals perceive the Byzantine / Ottoman heritage in their town as parts of their history and personal identity?
- How do the locals' perceptions affect the preservation of 'the Other's' heritage?

The following section presents the main findings of the research by referring to these questions. The possible contribution of the research is argued in section 7.2. It is followed by presenting the main limitations of the research. Future research directions are proposed in section 7.4, and the thesis is finalized with the author's concluding remarks.

7.1. Findings of the Research

This section presents an overview of the findings of this study and provides answers to the research questions. The subsections of this part are organized to offer the results comparatively, by presenting the analysis of the findings on different levels. In the first subsection, the public opinion surveys conducted in Greece and Turkey are discussed. The second part presents the findings on the states' perceptions. The final section combines the findings between the people's and states' perceptions and discusses their relations.

7.1.1. Peoples' Perceptions of 'the Other's' Heritage

7.1.1.1. *Trikala and Serres*

- The Ottoman monuments in Trikala and Serres are located in central locations that enable people to see them daily. However, the research shows that meaningful interactions and positive connections with these monuments are only established when the people visit them. The Ottoman monuments open to the public in Trikala and Serres are used as museums and cultural centres. These uses ensure the monuments' protection, and furthermore, they provide continuous visitation of the locals, i.e., for various events and exhibitions.
- The overwhelming majority of the participants think that the Ottoman monuments in their towns add value both to their towns and their fellow citizens. The highest value attributed to these monuments is 'historical value'. In Trikala, 'economic/touristic value' is considered as the second-highest value, whereas in Serres, the second-highest value is the 'scientific/educational value'. These results are believed to stem from the different uses of the Ottoman monuments as well as the towns' different characteristics. Trikala is thought to have a

higher tourist appeal due to its proximity with Meteora, whereas in Serres, one of the Ottoman monuments, Bedesten, is being used as the city's archaeological museum and therefore receiving many educational visits.

- In both case studies, the participants consider the Ottoman monuments as a part of their city's history and culture. However, fewer people identify themselves personally with these monuments, suggesting that fewer people have personal memories related to them.
- The participants in Trikala and Serres strongly agree with protecting the Ottoman monuments in their towns for future generations. On the other hand, compared with the answers to personal responsibility in protecting cultural heritage assets, fewer people consider themselves personally responsible for protecting the Ottoman monuments in their town. This disparity is explained by the lower level of personal identification with these monuments compared to the monuments from other eras, i.e., Byzantine and Classical periods. Another point worth mentioning is that the participants in Serres are in favor of utilizing the idle Ottoman monuments in their towns, as it would help to protect them and provide public access.

7.1.1.2. *İznik and Trabzon*

- In both cases, the participants' interactions with the Byzantine monuments take place and increase when these monuments have continuous usage, such as city walls and gates, bridges, aqueducts, or they are utilized with new functions. These functions include serving as museums and cultural centres, but also as mosques, which is the case with Hagia Sophia churches in İznik and Trabzon. Through these contemporary uses, some of which were ongoing for centuries, these monuments are

integrated into the daily lives of their present inhabitants, which helps maintain their physical integrities and, more importantly, contributes to their acceptance by the public.

- The majority of the participants in İznik and Trabzon agree that these monuments add value to their towns and people. One of the most common values attached to cultural heritage, and the Byzantine heritage, by the participants, in addition to their 'aesthetic values' and 'historical values', is their 'economic/touristic value'. In fact, most of the participants' opinions surrounding the contemporary heritage issues, such as the conversion of Hagia Sophia churches/museums to mosques or inadequate archaeological works, are shaped by their impacts on tourism and related economic benefits. This was especially evident in surveys conducted in İznik, where tourism is a major component of social and economic life.
- The majority of the participants consider Byzantine heritage in their towns as a part of their town's history and culture. On the other hand, fewer people consider these heritages to be a part of their personal histories and identities. Personal identifications with the Byzantine monuments mostly occur due to the participants' memories from their childhood or youth, or when their contemporary lives are related to these monuments, for example, in the case of souvenir shop owners.
- The participants in these towns strongly believe that the Byzantine monuments in their towns should be protected for future generations. According to them, archaeological works, such as excavation or restoration, should only take place unless they are absolutely necessary, or in the case that the idle Byzantine monuments are to be utilized. According to participants, in the case of utilization, the new functions should be 'respectable' to the monuments' original functions and do not physically harm the monuments. On the other hand, to protect the Byzantine monuments in their towns, the

participants think that the state and official institutions are the primary responsible parties. The responsibility of local people, including themselves and visitors, is considered secondary.

This perception is not unique to Byzantine heritage assets, but it also applies to Ottoman and Seljuk heritage.

7.1.2. State's Perceptions of 'the Other's' Heritage

7.1.2.1. Greece and its Ottoman Heritage

- The national identity constructed in the foundation of the independent Greek state considered the classical past of the Greek civilization as the nation's glorious past and its ancestors. Accordingly, the material remains of this era were cherished, and their protection and promotion were regarded above the remains of other civilizations', including the Ottoman heritage but also the Byzantine heritage. This perception, undeniably, had negative impacts on the material remains of the other eras, ranging from deliberate destruction to natural disintegration due to neglect and disuse.
- Cultural heritage legislation in Greece developed in line with the national history discourse in the 19th century, and thus it has granted higher levels of protection for the moveable and immovable remains of classical Greece. Even though the legislation called for the protection of medieval and post-medieval relics, including the Ottoman heritage in Greece, they were mostly overlooked in practical terms.
- Greece's current heritage legislation is undoubtedly more inclusive than its predecessors, as it considers the remains of all civilizations in its lands as the nation's heritage. On the other hand, it still embodies the national narrative of the late 19th – early 20th century and privileges the heritage of the Greek ancient past. In most ways, the Ottoman heritage in Greece

enjoys the levels of protection it previously had not, which demonstrates the Greek state's policy of acceptance. However, the Ottoman heritage is still inferior compared to the remains of the ancient Greek and Byzantine pasts in terms of the protection provided to them with the legislation. This situation affects the preservation of the immovable Ottoman monuments in Greece due to their status in terms of classification, ownership, management, public access, and function.

- The deliberate and politically motivated destructions of Ottoman monuments in Greece predominantly took place during the Greek War of Independence. Due to their symbolic nature, religious architectural monuments were mostly the main target of these actions. On the other hand, both during the Independence and after the foundation of the Greek state, we encounter many examples of re-use of the former Ottoman monuments, secular as well as religious, to serve contemporary needs. Therefore, on the state's perception, the research has not discovered acts of deliberate destructions of Ottoman monuments due to political or religious aims in the 19th and 20th centuries. Most of the destructions and demolitions of the Ottoman monuments were due to urban renewal projects, which also resulted in the demolition of Byzantine and post-Byzantine churches and disuse.
- In terms of the Greek state's contemporary cultural policies, the research shows that, especially in the last two decades, the Ottoman heritage in Greece is gaining increased recognition and appreciation. This is evident in the extensive number of restorations works on these monuments, their utilizations with new purposes, as well as an increasing number of academic research and publication. Undoubtedly, these developments positively affect the monuments' protection and their appreciation by the wider public, from the local inhabitants to the international public.

7.1.2.2. Turkey and its Byzantine Heritage

- The newly independent Turkish state aiming to become a modern nation-state in the Western sense, attempted to distance itself and the Turkish nation from their Ottoman past and the Islamic identity. The new Turkish history narrative, the so-called 'Turkish History Thesis', intended to establish a historical continuity of the Turkish people in Anatolia, which would go back to pre-historic eras. Consequently, the early republican era emphasized the past and heritage of the bronze age kingdoms, the Hittites, and the Sumerians. As a result, even though there was no official policy of denial, the Byzantine heritage in Turkey has not received much state attention during the early republican era.
- The Turkish heritage legislation had its roots in the late 19th century Ottoman state, which was developed with the influence of the West. Accordingly, it employed the Western heritage discourse, which predominantly valued the remains of the classical pasts. Therefore, during the late Ottoman empire, the heritage legislation included the ancient Greek, Roman, and Byzantine remains. The independent Turkish state, which preserved continuity with the Ottoman state in many senses, continued to use the same heritage legislation with minor changes. In addition, the Turkish state considered cultural heritage to demonstrate its modernity; hence, it embraced the cultural remains of all civilizations. For these reasons, the Byzantine heritage was not excluded or regarded inferior to others in the cultural heritage laws of the independent Turkish state.
- The current heritage legislation in Turkey is inclusive and does not separate between the remains of different civilizations. On the other hand, accompanied by the structural problems related to cultural heritage management in Turkey, certain

elements of the legislation create problems that affect the Byzantine heritage. The decentralization of heritage management and preservation, when combined with the inadequate state control, results in physical interventions that affect monuments' characteristics. The private ownership of immovable monuments and the possibility of leasing them to third parties are also two legislative issues that threaten the preservation, management, and public access of the Byzantine monuments in Turkey.

- It is seen that during the Seljuk and Ottoman periods, there were no deliberate destructions of Byzantine heritage, but their survival was affected by their use and disuse. On the other hand, even though it is not very well recorded and mentioned in the literature, destructions of Byzantine monuments, especially of religious architecture, had taken place during the Turkish War of Independence. The early republican era, due to its ideological and political narrative, was open to and welcoming the Byzantine heritage, which positively affected their preservation but also their uses and public access. The biggest threat to the Byzantine monuments in Turkey is the rapid and unplanned urbanization, industrialization, and development projects, which started in the 1950s and still continue today. However, it is important to point out that these factors do not target Byzantine heritage specifically, but affect all cultural heritage equally.
- In terms of the Turkish state's contemporary policies towards the Byzantine heritage, it is observed that, especially in the last two decades, the discussions were centred around the contemporary uses of religious Byzantine monuments. These monuments included the Byzantine churches, which were transformed into mosques during the Ottoman era and became museums in the republican era, as well as the Byzantine churches that were transformed into mosques and fell into

disuse with time. The conversions of these monuments to mosques by the government were due to political and ideological reasons. Consequently, these actions had negative impacts on the appreciation of Byzantine heritage by the public due to the limitations on public access. In some of the cases, the physical interventions made during these transformations also damaged the characteristics of the monuments.

7.1.3. Public Perceptions of ‘the Other’s’ Heritage

The identification of a nation with a specific past leads to the appreciation of a shared ‘national heritage’ and the marginalization of those which do not fit within this national narrative as ‘the Other’. The research shows that people and states’ approaches towards ‘the Other’s’ heritage – and also cultural heritage in general – are very much related to each other, and the state mostly governs this relationship. According to the changing cultural policies of the states’, the people’s perceptions of ‘the Other’s’ heritage are altered.

In the case of Greece, it was observed that the inclusion of the Ottoman heritage in the Greek heritage management practices has positively influenced the people’s perceptions of this heritage. The increasing number of restorations works conducted on Ottoman monuments positively impact their preservation and increase their visibility. Furthermore, their utilization with contemporary functions provides new and more insightful ways of interaction between people and Ottoman monuments. The concepts of multiculturalism, inclusiveness and a universal ‘world heritage’ seem to be gaining recognition within the Greek political and heritage sphere, shaping people’s perceptions of heritage.

In the case of Turkey, the state’s decades-long tourism-oriented heritage perception has also reflected on the people’s perceptions of heritage. Like heritage of different civilizations, Byzantine heritage in Turkey is also evaluated by the public according to its touristic value

and economic potential. Its 'otherness' is still reflected in Turkish people's opinions. Still, the general policy of acceptance and the potential benefits of them make Byzantine monuments in Turkey 'worthy of protecting' for the people. On the other hand, since the 1950s, nationalisms in Turkey have continuously expressed themselves through cultural heritage and, more specifically, by targeting the Byzantine heritage. Establishing a robust political ground and power within the last two decades, this discourse led to tangible outcomes which negatively affect the preservation, uses and public access of Byzantine monuments in Turkey. It is seen that the modern-day nationalisms, as were their 19th century ancestors, consider cultural heritage as a field for pursuing political interests. This situation, unfortunately, prevents the wider acceptance and enjoyment of heritage.

7.2. Contributions of the Research

This thesis has tried to discover the ways states and local communities perceive the material remains of 'the Other', by taking the Ottoman heritage in Greece and the Byzantine heritage in Turkey as its case studies. The research critically examined the heritage legislation and heritage management practices within these countries. In addition, it introduced original data collected with public opinion surveys. The main contributions of this research can be outlined as follows.

- There is a substantial research on 'heritage and identity' in Greece and Turkey, however, the perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage remains relatively understudied. On that point, the study contributes to the literature by providing concrete examples of how different publics (the state and the people) in Greece and Turkey perceive 'the Other's' heritage, namely the Ottoman heritage in Greece and the Byzantine heritage in Turkey.
- The research provides new empirical data gathered through

public opinion surveys conducted in four different case studies. Through the analysis of the statistical data, open-ended questions and on-site observations, the study provides original results and important insights on public perceptions of cultural heritage and more specifically locals' perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage in the selected case studies.

- It provides to be exemplary research in the field heritage studies, which employs a mixed research methodology. The research methodology and tools used in this study are considered to be useful in analysing public perceptions towards heritage. Using public opinion surveys in the forms of questionnaires is believed to be a convenient method for a study which focuses on multiple-case studies. Furthermore, the research showed that, on the contrary to using only qualitative or quantitative data, using questions that provide both type of data is more convenient, as it allows the researcher to better interpret the statistical data and thus to provides a deeper understanding of the context.
- It contributes to our understandings of nations and national identity, and their relationships with cultural heritage. The dichotomies which exist in the very nature of nationalisms, such as 'us' and 'them', 'ours' and 'theirs', create unavoidable presumptions. These include considering each single individual of a nation as a perfect representative of the nation or the nation state, as well as automatically labelling certain heritages as 'dissonant' considering that they don't fit in with the national narrative. This study shows that, on the contrary to what is generally believed to be, many people living in the selected case studies consider the so-called 'Other's' heritage as a part of their own identities and personal histories. These identifications are most of the time results of developing meaningful relationships with these monuments, may they be related with memories, for example, from the participants'

childhood spent around these remains, or due to contemporary interactions with these monuments, which includes visiting exhibitions or attending to social events housed in these monuments.

- It is believed to have practical policy implications and thus contribute to the protection and management of ‘the Other’s’ monuments. People’s positive approaches towards ‘the Other’s’ monuments mentioned in the previous paragraph constitute a significant potential for protecting these monuments. Physical integrities of historical monuments are best preserved with their continuous use. This research shows that the local peoples in selected case studies are already in favour of protecting and, where applicable, utilizing ‘the Other’s’ monuments, which provides an opportunity for the states to achieve these, without having any concerns about potential public objections.

7.3. Limitations of the Study

The study's main limitations derive from its methodological approach, which had certain negative impacts on the validity and generalizability of the results. These include questionnaires, quantitative data gathering, convenience sampling strategy, and the possibility of response biases in ethnographic research methodologies. Other limitations include the comparability of case studies and the researcher’s inadequate language skills in Modern Greek.

As was explained in Chapter 1.3.2., the selected method of data collection in evaluating the people’s perceptions was conducting public opinion surveys in the form of questionnaires. In investigating people’s thoughts and feelings, qualitative data collection methods, such as interviews, are considered more applicable. Using questionnaires as a methodology is argued to be problematic in terms of “ensuring the

validity of the data".⁶⁴⁸ In order to overcome this possible drawback, the number of questionnaires conducted in each case study was tried to be maximised. Furthermore, in addition to the multiple-choice and Likert scale questions, which produced quantitative data, a couple of open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire. Even though they were not answered by all the participants, these open-ended questions helped to gain deeper insights from the participants and provided the qualitative data, which was useful in evaluating the statistical data.

Providing pre-given categories of heritage values constituted another limitation for this study. As was widely discussed in the literature and acknowledged by now, "values are dynamic processes and not static qualities",⁶⁴⁹ therefore they are fluid and in constant creation. Furthermore, "they are ascribed not only to the object or site but also to the relationship that is created between people and heritage".⁶⁵⁰ Therefore, values attached to cultural heritage by individuals change according to their personal relationships with and attachments to cultural heritage assets in general and the specific monuments in question. Even though the selected methodological approach, i.e. providing pre-defined categories of heritage values in the questionnaire, makes comparisons between different case-studies more possible and convenient, unavoidably it also limits our understanding of the values participants associate with heritage assets.⁶⁵¹

⁶⁴⁸ Louise Stig Sørensen and John Carman, *Heritage Studies: Methods and Approaches*, (London: Routledge, 2009), 7. On this point, Sørensen and Carman are referring to Merriman and his influential work "*Beyond The Glass Case: The Past, the Heritage and the Public in Britain*". See Nick Merriman, *Beyond the Glass Case: The Past, the Heritage, and the Public in Britain*, (Leicester & New York (NY): Leicester University Press, 1991).

⁶⁴⁹ Fouseki and Sakka, 2013: 31.

⁶⁵⁰ Fouseki and Sakka, 2013: 32 quoting Russell 2010: 29-30.

⁶⁵¹ To overcome this limitation and to gain a deeper understanding of the values the participants associate with the cultural heritage in general and the Ottoman/Byzantine heritage assets in the selected towns, a preliminary investigation can be conducted. Through using semi structured interviews and open-ended questions, meanings certain

Another limitation of the study that affected the representativeness of the results was its sampling methodology and sample size. In quantitative research, probability sampling and large-scale samples are used since they are considered more “representative and produce statistically generalisable research results”.⁶⁵² However, considering the limitations in time, knowledge of the selected towns’ demographics, and financial resources, the most suitable sampling method was convenience sampling. Certainly, due to this factor, the results of the public opinion surveys conducted in Trikala and Serres may not represent the opinions of the whole Greek population, which applies to the results of the case studies in Turkey. On the other hand, due to the high number of participants in these surveys and their heterogeneity in terms of demographics, the results are believed to be representative of the local inhabitants of these towns.

Two common weaknesses associated with public opinion surveys are the possibility of response biases and reflexivity.⁶⁵³ As was noted by Krumpal (2013), the respondents of surveys have a general tendency to “distort their answers towards the social norm in order to maintain a socially favourable self-presentation”, which is called ‘social desirability bias’.⁶⁵⁴ Accordingly, considering that the questions in this survey are related to self-identities, national identities and ‘the Other’, the respondents might have resulted more positively than they might

types of monuments have for the participants personally, for their community and for their nation can be evaluated. These answers, then, can be transformed into categories to be used in Likert-scale questions in the quantitative questionnaires. For research which successfully employ this methodology, see Fouseki and Sakka 2013; Dragouni and Fouseki 2018; Stelios Lekakis and Mina Dragouni, “Heritage in the making: Rural heritage and its mnemeiosis at Naxos Island, Greece”, *Journal of Rural Studies*, 77, 2020:84-92].

⁶⁵² Anneke Meyer, “Investigating Cultural Consumers”, In Michael Pickering, (ed.), *Research Methods for Cultural Studies*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 78.

⁶⁵³ Yin 2003, 86; Gray 2003, 71.

⁶⁵⁴ Ivar Krumpal, “Determinants of social desirability bias in sensitive surveys: a literature review”, *Quality & Quantity*, volume 47 (2013), 2028.

actually think. In addition, they might have considered themselves as 'representatives of their nation', and hence, give more positive answers. This last point was especially evident while conducting the questionnaires with a respondent in İznik (Turkey). At some point, this participant realized that the questions focused only on the Byzantine monuments, and he asked why. When he was explained that a similar study was conducted in Greece regarding the Ottoman monuments in Greece, he replied, "Then, it all changes! You should have told me that before!". To avoid such cases, the respondents were not informed of the comparative nature of the research beforehand. In addition, to avoid any possible negative bias and to decrease the refusal rate, the possible respondents were approached by telling that this research was on the historical monuments and cultural heritage of their towns. On the other hand, as Plummer (2001) argued, such biases are common elements of ethnographic methods, and it is impossible to avoid them completely.⁶⁵⁵

This research uses multiple-case studies, which were determined according to the criteria stated in Chapter 1.3.2. On the other hand, as exploratory research, the primary goal is not to test a hypothesis in different settings and make direct comparisons between the results but to investigate the proposed research questions in different contexts. Each case study selected for this research shares certain similarities and unique characteristics. Therefore, even though comparisons are tried to be made between the case studies, the results should not be evaluated in comparison to each other but specific to each case.

It is argued that in studies with multiple-case studies, the validity of the research is higher if a single investigator conducts it.⁶⁵⁶ However, due to the lack of fluency of the researcher in Modern Greek and to

⁶⁵⁵ Ken Plummer, *Documents of Life 2*, second ed., (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2001) quoted in Gray 2003, 71-2.

⁶⁵⁶ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: MIT Press, 2005), 71 [hereafter cited in text as George and Bennett 2005].

avoid any possible biases on the respondents' side (see Chapter 1.3.2.), the questionnaires in Trikala and Serres were conducted with the assistance of two native speakers. In these cases, the researcher was always present to monitor the process and take corrective actions if needed.⁶⁵⁷

7.4. Future Research Directions

This research can be enriched by including further data collection methods and different sampling strategies.

Interviews and participant observation can be employed as data collection strategies in analysing people's perceptions. These methods might include both probability sampling, i.e., using focus groups, and non-probability sampling, i.e., using online interviews and questionnaires for increasing the number of participants. Furthermore, a textual analysis focusing on users' social media posts and comments on online news articles might be helpful.

The Critical Discourse Analysis can be implemented on the textual data to investigate the state's perceptions. This data can be collected from official cultural policy documents, speeches of government officials and the representation of 'the Other's' monuments on the actual sites as well as official websites of related bodies, i.e. ministries and municipalities.

In order to have a sample that truly represents the population, may it be the inhabitants of a city, region or the whole nation, professional assistance can be acquired. An excellent recent example is the SARAT Project's research on public attitudes towards archaeology and archaeological assets in Turkey.⁶⁵⁸ In this research, the interviews were conducted by a professional research and consultancy company which is specialized in public opinion polls. On the other hand, even though

⁶⁵⁷ George and Bennett 2005, 71.

⁶⁵⁸ Gürsu, Pulhan and Vandeput 2020.

the results would be accurately generalizable, it would also be very costly for an individual researcher. Therefore, this methodology is considered suitable only for projects with extensive funds or national authorities.

Another possible future contribution would be to conduct similar research by including more case studies from Greece and Turkey. In addition, research that investigates the perceptions towards 'the national heritage' would provide an excellent point of comparison for the result of this study. Last but not least, as the current literature is insufficient in terms of studies conducted on public perceptions of 'the Other's' heritage, similar research can be adopted to different contexts, such as India and Pakistan.

7.5. Concluding remarks

This study tried to shed light on various understandings of heritage by the people, which is almost always shaped and affected by politics and political ideologies. It is hoped that it can make even the slightest impact in removing these barriers and boundaries set by nationalisms, contribute to fostering respect towards difference, and increase understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of culture by all – especially for those living in Greece and Turkey.

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Appendices

Appendix A – Public Opinion Survey

Thank you very much for participating in this survey.

This questionnaire aims to understand ‘Name of the Case Study’ inhabitants’ relationships with cultural heritage and historical monuments in their towns. It is conducted as a part of a PhD thesis in ‘Analysis and Management of Cultural Heritage’ programme in ‘IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca’, Italy.

All responses to the questionnaire will be kept anonymous and the personal data of the participants will be strictly disclosed.

Part I – Demographics

- 1- Are you living in ‘Name of the Case Study’? ☐Yes ☐No
- 2- For how many years have you been living in ‘Name of the Case Study’?
.....
- 3- What is your gender: ☐ Male ☐ Female
- 4- How old are you?
- 5- What is your educational level/highest level of education you have reached?⁶⁵⁹
☐No formal education ☐Dimotiko (1st – 6th Grade) / İlkokul
☐Gymnasio (7th – 8th – 9th Grade) /Ortaokul ☐High School
☐University ☐Master’s Degree or Higher

⁶⁵⁹ The categories provided were different between Greece and Turkey, taking in consideration the differences in public education systems. In Greece, the categories were ‘No formal education’, ‘Dimotiko (1st – 6th Grade)’, ‘Gymnasio (7th – 8th – 9th Grade)’, ‘High School’, ‘University’ and ‘Master’s Degree or Higher’. In Turkey, the categories were ‘No formal education’, ‘İlkokul mezunu’ (1st – 5th Grade), ‘İlköğretim/Ortaokul mezunu (1st – 8th Grade / 6th – 8th Grade)’, ‘High School’, ‘University’ and ‘Master’s Degree of Higher’.

6- What is your occupation?⁶⁶⁰

- ☐ Unemployed ☐ Self-Employed ☐ Civil Servant
☐ Private Sector Employee ☐ Student ☐ Retired

Part 2 – Public Interest and Attitude Towards Cultural Heritage

7- What does the term ‘cultural heritage’ mean to you?

.....

8- From 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), what is your opinion on the sentences below?

Cultural heritage (archaeological sites, monuments, museums, folklore etc.) is valuable
...

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a- To me.	1	2	3	4	5
b- To the local people.	1	2	3	4	5
c- To States.	1	2	3	4	5
e- To tourists.	1	2	3	4	5
g- To the humanity.	1	2	3	4	5

Cultural heritage (archaeological sites, monuments, museums, folklore etc.) has ...

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a- Aesthetic value	1	2	3	4	5
b- Historical value	1	2	3	4	5
c- Scientific - Educational value	1	2	3	4	5

⁶⁶⁰ For the public opinion surveys conducted in Turkey, an additional category, ‘Housewife’ was added.

e- Economic – Touristic value.	1	2	3	4	5
g- Political value	1	2	3	4	5

9- In your opinion, who owns cultural heritage assets / to whom they belong to?

.....

10- Who do you think are responsible for the protection of cultural assets?

.....

11- How often do you visit archaeological sites, monuments or museums?

☐ Weekly ☐ Monthly ☐ Several times a year

☐ Once a year ☐ Less than once a year ☐ Never

12- From 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely well) how knowledgeable do you think you are about cultural heritage in general?

☐ Not at all ☐ Very Little ☐ Somewhat

☐ Fairly Well ☐ Extremely Well

Part 3 - 'Name of the Case Study's Cultural Heritage Assets

13- In your opinion, what is the most important monument/landmark of 'Name of the Case Study'?

.....

a. Why?.....

14- From 1 (Very Poor) to 5 (Very Well) how well are the historical/cultural monuments in 'Name of the Case Study' preserved?

☐ Very Poor ☐ Poor ☐ Fair ☐ Well ☐ Very Well

15- Have you ever visited the 'Selected monument 1/2/3/4'? ⁶⁶¹ ☐ Yes ☐ No

a. *If yes*, how many times have you visited it?

⁶⁶¹ This question was asked separately for each of the monument selected as the research case study. For the selected case studies see Chapter 1.3.2., Table 1.

-
- b. What was the reason for your last visit?
-

If Not Visited:

- Do you know what these monuments are being used for today? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- Did you know that the entrance to these monuments is free? ☐ Yes ☐ No

- 16- From 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely well) how knowledgeable do you think you are about these monuments?

☐ Not at all ☐ Very Little ☐ Somewhat

☐ Fairly Well ☐ Extremely Well

- 17- Would you like to learn more about these monuments?

☐ Yes ☐ No

- 18- From 1 (Very Poor) to 5 (Very Well) how well are the **Ottoman/Byzantine monuments** in '**Name of the Case Study**' preserved?

☐ Very Poor ☐ Poor ☐ Fair ☐ Well ☐ Very Well

- 19- Do you think these monuments are valuable for '**Name of the Case Study**' and its citizens? ☐ Yes ☐ No

- 20- From 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), what do you think of the sentences below?

I think that the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments of '*Name of the Case Study*' add value to '*Name of the Case Study*'.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a- Aesthetic value	1	2	3	4	5
b- Historical value	1	2	3	4	5
c- Scientific - Educational value	1	2	3	4	5
e- Economic – Touristic value.	1	2	3	4	5
g- Political value	1	2	3	4	5

- 21- From 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree), what is your opinion on the sentences below, regarding **Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study'**?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	1	2	3	4	5
I have a personal responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	1	2	3	4	5
Archaeological works (excavations/restorations) should be conducted on these monuments. ⁶⁶²	1	2	3	4	5
These monuments should be utilized with new contemporary uses. ⁶⁶³	1	2	3	4	5
These monuments are part of ' Name of the Case Study's ' history and culture.	1	2	3	4	5
These monuments are part of my own	1	2	3	4	5

⁶⁶² This question was included in the questionnaires conducted in Trabzon and İznik (Turkey).

⁶⁶³ This question was included in the questionnaires conducted in Serres (Greece) and Trabzon and İznik (Turkey).

history and culture.					
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22- Who do you think should be responsible for the protection of the
Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study'?

.....

23- In your opinion, how do your fellow Trikala citizens feel about the
Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Name of the Case Study'?

.....

24- From 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree), what is your opinion on the
sentences below, regarding **Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in Greece/Turkey?**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
These monuments should be protected for the future generations.	1	2	3	4	5
I have a personal responsibility in the protection of these monuments.	1	2	3	4	5
Archaeological works (excavations/restora tions) should be conducted on these monuments. ⁶⁶⁴	1	2	3	4	5
These monuments should be utilized with new	1	2	3	4	5

⁶⁶⁴ This question was included in the questionnaires conducted in Trabzon and İznik (Turkey).

contemporary uses. ⁶⁶⁵					
These monuments are part of 'Greece/Turkey's' history and culture.	1	2	3	4	5
These monuments are part of my own history and culture.	1	2	3	4	5

25- Who do you think should be responsible for the protection of the
Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Greece/Turkey'?

.....

26- Do you have any other comments on **Ottoman/Byzantine monuments** of 'Name of
the Case Study' or '**Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in 'Greece/Turkey'**'?

.....

⁶⁶⁵ This question was included in the questionnaires conducted in Serres (Greece) and Trabzon and İznik (Turkey).

Appendix B - Tables

Table 1: “What does the term cultural heritage mean to you?”

Category Name	Description	Statements included
Tangible	Statements that highlighted the material elements	• Archaeological sites, monuments, buildings, pieces of art • Everything that was built by past civilizations • Cultural assets left to us by the generations that lived before us
Intangible	Statements that highlighted the immaterial elements	• Language, music, literature, customs, • Cultural values that we have inherited from past generations • Customs and folklore of our ancestors
Natural	Statements that highlighted the natural elements	• Lakes, springs, mountains • Natural beauties that survived until today
History / Past	Statements that referred to history and past civilizations	• Things that help us to learn about and understand the past / past civilizations • The history of our place / country • The totality of the tangible and intangible elements left by all the past civilizations existed before us
National / Place Identity	Statements that associated heritage with national/local identity	• The particular characteristics that differentiate a society from other cultures • Our national values • Monuments that belong to our tradition • The history of our country • Anything that is related with the culture of an area
Inheritance / Stewardship	Statements that referred to cultural heritage	• Preserving our values and transmitting them to next generations • Whatever we have and that we offer to the forthcoming generations

	as a link between generations and stressed the responsibility of present generations in protecting them for the future	• Every single value that connects the past to the future
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Table 2: “In your opinion, who owns cultural heritage assets / to whom they belong to?”

Category Name	Description	Statements included
Citizens / Locals	Statements that stress citizens' / locals' ownership	• The local people • The citizens of the country they are located in • Whoever is living around the monuments
States / Countries	Statements that stress states' / countries' ownership	• The country where they are located in • The relevant ministry (e.g. Ministry of Culture)
Everyone	Statements that stress universal ownership	• All humanity • All of us

Table 3: “Who do you think are responsible for the protection of cultural assets?”⁶⁶⁶

Category Name	Description	Statements included
Everyone	Statements that stress peoples' responsibility	• The local people • Everyone living around the monuments • All of us • Visitors / Tourists
National / Regional Authorities	Statements that stress officials' responsibility	• The municipality • The ministry of culture • Local ephorates
International Organizations	Statements that stress international organization's responsibility	• UNESCO • ICOMOS • European Union

⁶⁶⁶ The same categories also apply to the questions “Who do you think should be responsible for the protection of the Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in ‘Name of the Case Study’?” and “Who do you think should be responsible for the protection of the ‘Ottoman/Byzantine monuments in ‘Greece/Turkey’?”.