CLPDI-based Fast Secure Code Estimation and Replay Attacks on GNSS Signals

In an era where satellite communications underpin global interconnectivity, protecting used channels against cyber threats is imperative. This paper introduces a new strategy to expedite spoofing attacks on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) by leveraging the novel utilization of the Chip Level Post Detection Integration (CLPDI) technique. This research explores the mechanics of CLPDI, discovering a previously underexplored vulnerability that could dramatically shorten the timeline for executing successful GNSS spoofing attacks. Our contribution extends beyond the technical exposition of vulnerabilities; it encompasses the development of robust countermeasures designed to fortify GNSS against the evolving landscape of threats. Through theoretical analysis and practical simulations, we analyzed the mean acquisition time (TMA) and the probability of detection (Pd) as metrics to evaluate the proposed method's robustness. Experiments demonstrate the goodness of using CLPDI to speed up Security Code Estimation and Replay (SCER) attacks on GNSS signals in a multipath fading channel. Using CLPDI, we can improve the TMA to acquire the spreading code by 21.28%, providing a significant advantage to the attacker. This work aims to inspire the security community to explore new defensive strategies and the adoption of our proposed measures to protect the future of satellite communications.