The basic thesis of the paper assumes that the automation of judicial enforcement changes the axiological conditions of the decision-making process in law enforcement. Such an assumption was based on at least three findings. First, the decision-making process in judicial enforcement is characterised by a greater degree of automation. This results in the limitation of the argumentative nature of decisions taken by the enforcement authority (unlike in the adjudicative proceedings). In the current model of judicial enforcement, the overriding goal turns out to be the implementation of praxeological values (promptness, efficiency, economy). Automation increases the efficiency of action thus understood but does not in every case lead to achieving substantive effectiveness (e.g. the algorithm will not show at a given moment that the debtor owns a property or the established assets are not subject to enforcement). In the paper, I draw attention to the need to maintain a proper balance between praxeological values and the purpose of judicial enforcement in the process of lawmaking and applying enforcement law. Such a direction is confirmed by European guidelines on the enforcement of court judgments. Secondly, automation changes the previous understanding of the axiological foundations of judicial enforcement. This concerns, among other things, different perceptions and interpretations of values. For example, justice increasingly pertains to its procedural aspect (conducting the proceedings according to principles, regardless of the outcome) rather than receiving due reward (enforcement justice). Book of Abstracts 1120 Thirdly, the use of modern information technology in enforcement proceedings leads to a re-evaluation of the scope of discretion exercised by the authorities responsible for applying the law. Currently, the automation of enforcement means that certain enforcement activities are generated and carried out by appropriate algorithms (e-seizure of bank accounts, e-seizure of tax overpayments and refunds, e-auction of movable property, eauction of immovable property), but their form does not rule out the discretion of the enforcement officer. E-enforcement, in the sense described, does not replace the authority’s decision-making, e.g. regarding the onerousness or sufficiency of the enforcement method applied. Furthermore, the various enforcement models in operation in Europe (application-based, cooperation between the creditor and the enforcement officer, and the model of enforcement by an autonomous authority) inherently influence the scope of the enforcement officer’s discretion. In the paper, I focus on the concept of automation and reconstructing its meaning in judicial enforcement. I analyse the impact of automation as a "technological process" in enforcement on the creditor’s rights and debtors’ obligations from the perspective of the axiology of law. Finally, I try to answer whether the current model of judicial enforcement using the automation of activities changes the axiological basis of decision-making and to what extent. In the conclusions, I put forward the postulate that progressive automation should not violate the decision-making space of the enforcement authority. In this sense, it is the enforcement authority that is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the law secured by axiology. Hence, there is a clear need for a definite boundary between the automation of enforcement activities and the sphere of decision-making handed over to algorithms.

From tool to agent: rethinking legal liability in the age of agentic AI / Salerno, T., Russo, S.. - 1/2026:1(2026), pp. 1117-1117. (IVR 32nd WORLD CONGRESS of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy Law in the Face of the Changing Problems of the World Istanbul, Turkiye 28/06-03/07/2026).

From tool to agent: rethinking legal liability in the age of agentic AI

Salerno Tina;
2026

Abstract

The basic thesis of the paper assumes that the automation of judicial enforcement changes the axiological conditions of the decision-making process in law enforcement. Such an assumption was based on at least three findings. First, the decision-making process in judicial enforcement is characterised by a greater degree of automation. This results in the limitation of the argumentative nature of decisions taken by the enforcement authority (unlike in the adjudicative proceedings). In the current model of judicial enforcement, the overriding goal turns out to be the implementation of praxeological values (promptness, efficiency, economy). Automation increases the efficiency of action thus understood but does not in every case lead to achieving substantive effectiveness (e.g. the algorithm will not show at a given moment that the debtor owns a property or the established assets are not subject to enforcement). In the paper, I draw attention to the need to maintain a proper balance between praxeological values and the purpose of judicial enforcement in the process of lawmaking and applying enforcement law. Such a direction is confirmed by European guidelines on the enforcement of court judgments. Secondly, automation changes the previous understanding of the axiological foundations of judicial enforcement. This concerns, among other things, different perceptions and interpretations of values. For example, justice increasingly pertains to its procedural aspect (conducting the proceedings according to principles, regardless of the outcome) rather than receiving due reward (enforcement justice). Book of Abstracts 1120 Thirdly, the use of modern information technology in enforcement proceedings leads to a re-evaluation of the scope of discretion exercised by the authorities responsible for applying the law. Currently, the automation of enforcement means that certain enforcement activities are generated and carried out by appropriate algorithms (e-seizure of bank accounts, e-seizure of tax overpayments and refunds, e-auction of movable property, eauction of immovable property), but their form does not rule out the discretion of the enforcement officer. E-enforcement, in the sense described, does not replace the authority’s decision-making, e.g. regarding the onerousness or sufficiency of the enforcement method applied. Furthermore, the various enforcement models in operation in Europe (application-based, cooperation between the creditor and the enforcement officer, and the model of enforcement by an autonomous authority) inherently influence the scope of the enforcement officer’s discretion. In the paper, I focus on the concept of automation and reconstructing its meaning in judicial enforcement. I analyse the impact of automation as a "technological process" in enforcement on the creditor’s rights and debtors’ obligations from the perspective of the axiology of law. Finally, I try to answer whether the current model of judicial enforcement using the automation of activities changes the axiological basis of decision-making and to what extent. In the conclusions, I put forward the postulate that progressive automation should not violate the decision-making space of the enforcement authority. In this sense, it is the enforcement authority that is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the law secured by axiology. Hence, there is a clear need for a definite boundary between the automation of enforcement activities and the sphere of decision-making handed over to algorithms.
2026
978-975-7748-83-0
Cybersecurity, Cyberdeception, Privacy, International new tech law
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11771/45378
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