How should we change our theories in response to new information? What happens when such new information contradicts our old beliefs? Should this change always lead our theories closer to the truth? These and similar questions relate to central problems in the philosophy of science, such as explanation, confirmation, the role of falsification in theoretical change, and approximation to the truth. Similar issues have also been independently addressed from the point of view of Artificial Intelligence and computer science, but hardly any attempt has been made to link these technical improvements to their epistemological applications. The present thesis concerns the application of the theory of belief change and nonmonotonic inference to scientific reasoning and method, and so intends to be a step forward in this promising area of research.
Belief Change, Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Scientific Method
CEVOLANI G
2006-01-01
Abstract
How should we change our theories in response to new information? What happens when such new information contradicts our old beliefs? Should this change always lead our theories closer to the truth? These and similar questions relate to central problems in the philosophy of science, such as explanation, confirmation, the role of falsification in theoretical change, and approximation to the truth. Similar issues have also been independently addressed from the point of view of Artificial Intelligence and computer science, but hardly any attempt has been made to link these technical improvements to their epistemological applications. The present thesis concerns the application of the theory of belief change and nonmonotonic inference to scientific reasoning and method, and so intends to be a step forward in this promising area of research.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
