Assortativity in cognition

In pairwise interactions, where two individuals meet and play a social game with each other, assortativity in cognition means that pairs where both decision-makers use the same cognitive process are more likely to occur than what happens under random matching. In this paper, we show theoretically that assortativity in cognition may arise as a consequence of assortativity in other dimensions. Moreover, we analyze an applied model where we investigate the effects of assortativity in cognition on the emergence of cooperation and on the degree of prosociality of intuition and deliberation, which are the typical cognitive processes postulated by the dual process theory in psychology. In particular, with assortativity in cognition, deliberation is able to shape the intuitive heuristic toward cooperation, increasing the degree of prosociality of intuition, and ultimately promoting the overall cooperation. Our findings rely on agent-based simulations, but analytical results are also obtained in a special case. We conclude with examples involving different payoff matrices of the underlying social games, showing that assortativity in cognition can have non-trivial implications in terms of its societal desirability.