Structures are ubiquitous in mathematics. But how should they be understood? Modelists claim they are model-theoretic structures. This thesis can be read in two ways: as a claim about what structures refer to, or about how we conceptualize them. Objects-modelism, developed by Button and Walsh, pursues the first; the second leads to concepts-modelism, which remains underexplored. In this paper we develop and defend a version of concepts-modelism, cognitive modelism, drawing on Carey’s theory of conceptual development, and we show how it addresses the challenges Button and Walsh pose for a conceptual account of mathematical structures.
Cognitive modelism / De Benedetto, Matteo; Rossi, Lorenzo. - In: PHILOSOPHIA MATHEMATICA. - ISSN 0031-8019. - (2026). [10.1093/philmat/nkaf027]
Cognitive modelism
De Benedetto Matteo;
2026
Abstract
Structures are ubiquitous in mathematics. But how should they be understood? Modelists claim they are model-theoretic structures. This thesis can be read in two ways: as a claim about what structures refer to, or about how we conceptualize them. Objects-modelism, developed by Button and Walsh, pursues the first; the second leads to concepts-modelism, which remains underexplored. In this paper we develop and defend a version of concepts-modelism, cognitive modelism, drawing on Carey’s theory of conceptual development, and we show how it addresses the challenges Button and Walsh pose for a conceptual account of mathematical structures.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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