In the recent years, a vast number of economic studiesfocused on the art market and on its development,as well as on the artists as agents of a labourmarket with features that are particular of art market.However, really few studies analyzed the functioningof the art market as a whole with a theoreticalapproach, often considering the artist as nothingmore than a simple producer of artworks. Thisdissertation aims to enrich the economics literaturewith the above-mentioned missing parts.In Chapter 2 we build a model for studying the priceformation in the private art market in a context ofcomplete information and full rationality, using agame theory approach. In this first part, the keyvariables in this market are the market powers ofthe agents in the market, that define what is thechannel through which a certain artwork reachesthe public market. Chapter 3 firstly better defineswhat are the economic and cultural values and howtheir formation works for artworks, and then it introducesin the just-created framework the effectsof information asymmetry among the agents operatingin the market, and behavioural aspects in thechoices of some of them: besides market powers,also information has a key role in the art market,and it mainly depends on artists’ characteristics, asfame and talent. Chapter 4 empirically investigatesthese artists’ characteristics, creating a new measurefor them, through the use of hedonic regression andquantile hedonic regression, finding that this measurepresents a bimodal distribution in all the specificationswe implemented, coherently with the superstartheory in the art market, and that there existvarious effects than influence the ranking createdusing our measure.Chapter 2Chapter 2 analyses the pricing of artworks just createdby an artist and sold for the first time in theart market, investigating the price-formation mechanismat work in the private art market. In particular,a game theory approach is used to consider thepossible channels (paths) that a new artwork cantake to reach a collector or an auction house, assumingprice-maximizing agents with full informationon market powers and reserve prices. The study isaimed to identify the relationships between the artworkprices and the market power of agents operatingin each channel of the market. What we findis that the market power of each of the agents is keyto identify the market channel that will be preferredby the artist and, then, her incentive in creating anew artwork. At the same time, the importance ofart market intermediaries as the galleries in the formation of art prices is attested and their incentivesto enter and remain in the market are confirmed.Chapter 3Chapter 3 aims to explore the role of cultural andeconomic value, and of the information on privateart market price formation; in this Chapter, we developa bargaining game model in which we explicitlyconsider the effects of these issues. Furthermore,we introduce artists’ fame and talent as determinantsof an artwork’s cultural and economicvalue. Assuming artists, galleries, and collectorshave different levels of information on the quality ofthe artworks and on the characteristics of the artists,we study the behaviour of these agents and the potentialemergence of disappointment for the sophisticatedcollectors and undertreatment for the unsophisticatedones. Artworks will be treated as credencegoods, experience goods, or search goods, dependingon the level of information each agent hasat his disposal; this influences the way the price isformed and how the surplus of the trade is sharedamong the agents in certain particular trade channels.Chapter 4In Chapter 4, we aim to empirically analyze thosecharacteristics of the artists that influence cultural and economic values, in order to understand howthe art market considers them in the formation ofprices. To do so, using a unique hand-collected datasetfrom the Artist Re-sale Rights (ARR) archives ofthe Societ`a Italiana degli Autori ed Editori (SIAE),we build a novel index of artists’ talent and fame inthe Italian art market. The distribution of this measureand the ranking of the artists’ index is analyzedin several model specifications, and the dynamicsof the index is also qualitatively studied. Despite ofthe existence of a price effect, a time effect, and anart genre effect, coherently with the superstars theory,the bimodality of the distribution is confirmedin all our empirical findings.
Essays on Economics of the Arts / Angelini, F.. - (2017). [10.13118/angelini-francesco_phd2017]
Essays on Economics of the Arts
Angelini, Francesco
2017
Abstract
In the recent years, a vast number of economic studiesfocused on the art market and on its development,as well as on the artists as agents of a labourmarket with features that are particular of art market.However, really few studies analyzed the functioningof the art market as a whole with a theoreticalapproach, often considering the artist as nothingmore than a simple producer of artworks. Thisdissertation aims to enrich the economics literaturewith the above-mentioned missing parts.In Chapter 2 we build a model for studying the priceformation in the private art market in a context ofcomplete information and full rationality, using agame theory approach. In this first part, the keyvariables in this market are the market powers ofthe agents in the market, that define what is thechannel through which a certain artwork reachesthe public market. Chapter 3 firstly better defineswhat are the economic and cultural values and howtheir formation works for artworks, and then it introducesin the just-created framework the effectsof information asymmetry among the agents operatingin the market, and behavioural aspects in thechoices of some of them: besides market powers,also information has a key role in the art market,and it mainly depends on artists’ characteristics, asfame and talent. Chapter 4 empirically investigatesthese artists’ characteristics, creating a new measurefor them, through the use of hedonic regression andquantile hedonic regression, finding that this measurepresents a bimodal distribution in all the specificationswe implemented, coherently with the superstartheory in the art market, and that there existvarious effects than influence the ranking createdusing our measure.Chapter 2Chapter 2 analyses the pricing of artworks just createdby an artist and sold for the first time in theart market, investigating the price-formation mechanismat work in the private art market. In particular,a game theory approach is used to consider thepossible channels (paths) that a new artwork cantake to reach a collector or an auction house, assumingprice-maximizing agents with full informationon market powers and reserve prices. The study isaimed to identify the relationships between the artworkprices and the market power of agents operatingin each channel of the market. What we findis that the market power of each of the agents is keyto identify the market channel that will be preferredby the artist and, then, her incentive in creating anew artwork. At the same time, the importance ofart market intermediaries as the galleries in the formation of art prices is attested and their incentivesto enter and remain in the market are confirmed.Chapter 3Chapter 3 aims to explore the role of cultural andeconomic value, and of the information on privateart market price formation; in this Chapter, we developa bargaining game model in which we explicitlyconsider the effects of these issues. Furthermore,we introduce artists’ fame and talent as determinantsof an artwork’s cultural and economicvalue. Assuming artists, galleries, and collectorshave different levels of information on the quality ofthe artworks and on the characteristics of the artists,we study the behaviour of these agents and the potentialemergence of disappointment for the sophisticatedcollectors and undertreatment for the unsophisticatedones. Artworks will be treated as credencegoods, experience goods, or search goods, dependingon the level of information each agent hasat his disposal; this influences the way the price isformed and how the surplus of the trade is sharedamong the agents in certain particular trade channels.Chapter 4In Chapter 4, we aim to empirically analyze thosecharacteristics of the artists that influence cultural and economic values, in order to understand howthe art market considers them in the formation ofprices. To do so, using a unique hand-collected datasetfrom the Artist Re-sale Rights (ARR) archives ofthe Societ`a Italiana degli Autori ed Editori (SIAE),we build a novel index of artists’ talent and fame inthe Italian art market. The distribution of this measureand the ranking of the artists’ index is analyzedin several model specifications, and the dynamicsof the index is also qualitatively studied. Despite ofthe existence of a price effect, a time effect, and anart genre effect, coherently with the superstars theory,the bimodality of the distribution is confirmedin all our empirical findings.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Angelini_phdthesis.pdf
Accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Tesi di dottorato
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione
1.37 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.37 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


