In a recent paper entitled "Truth does not explain predictive success" (Analysis, 2011), Carsten Held argues that the so-called "No-Miracles Argument" for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude), survives Held's criticism unscathed. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.
Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does
Cevolani G;
2013-01-01
Abstract
In a recent paper entitled "Truth does not explain predictive success" (Analysis, 2011), Carsten Held argues that the so-called "No-Miracles Argument" for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude), survives Held's criticism unscathed. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.File in questo prodotto:
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