We focus on stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems (SGNEPs) to establish probabilistic guarantees on the quality of the solution produced by a data-driven version of the extragradient (EG) algorithm for stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) seeking. Specifically, we consider a setting where the distribution of the random variable influencing the multi-agent process is unknown, and only a finite number of realizations is available for its characterization. While convergence to a SGNE should not be expected with finite data, we leverage a sample average-based approximation of the game mapping to derive distribution-free certificates bounding the distance between the true SGNE and the solution produced by the data-driven EG method. Consistently, the proposed bound shrinks as the number of samples grows to infinite.
Certifying ε-equilibria in stochastic games with limited data availability / Fabiani, F., Franci, B.. - In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CONTROL. - ISSN 1435-5671. - (2026). [10.1016/j.ejcon.2026.101558]
Certifying ε-equilibria in stochastic games with limited data availability
Fabiani Filippo
;
2026
Abstract
We focus on stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems (SGNEPs) to establish probabilistic guarantees on the quality of the solution produced by a data-driven version of the extragradient (EG) algorithm for stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) seeking. Specifically, we consider a setting where the distribution of the random variable influencing the multi-agent process is unknown, and only a finite number of realizations is available for its characterization. While convergence to a SGNE should not be expected with finite data, we leverage a sample average-based approximation of the game mapping to derive distribution-free certificates bounding the distance between the true SGNE and the solution produced by the data-driven EG method. Consistently, the proposed bound shrinks as the number of samples grows to infinite.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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Descrizione: Certifying ε-equilibria in stochastic games with limited data availability
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