Before the start of a negotiation, the negotiating parties may try to manipulate its outcome by making socially-wasteful investments, such as purchasing weapons or asking for legal opinions. We study the problem of a benevolent mediator who controls the bargaining protocol of the negotiation and wishes to minimize pre-negotiation wasteful investments. We derive the efficient bargaining protocol under different specifications of the information available to the mediator. Under some conditions the mediator will choose a protocol that benefits the strongest player. We therefore highlight a potential conflict between fairness and efficiency arising in negotiations.

Benevolent mediation in the shadow of conflict

Canidio Andrea;
2018-01-01

Abstract

Before the start of a negotiation, the negotiating parties may try to manipulate its outcome by making socially-wasteful investments, such as purchasing weapons or asking for legal opinions. We study the problem of a benevolent mediator who controls the bargaining protocol of the negotiation and wishes to minimize pre-negotiation wasteful investments. We derive the efficient bargaining protocol under different specifications of the information available to the mediator. Under some conditions the mediator will choose a protocol that benefits the strongest player. We therefore highlight a potential conflict between fairness and efficiency arising in negotiations.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Canidio-Esteban-Benevolent-Mediation.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Nessuna licenza
Dimensione 610.5 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
610.5 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11771/14211
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
social impact